

University of Montana

## ScholarWorks at University of Montana

---

Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, &  
Professional Papers

Graduate School

---

2008

### Causes and Consequences of Displacement Decision-making in Banhine National Park, Mozambique

Chad Edward Dear  
*The University of Montana*

Follow this and additional works at: <https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd>

**Let us know how access to this document benefits you.**

---

#### Recommended Citation

Dear, Chad Edward, "Causes and Consequences of Displacement Decision-making in Banhine National Park, Mozambique" (2008). *Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers*. 174.  
<https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/174>

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact [scholarworks@mso.umt.edu](mailto:scholarworks@mso.umt.edu).

# **CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF DISPLACEMENT DECISION- MAKING IN BANHINE NATIONAL PARK, MOZAMBIQUE**

By

Chad E. Dear

M.Sc. Geography, Western Washington University, Bellingham, WA, 2001

B.A. Interdisciplinary Studies: Communications, Legal Institutions, Economics, and  
Government, American University, Washington, DC, 1997

Dissertation  
presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy in Forestry

The University of Montana, Missoula, MT

Spring 2008

Approved by:

Dr. David A. Strobel, Dean  
Graduate School

Dr. Stephen F. McCool, Chair  
Department of Society and Conservation

Dr. Jill M. Belsky  
Department of Society and Conservation

Dr. Wayne A. Freimund  
Department of Society and Conservation

Dr. Jeffrey A. Gritzner  
Department of Geography

Dr. Charles M. Breen  
Centre for Environment, Agriculture and Development  
University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa

Dr. Alan E. Watson  
Aldo Leopold Wilderness Research Institute

© COPYRIGHT

by

Chad E. Dear

2008

All Rights Reserved

Dear, Chad E. Ph.D. May 2008

Forestry

**Causes and Consequences of Displacement Decision-making in Banhine National Park, Mozambique**

Committee Chair: Dr. Stephen F. McCool

Decision-making is looming regarding the displacement of people resident in and reliant on resources in strict protected areas around the world. This research investigated the causes and consequences of displacement decision-making in Banhine National Park (BNP), Mozambique. I investigated causes using political-economic, actor-centered, and post-structural perspectives on power. I investigated consequences using the Impoverishment Risk and Reconstruction (IRR) framework. Methods included interviews, focus groups, and observations involving BNP-area residents; park staff; district, provincial, and national-level government employees from various sectors; NGO and World Bank staff; and private consultants. I also analyzed numerous government and donor policies, plans, reports, and legal contracts.

A major finding is that district-level government officials promoted the displacement of BNP-area residents and their resettlement into villages outside the park. These actions were inconsistent with legal agreements between the Mozambican government and the World Bank regarding the World Bank's safeguard policy on involuntary resettlement.

Factors influencing displacement decision-making included: insufficient coordination; pressure to reduce poverty; a dominant idea that dispersed rural populations should be concentrated; diverging perceptions of the voluntariness of government resettlement efforts; rapid decentralization of decision-making to the district level; and a dominant idea that wildlife would be introduced to BNP, that human-wildlife conflicts were inevitable, and that residents would, therefore, have to move out of the park. In response to these factors, district employees promoted displacement that exposed BNP-area residents to a system of impoverishment risks and for which mitigation was insufficient.

Connections between the causes and consequences of displacement decision-making are complex, but are necessary to understand to minimize displacement or to successfully resettle displaced people. Debates regarding inhabited versus uninhabited protected area approaches that do not account for broader and more powerful political factors (such as poverty reduction, decentralization, and villagization agendas) may be of little significance to real decisions regarding displacement. Protected area management agencies and conservation NGOs unaware of or unwilling to address such political factors will likely be held negligent in the poverty caused by displacement decisions.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, thank you to all of the people who participated in the research contributing to this dissertation. Hundreds of people, including Mozambican government officials; NGO and World Bank employees; Mozambican, South African, and U.S. academics; private consultants, and fellow researchers all took time to be interviewed or otherwise help me understand the complex and sensitive issues presented herein. I want to particularly thank the people resident in and around Banhine National Park who, in the midst of personal trauma and great uncertainty, took time to teach me about their lives and livelihoods.

A very sincere thank you to my advisor, Stephen McCool, for his challenging questions, pointed critiques, good nature, and unwavering support through the many ups and downs of my Ph.D. program. Thank you as well to the rest of my committee. Thank you to Wayne Freimund for his confidence in me, his calm reassurances, and his amazing ability to garner the financial resources necessary to support this research. Thank you to Jill Belsky for her many substantive contributions to this research and to my intellectual development. Thank you to Charles Breen for his critical and always challenging questions. Thank you also to Alan Watson and Jeffrey Gritzner for their questions, comments and support. And, although not a formal committee member, thank you to Mike Patterson for his genuine concern for my research, my personal development, and my psychological health. Thank you as well to the administration of The University of Montana's College of Forestry and Conservation, especially Dean Perry Brown and Associate Dean Jim Burchfield.

Thank you to the U.S. and Southern Africa students, faculty, managers, and other partners who were part of the Treehouse Program. I gained great benefits from our long-term collaboration. Thank you to USFS International Programs for consistently supporting Treehouse. Thank you to Boaventura Cuamba and Eduardo Mondlane University, and to Simon Munthali and the African Wildlife Foundation for their logistical and other support. Thank you to Conrad Steenkamp for his early encouragement to focus on Banhine National Park. And a special thank you to Celso Inguane whose professional translation and research assistance were invaluable.

Thank you to friends and family who supported me in various ways throughout my Ph.D. program. Thank you especially to Paul Lachapelle for being a friend, role model, and recreation partner. Thank you to Rebecca Witter and Theo for helping me through my fieldwork. Thank you to Adam Switalski for providing invaluable recreational distractions. Thank you to my parents, Mary and Ed, for always encouraging me during my many years in graduate school. And finally, I owe tremendous gratitude to my colleague, friend, and life partner, Laurie Ashley.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract.....	iii
Acknowledgements.....	iv
List of Tables .....	x
List of Figures .....	x
List of Figures .....	x

### CHAPTER I

#### **Impending decisions regarding displacement from strict protected areas**

1.1 Introduction.....	1
1.2 Three approaches to displacement in protected areas.....	2
1.3 The importance of displacement decision-making .....	4
1.4 The importance of context .....	5
1.5 Research questions.....	7
1.6 Displacement decision-making in Banhine National Park .....	9
1.6.1 District displacement intentions and contextualized research questions .....	11

### CHAPTER II

#### **A framework for understanding the causes and consequences of displacement**

2.1 Overview.....	13
2.2 Protected area displacement in a broader context.....	14
2.3 Choosing and defining terminology .....	19
2.2.1 Choice of terms .....	19
2.2.2 Defining displacement.....	21
2.4 Interconnections of practice, problems, and theory .....	24
2.5 The Impoverishment Risk and Reconstruction Framework (IRR).....	27
2.6 World Bank Operational Policy 4.12 on Involuntary Resettlement .....	33
2.7 Critiques of IRR and DIDR safeguard policies .....	34
2.7.1 Operational critiques .....	35
2.7.2 Conceptual critiques: “Risk” .....	36
2.7.3 Why do people continue to be impoverished by displacement? .....	39
2.7.3.1 DIDR is inherently complex.....	40
2.7.3.2 IRR has a managerial orientation .....	42
2.7.3.3 IRR does not explicitly address political dynamics .....	44
2.8 Addressing the political dynamics of DIDR.....	46
2.8.1 Political Economy .....	48
2.8.2 Actor-Centered .....	51
2.8.3 Post-structural.....	53
2.9 A framework for understanding the causes and consequences of displacement .....	56

## CHAPTER III

### Methodology and the research process

3.1 Introduction.....	60
3.2 Methodological Framework.....	60
3.2.1 Interpretive and Critical Approaches to Science.....	60
3.2.2 Inquiry-guided research.....	63
3.2.3 Moving beyond the particularities of a case study .....	64
3.2.3.1 Case selection .....	67
3.2.4 Nested scales and chains of explanation .....	71
3.3 Operationalizing the methodological framework .....	72
3.3.1 Planning data collection .....	73
3.3.2 Data Collection.....	74
3.3.2.1 BNP-area methods.....	75
3.3.2.2 Non-BNP-area methods.....	83
3.3.3 Data Processing.....	88
3.3.4 Data Coding.....	91
3.3.4.1 Theory and coding.....	92
3.3.5 Analyzing relations among data, theory, and interpretations.....	93
3.3.6 Reflecting on my role as a researcher .....	95
3.3.6.1 Responding to changing circumstances.....	95
3.3.7 Selecting data for inclusion in text.....	96
3.3.8 Translation and research assistance.....	97
3.4 Chapter Summary .....	98

## CHAPTER IV

### Context

4.1 Introduction.....	99
4.2 History of inhabitation, displacement and resettlement in the area now known as BNP.....	100
4.2.1 19 <sup>th</sup> century and prior .....	101
4.2.2 Portuguese colonial influences.....	101
4.2.3 Establishment of <i>Coutada 17</i> and BNP.....	103
4.2.4 Post-independence, government villagization schemes .....	104
4.2.5 FRELIMO-RENAMO war-caused displacement and death.....	106
4.2.6 Post-war repatriation and reintegration .....	106
4.3 All land is not equal: Ecological functioning, inhabitation, and livelihoods.....	107
4.3.1 Ecological functioning .....	108
4.3.2 Inhabitation and Livelihoods.....	109
4.4 Social services in the district of Chigubo .....	121

4.5 Ambiguous local rights to inhabit, manage, and use protected areas .....	124
4.6 The Transfrontier Conservation Area Program .....	129
4.6.1 TFCA Program Phase One .....	131
4.6.2 TFCA Program Phase Two .....	134
4.6.2.1 Triggering the safeguard policy and choosing safeguard instruments .....	134
4.6.2.2 Integrated District Development Planning .....	136
4.6.2.3 Legal agreement .....	137
4.6.2.4 Involuntary resettlement decision-making structure .....	138
4.7 Chapter Summary .....	139

## CHAPTER V

### Factors influencing displacement decision-making in BNP

5.1 Introduction.....	141
5.2 Lack of coordination between TFCA Program and Chigubo District officials .....	142
5.2.1 There was no functioning plan for coordinating TFCA and district activities..	143
5.2.2 Barriers to coordination in established government frameworks.....	145
5.2.3 District Administration expectation of resettlement funding from the TFCA ..	147
Program .....	147
5.2.4 Section summary .....	148
5.3 District employees intended for resettlement to reduce poverty .....	148
5.3.1 The poverty reduction agenda is supported by powerful external actors.....	149
5.3.2 Service provision is an indicator of poverty reduction .....	151
5.3.3 People in parks are impoverished.....	151
5.3.4 Section summary .....	152
5.4 Villagization + Service Provision = Poverty Reduction.....	153
5.4.1 Perceived operational flaws of past villagization efforts .....	153
5.4.2 Framing the problem of dispersed rural populations .....	155
5.4.3 Villagization logic in current government policies, plans, and principles .....	155
5.4.4 Connecting past villagization efforts and the current resettlement of BNP-area	
157	
residents.....	157
5.4.5 Section summary .....	158
5.5 Differing perceptions of voluntariness .....	159
5.5.1 Non-TFCA Unit government employees perceive resettlement to be	
voluntary.....	159
5.5.2 TFCA Unit employees perceive resettlement to be <i>involuntary</i> .....	161
5.5.3 District administration employees perceive resettlement to be voluntary .....	162
5.5.4 BNP-area residents claim resettlement is involuntary .....	164
5.5.5 Section summary .....	164
5.6 The district administration was emboldened to decide and act .....	165



5.6.1 “A very rapid process of decentralization” of decision-making .....	165
5.6.2 BNP-area resettlement was the decision of the district administration.....	167
5.6.3 Encouragement from above .....	167
5.6.4 Section Summary .....	167
5.7 “A park is a place for animals, not for people” .....	168
5.7.1 No formal plan for wildlife introduction.....	168
5.7.2 Resettlement was motivated by perceived impending wildlife introduction ....	169
5.7.3 Uninhabited wildlife park model dominant among TFCA Unit employees .....	170
5.7.4 Perceived human-nature disharmony .....	170
5.7.5 Parks are easier to manage without people .....	171
5.7.6 Section Summary .....	171
5.8 Chapter Summary .....	172

## **CHAPTER VI**

### **Consequences of displacement and resettlement for BNP-area residents**

6.1 Introduction.....	173
6.2 BNP-area residents’ changing perceptions of the risk of landlessness.....	175
6.2.1 Prior perceptions of land security.....	175
6.2.2 Mixed messages from outsiders about land security.....	176
6.2.3 Consistent message from park guards of impending displacement .....	178
6.2.4 Land in the new village was perceived as secure by comparison to land in the park.....	179
6.3 District Administration perceives minimal risk of landlessness.....	179
6.4 All land is not equal: reduced land quality as part of a system of impoverishment risks.....	181
6.4.1 Relationship between land quality and loss of common property .....	182
6.4.2 Relationship between land quality and food and water insecurity.....	182
6.4.2.1 The banhine provides potable water security .....	183
6.4.2.2 Survival knowledge is context specific .....	184
6.4.3 Relationship between land quality and joblessness.....	184
6.4.3.1 Livestock owners rely on water from the banhine .....	185
6.4.3.2 BNP-area people sell non-timber forest products, crops, and other goods from .....	186
BNP .....	186
6.4.3.3 Traditional healers rely on medicinal plants only found in the banhine ....	187
6.5 Consequences of the lack of planned reconstruction of land security.....	187
6.5.1 Resettlement planning in Tchove.....	187
6.5.2 Relationship between landlessness and social disarticulation.....	188
6.6 Relationship between resistance, landlessness, and marginalization .....	191
6.6.1 Damned if you resettle and damned if you resist .....	192

6.6.2 Local feelings of alienation from government .....	193
6.6.3 Uncertainty .....	194
6.6.4 Landlessness, resettler-host relations, marginalization, and resistance .....	195
6.7 Chapter Summary .....	198

## **CHAPTER VII**

### **Discussion**

7.1 Introduction.....	199
7.2 Review of research problem, questions, framework, methods, and findings .....	199
7.3 Implications .....	205
7.3.1 Transparency and external attention is critical in displacement.....	205
7.3.3 “Sustainability” debates may have little influence on displacement decisions.	209
7.4 Limitations .....	210
7.4.1 Limitations of the case study design .....	210
7.4.2 Breaking the chains of explanation .....	211
7.4.3 Limitations of this case: sensitive relations with research participants.....	212
7.4.4 Other challenges and limitations .....	215
7.5 Suggestions for future research.....	215
 BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	 218
 APPENDIX A: Informed consent explanation .....	 231
 APPENDIX B: Interview protocol for BNP-area community leaders .....	 233
 APPENDIX C: Household interview protocol, Phases I and II .....	 236
 APPENDIX D: Planning and Policy Documents Analyzed.....	 238

## LIST OF TABLES

1.1	Approaches to displacement in protected area management .....	4
4.1	Mozambican legislation addressing the status and rights of people in national parks.....	129

## LIST OF FIGURES

2.1	A framework for understanding the causes and consequences of displacement .....	60
3.1	Overlap of BNP and Chigubo District within Greater Limpopo Transfrontier Conservation Area .....	71
3.2	Distribution of BNP-area communities within Chigubo District .....	71
3.3	Research process.....	74
4.1	Banhine wetland and catchment area.....	109
4.2	Overlap of BNP and Chigubo District within Greater Limpopo TFCA.....	122
4.3	Distribution of BNP-area communities within Chigubo District .....	122
4.4	Location of BNP within Greater Limpopo TFCA .....	130
4.5	Mechanisms regulating relationships between major actors regarding resettlement decision-making.....	140
6.1	Location of Hocuanhe, Hlecane, and Harriane, and their proposed resettlement areas .....	197

## LIST OF IMAGES

4.1	Agriculture near permanent residences.....	117
4.2	Non-timber forest products near residences .....	117
4.3	Water soources near residences .....	118
4.4	Food donations.....	118
4.5	Banhine-area agriculture.....	119
4.6	Gathering banhine-area aquatic, semi-aquatic, and terrestrial plants, roots, and sap .....	119
4.7	Acquatic and Terresttrial Fishing.....	120
4.8	Banhine water sources .....	120
4.9	Temporary housing in the banhine .....	121
4.10	Stick and mud schoolhouse in Tchove.....	123
4.11	Author and the Permanent Secretary of the District of Chigubo .....	124

# CHAPTER I

## **Impending decisions regarding displacement from strict protected areas**

### **1.1 Introduction**

Some of the world's most biologically diverse places are also home to some of the world's poorest, most marginalized, and most directly natural resource dependent people. This type of overlapping ecological and social significance often occurs in places now designated as protected areas and has sparked contentious debates about historic, present, and future relationships between biodiversity, human resource use, protected area management, and poverty (see, for example, exchanges in *Oryx* 37 2003, 38 2004, 41 2007 and *Conservation Biology* 14 2000). Central to these debates are decisions about whether protected area residents should be physically removed from protected areas and restricted from accessing and using protected area resources.

On one side of a richly-textured continuum of arguments, many conservation biologists and others maintain that remaining biodiversity is invaluable in the face of the current extinction crisis; that all consumptive human uses, including directly natural resource dependent local livelihoods, inevitably diminish biodiversity; and that protected areas will only maintain ecological value if these uses are excluded and protected area residents are removed (Kramer, van Schaik, and Johnson 1997; Oates 1999; Terborgh 1999). While many arguments on this end of the continuum suggest that States and development organizations have a responsibility to ensure the welfare and rights of protected area residents, ensuring residents' welfare and rights should not come at the expense of conserving biodiversity in strict protected areas (e.g., Terborgh 2004).

At the other end of the continuum, many social scientists, social justice advocates, some natural scientists, and others highlight the material and cultural harm to people and nature resulting from past and present displacements and resettlements conducted by States, development organizations, and protected area management organizations. Those critical of displacement also highlight the history of infringements on the legal and human rights of displaced people. Furthermore, many critics argue that in places where long-term, co-evolutionary development of social and ecological systems has occurred, local livelihoods nurture biodiversity and ecological functioning. In these situations, eliminating the disturbances wrought by livelihood activities will likely change the flora and fauna that a particular area was established to protect (Brechtin et al. 2003; Cernea and Schmidt-Soltau 2003; Chatty and Colchester 2002; Ghimire and Pimbert 1997; Stevens 1997).

## **1.2 Three approaches to displacement in protected areas**

These differing viewpoints are operationalized in three general approaches that States, development organizations, and protected area management organizations have taken with regard to displacement in protected areas. These approaches include: involuntary displacement, no displacement, and voluntary displacement.<sup>1</sup> Involuntary displacement approaches can be characterized by the combination of (1) a key assumption that local livelihood-related disturbances are in conflict with the conservation and management of protected area resources; (2) a goal to reduce or eliminate local

---

<sup>1</sup> Since the 1980's, characteristics of approaches to displacement or protected area management more generally have been described in various typologies (see for example Abbot et al. 2001; Brown 2002; Hughes and Flintan 2001; Salafsky and Wollenberg 2000). The characteristics that I present are drawn from these typologies and adapted for the purposes of this study.

livelihood-related disturbances in protected areas; and, (3) tactics of forced removal and enforced restriction of access. In contrast, protected area management approaches that involve no displacement (1) assume compatibility between local livelihood-related disturbances and the conservation and management of protected area resources; (2) aim to maintain local livelihood-related disturbances in protected areas; and, (3) employ tactics that secure protected area residents' rights to live in, use, and manage lands now part of protected areas. Finally, voluntary displacement approaches maintain the key assumption of involuntary displacement—local livelihood-related disturbances conflict with the conservation and management of protected area resources—and the goal of involuntary displacement—to reduce or eliminate such disturbances in protected areas. Voluntary displacement approaches, however, attempt to manage the conflict and achieve the goal in a different manner. Rather than forcefully removing local people and/or restricting their access to and consumptive use of protected area resources, involuntary displacement approaches use various economic incentives to encourage local people's voluntary adoption of new livelihood activities and restrictions on old livelihood activities, and possibly their voluntary relocation from a protected area. Characteristics of involuntary displacement, no displacement, and voluntary displacement approaches are summarized in Figure 1.

**Table 1.1. Approaches to displacement in protected area management**

<b>Approach</b>	<b>Key Assumption</b>	<b>Goal</b>	<b>Tactics</b>
<b>Involuntary displacement</b>	Livelihood-related disturbances conflict with conservation and management of PA resources	Reduce/eliminate livelihood-related disturbances in PA's	Forced removal, restriction of access, enforcement. May include compensation and/or resettlement
<b>No displacement</b>	Livelihood-related disturbances are compatible with conservation and management of PA resources	Maintain livelihood-related disturbances in PA's	Strengthen rights of PA residents to live in, use and manage PA resources
<b>Voluntary displacement</b>	Livelihood-related disturbances conflict with conservation and management of PA resources	Reduce/eliminate livelihood-related disturbances in PA's	Incentives used to relocate PA residents and alter their livelihoods so they are not dependant on PA resources

### **1.3 The importance of displacement decision-making**

Decision-making by States, development organizations, or protected area management organizations between these three approaches has tremendous implications for protected area residents and biodiversity in many developing countries. As example, in Mozambique, virtually all strict and other types of protected areas are inhabited and resident and other local people rely on protected area resources to support local livelihoods. Additionally, in Mozambique and elsewhere, a surge in the past two decades of international financial institution loans and grants and international conservation NGO support is enabling the creation of new strict protected areas on inhabited lands and is increasing government capacity to manage what in many cases were previously “paper parks.” In short, decision-making is impending regarding the future of people resident in and reliant on the resources in strict protected areas.

Despite the immediacy of displacement decision-making and the voracity of much of the debate, surprisingly few studies have empirically and rigorously investigated

displacement decision-making or the implications of displacement decision-making for affected people or biodiversity. In a comprehensive review, Brockington and Igoe (2006) identified only 55 reports that detail livelihood changes as a result of “eviction” from protected areas. Similarly, Agrawal and Redford (2007:14) explain that “there are very few studies that establish a relationship between the displacement of humans from protected areas and the *marginal* gain such displacement confers on biodiversity conservation” (emphasis in original). Further, many countries do not have national policies that directly address displacement and resettlement (Cernea 2002). And, until recently, no major international conservation NGO had a policy to guide organizational conduct with regard to displacement and resettlement.

Partly as a response to the knowledge gap regarding the implications of displacement decisions as well as the increasing profile of protected area displacement decisions, numerous academic and NGO-led efforts are underway to investigate the social and biophysical impacts of displacement and resettlement from protected areas. World Wildlife Fund, African Wildlife Foundation, Wildlife Conservation Society, and the United Nations Environment Program-World Conservation Monitoring Centre are among the more prominent conservation organizations that recently began or plan to begin systematically investigating social and/or biophysical impacts of protected area displacement and resettlement. And at least one organization, the Wildlife Conservation Society, is developing a policy to guide organizational conduct regarding displacement and resettlement.

## **1.4 The importance of context**



Contrary to the polarizing viewpoints presented above, another group of contributors suggest that there is no essential or generalizable relationship between resident people, protected areas, and the socio-ecological interactions they involve. Furthermore, differing protected area management approaches along the lines of those presented above have strengths and weaknesses, and their appropriateness and effectiveness depends on specific contexts (Belsky 1999; Brown 2002; Salafsky and Wollenberg 2000). Based on these arguments, some authors have called for more case-specific investigations to understand under what conditions or in what contexts different protected area management approaches are appropriate (Brockington, Igoe, and Schmidt-Soltau 2006; Redford, personal communication 2006; Wilkie et al. 2006).

The concept of contextual appropriateness, however, raises a number of questions. First, based on what are displacement decisions appropriate? There are many international, national, and local policies and economic arrangements relevant to protected areas, displacement, resettlement, conservation, development, poverty, land rights, resource access, and livelihoods. While many policies and economic arrangements at various political scales may apply to a particular case of displacement decision-making, certain policies and economic arrangements will have a greater influence and subsequently structure the parameters according to which decision-makers measure the appropriateness of a decision. Which policies and economic arrangements influence decision-makers' measures of the appropriateness of displacement decision-making in a particular case?

Second, according to who is a decision appropriate? Displacement decisions are made by real people or groups of people who, despite the influence of policies and

economic arrangements, pursue their own interests and agendas using their own strategies and resources. In any particular case of displacement decision-making, those who are making decisions and those who are affected by decisions are entangled in contextually-specific social relationships that empower some and disempower others. Subsequently, while many people and groups of people may have an interest in displacement decision-making, some people and groups have a greater ability to influence what is and is not an appropriate decision. Which people or groups influence the appropriateness of displacement decision-making in a particular case?

Third, why is a decision appropriate? Individuals or groups of people make displacement decisions within political and economic parameters; however, influential people and influential policies' justifications for the appropriateness of a particular displacement decision is underlain by influential ideas. What is and what is not appropriate in a particular context, therefore, may be the outcome of a struggle among competing ideas as much or more than it is a struggle among people or policies. While there are many ideas or ways of thinking relevant to any particular displacement decision-making context, only certain ideas come to justify what is and what is not appropriate. Which ideas dominate and influence the appropriateness of displacement decision-making in a particular case?

## **1.5 Research questions**

Scientific investigations of social-ecological relationships and the impacts of displacement for people and biodiversity are important and necessary, but not sufficient to understand the contextual appropriateness of displacement decision-making. Scientific knowledge cannot provide the answers with regard to what decisions *should* be made or

how such decisions *should* be made. Nor can science decide who and what *should* benefit or who and what *should* pay the price for decisions to or not to displace protected area residents. These are political decisions. More specifically, determinations of the appropriateness of displacement decisions are dependent on the context-specific power of certain policies and economic arrangements, certain people or groups of people, and certain ideas. Although science cannot provide the answer with regard to what is appropriate, scientific investigation can help displacement decision-makers and those affected by displacement decisions to understand the factors that influence determinations of the appropriateness of displacement decisions. Subsequently, the first question this research investigates is:

***What factors influence displacement decision-making and how?***

Displacement decision-making and subsequent actions will have consequences for biodiversity and affected people, most especially for those people who are displaced or who host displaced people. Understanding the consequences of displacement decision-making underscores the importance of such decision-making. While investigations of the consequences of displacement decision-making on biodiversity or other environmental values are important and necessary, this research focuses on the consequences of displacement decision-making on affected people. The second question this research investigates is:

***What are the consequences of displacement decision-making for affected people?***

Throughout this dissertation, I short-handedly refer to my research as addressing the “causes and consequences” of displacement. While use of the term “cause” is convenient, determinations of causation are difficult to identify. This is especially so in

complex, multi-scale situations such as is the case under investigation in this dissertation. The term cause, therefore, should not be understood as meaning the ultimate or complete reason why displacement decisions were made; instead, the term cause should be understood as the combination of factors influencing displacement decision-making.

## **1.6 Displacement decision-making in Banhine National Park**

Because this research investigates context-dependent causes and consequences of displacement decision-making, I focused my investigation on a specific place, a specific group of people, and a specific case of displacement decision-making. In this section, I briefly introduce the specific context of the research. I end this section by contextualizing and restating my research questions.

This study focused on Banhine National Park (BNP), Mozambique, and the larger World Bank-financed Transfrontier Conservation Area Program of which management of BNP is a component. BNP, like nearly every other national park and protected area in Mozambique, is inhabited and local residents have relied on its physical resources to support local livelihoods. Current residents of the park describe a long history of inhabitation, displacement, and resettlement dating back at least to the time of the Gaza Kingdom in the early-to-mid 19<sup>th</sup> century. The 7,000<sup>2</sup> km area now known as BNP was designated by the Portuguese colonial authorities as a hunting reserve (*Coutada 17*) in 1969 and a national park in 1973. Policies of the hunting reserve and park involved, among other things, the prohibition of local hunting and the use of fire. There was minimal enforcement of these prohibitions in the brief time before independence in 1975 and there was no attempt to physically relocate park residents (pers. comm., Tinley 10 July 2006). Most BNP-area residents, however, were involuntarily displaced and many

died as a result of the post-independence FRELIMO-RENAMO war. After the war and in accordance with a massive post-war repatriation and resettlement effort in the mid-1990's, many displaced BNP-area residents returned to live inside and around BNP. According to a 2003 consultancy report, and as I roughly verified in 2006, there were approximately 2,000 to 3,000 people living within the park and thousands more living outside the park but using resources inside the park.

The primary biophysical feature of BNP is a dynamic wetland system which is charged by periodic cyclones that fill and then slowly drain the wetland over the course of years. This hydrological regime results in high degrees of biological diversity. Prior to the extirpation or near extirpation of many species in the latter part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the wetland and surrounding areas were home to a wide variety of fauna including what are now rare antelope species.<sup>2</sup> Although there are no formal plans for wildlife reintroduction, numerous consultancy reports mention and government officials openly discuss the potential in the park for the reintroduction of wildlife.

BNP-area residents live spatially dispersed but in socially operational communities on the edge of the wetland's floodplain. By spatially dispersed I mean that there are no village structures. Rather residents live nearby their farms, fallow fields, livestock kraals, grazing areas, and water sources which are themselves spatially separated from each other. By socially operational I mean that community boundaries and governance arrangements within those boundaries are understood and respected by community members.

---

<sup>2</sup> This description of the biophysical features of BNP is informed by the park's draft management plan. The plan has not been enacted.

Most of the land within the wetland's floodplain is not within the boundaries of any one of the BNP-area communities; it is common property. Traditional leaders from six BNP-area communities control access to and use of specifically-defined portions of the floodplain. According to customary rules, members of other communities are allowed access to and use of the resources in the floodplain with the permission of traditional leaders from the above-mentioned six communities.

People in BNP-area communities are dependent on the floodplain and wetland in different ways and to different degrees throughout the wet and dry cycles of the hydrological regime. Generally, however, people are most dependent on floodplain resources during drought, crop failure, and famine. In these times, people will temporarily migrate to the floodplain to harvest famine foods, water livestock, and collect water from emergency wells for their consumption. During drought, crop failure, and famine, the floodplain provides resource for which there is no locally available alternative.

In addition to living inside or near BNP, residents live in the government administrative district of Chigubo. Similar to other people in the northern part of Chigubo District, the people in BNP-area communities live far from clinics, schools are few and elementary, boreholes are few and the water is often salty, formal employment is almost non-existent, and the road infrastructure is extremely rough.

#### **1.6.1 District displacement intentions and contextualized research questions**

Beginning in early 2006, employees of the Chigubo District Administration visited the BNP-area communities and communicated to leaders and community members that it was the district's desire that residents organize themselves in aggregates

or villages in areas that had basic services or where basic services could be provided. Doing so, district officials explained, would give people improved access to available services. It would also allow the government or NGO's to more easily provide services or other assistance than if residents continued to live dispersed. District officials also communicated to BNP-area residents that the government would not provide services within the boundaries of the park and that it was the district government's desire that those people living inside BNP resettle to areas outside the park.

Those who were residents in communities that were wholly outside the park, therefore, were suggested to congregate within their communities. Residents in communities that were partially inside and partially outside the park were suggested to congregate in their communities but in the portion of their communities that is outside the park. Residents in communities that were wholly inside the park were suggested to congregate on the lands controlled by leaders of other communities outside the park.<sup>3</sup> This explanation of events was consistent across nearly all research participants including those from the Chigubo District Administration and those from BNP-area communities. This situation was my primary focus of research. The context-specific research questions I investigated are as follows:

- 1. What factors influenced decision-making regarding the displacement of BNP-area residents and how?***
- 2. What are the consequences of displacement decision-making for BNP-area residents?***

---

<sup>3</sup> The word "suggested" is used here because district officials did not explicitly tell people where they should move, except that they should move out of the park and into villages or aggregates. Officials did, however, suggest certain resettlement areas. The issue of voluntariness is addressed in Chapter V.

## **CHAPTER II**

### **A framework for understanding the causes and consequences of displacement**

#### **2.1 Overview**

The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, to enhance understanding of and further refine the research questions presented in Chapter I through review of relevant concepts, theories, and practices regarding displacement. Second, to present a framework that provides a foundation for the analysis of field research and, hopefully, an original contribution to understanding the complex phenomenon of displacement.

Academic literature, institutional policies, and managerial practices specific to displacement have historically treated questions regarding causes and consequences as separate and independent questions. And, until recently, most research attention has primarily focused on issues regarding the consequences of displacement. In this dissertation, I treat the causes and consequences of displacement as inter-related and mutually influential; conceptually linking causes and consequences is a major characteristic of my research framework. Because of the specific evolution of displacement literature, policy, and practice, however, it is helpful to first address issues regarding the consequences of displacement, then to address the critiques of focusing only on consequences, and then to address issues regarding the causes of displacement. I end the chapter by summarizing the main points presented and describing how these points contribute to a framework that addresses both causes and consequences.

Before addressing either causes or consequences of displacement, however, I first contextualize protected area displacement within the larger discussion of development-



induced displacement. I also define and justify my use and definition of the term displacement.

## **2.2 Protected area displacement in a broader context**

Displacement decision-making and its consequences are not new issues for protected area management. Displacement has been occurring in formal protected areas since the inception of the modern movement to establish such places in the mid-to-late 1800's. Displacement also likely occurred in the great variety of protected areas around the world that predated the modern movement (Lockwood et al. 2006).

Displacement is also not limited to the establishment and management of protected areas. War and other violent conflicts, natural disasters, and environmental change involuntarily displace millions of people every year (UNHCR 2001). While such displacement resulting from, for example, the war in Iraq, Hurricane Katrina, and global climate change garner media attention, the cause of the largest annual number of displaced people is the implementation of projects or programs intended to promote development (Cernea 2000, Koenig 2002). This category of displacement is commonly referred to as Development-Induced Displacement and Resettlement or DIDR. Projects or programs that result in DIDR include installation of infrastructure for water projects (primarily dams and irrigation systems), transportation projects (road and rail), utility projects (such as electrical grids), and urban development. DIDR may also result from natural resource extraction projects (especially mining). Closely related to DIDR is displacement and resettlement resulting from population transfer programs (justified either by development or disaster-avoidance concerns) and expansion of military facilities. Approximately ten million people annually are displaced by dam and road

infrastructure projects alone (Cernea and McDowell 2000). Similar to the contestation involved with protected area displacement issues outlined in Chapter I, Oliver-Smith (2005:189) explains that “there are few more bitterly contested issues in the field of development today than the displacement and resettlement of people and communities by large-scale infrastructure projects.”

Those contributing to the DIDR literature typically refer to displacement and resettlement caused by the establishment and management of protected areas as one form of DIDR. This is not a common practice, however, in published debates that specifically address protected area displacement. Agrawal and Redford (2007) point out the lack of reference to DIDR literature in protected area displacement debates as a deficiency in those debates. As part of an effort to address this deficiency, I situate protected area-induced displacement and resettlement within the larger concept and literature of DIDR.<sup>4</sup> In the remainder of this section, I describe five reasons for doing so.

First, at a general level, justifications for and tensions regarding displacement induced by development or protected area projects are similar. While specific justifications for displacement differ in each context, government, private sector and other promoters of development or protected area projects justify displacement as the imposition of costs on a few for the greater good of a larger society; displacement is justified as being in the “public interest.” This is most overtly the case when States apply eminent domain to acquire property rights. In cases of DIDR, government, private sector, and other interests associate the greater good with national and oftentimes urban economic growth. In cases of protected area-induced displacement, the greater good may

---

<sup>4</sup> Future references to DIDR beyond this section will consider protected area-induced displacement and resettlement to be included in DIDR.

be associated with either or both conservation and economic development. A primary tension involved in both cases regards the wants and needs of society for development and/or conservation which are viewed in sum as greater than the welfare of the people that make room such projects (Oliver-Smith 2005). An additional tension surrounds decisions and actions regarding why, how, and by whom the public interest is defined.

Further, similar to the justifications for creating many of America's early national parks (Runte 1987, displacements from which are detailed in Keller and Turek 1998), large infrastructure projects have often taken on a "monumental character" and have been treated as symbols of national unity and identity (Turton 2002:48). As John Muir referred to the Yosemite Valley and other early national parks as "cathedrals" (Nash 1982), former Indian Prime Minister, Nehru, referred to his country's dams as "the temples of modern India" (Turton 2002). Similarly, former Ghanaian president Nkrumah called the Akosombo Dam on the Volta River, "a scheme which transcends any political consideration, and which is, in the truest sense, an expression of our national unity and aspirations" (Lumsden 1973, cited in Turton 2002)

A second reason to contextualize protected area displacement within the larger concept and literature of DIDR is that those most affected by DIDR and protected area displacement often share common socio-economic and political characteristics. As mentioned in Chapter I, protected areas are often established in remote regions that are frequently home to countries' poorest and most politically marginalized citizens. As is described in a 1994 World Bank report on displacement, the majority of those displaced by World Bank-supported infrastructure projects "are rural and poor." The explanation given by the World Bank for this is that "new projects are brought to the most

underdeveloped, poorest areas, where infrastructure is lacking and *land and political costs are lowest*” (World Bank 1994:93 emphasis added). As Fox (2000:314) summarizes, there is a “direct association between large projects involving displacement and the lack of political representation of displaced people.”

A third reason to contextualize protected area displacement within the larger concept and literature of DIDR is that the literature on the latter has a well developed conceptual structure that can inform the former. Consistent academic investigation of DIDR since the 1970’s has generated a field of research that has both theoretical and descriptive depth. As Agrawal and Redford (2007:6) explain, DIDR literature, compared to literature on protected area-induced displacement, provides “greater historical detail and accuracy...more evolution of consideration of harm and how to mitigate it [and] better quantitative information and qualitative knowledge about the scope, nature, and impacts of displacement.”

Fourth, one component of the richer DIDR literature argues that the consequences of various types of displacement share many similarities (Cernea 2000; Ohta 2005). While this view is contested with regard to the similarities between the consequences felt by, for example, war refugees and those displaced by development projects (Oliver-Smith 2005), there is general agreement that the consequences of various forms of DIDR (including protected area displacement) are conceptually similar (Agrawal and Redford 2007; Cernea and Soltau 2006; West, Igoe, and Brockington 2006).

A final reason to situate protected area displacement within DIDR literature is that scientists and practitioners involved with social dimensions of protected areas have a lot

to learn from development literature and practice.<sup>5</sup> An early and still relevant critique of conservation and protected area management projects that attempted to simultaneously address rural development concerns is that conservation agencies and organizations implementing such projects failed to heed the lessons of more than a half century of research and experience in rural development (Brandon and Wells 1992). Organizations, projects, and individuals which do not heed these lessons are likely wasting time and resources, if not causing harm to the people and places that are supposed to be beneficiaries.

Further, for good or for naught, development agencies and international financial institutions have more experience than government protected area management agencies or conservation organizations in addressing displacement. While development agencies and institutions have been heavily criticized for their past and current responsibilities with regard to the displacement and failed resettlement of millions of people around the world, these same organizations have subsequently become leaders in developing policies and guidelines for preventing and mitigating the negative effects of displacement. Protected area management organizations, conservation NGO's, and scientists addressing protected area-induced displacement would be remiss if they ignored the history, voluminous literature, and lessons learned from development agencies and institutions' experiences.

A related point is that international financial institutions, such as the World Bank, Global Environment Facility, and others, are playing an increasingly large role in protected area projects around the world. This means that government agencies and conservation NGO's involved in projects financed by such institutions are often required

---

<sup>5</sup> I would argue that the reverse is also true.

to abide by such institutions' policies and guidelines regarding displacement and resettlement. This final point is particularly important because the situation under study in this dissertation involves a World Bank-financed project in which World Bank policies regarding displacement applied.

## **2.3 Choosing and defining terminology**

Terminology regarding displacement is problematic and political and is a focus of debate in the “displacement” literature. There are many different terms and phrases that authors use similar to or synonymous with displacement. These include: involuntary resettlement, forced migration, dispossession, dislocation, relocation, eviction, exclusion, or various combinations of these terms. Furthermore, definitions of displacement and similar terms vary. Which terms authors choose to employ and how they define them are political acts that frame a problem from a particular ideological perspective and exclude other problem framings. The purpose of this section is to discuss which interests are being promoted by the choice and definition of a particular term. A second purpose of this section is to justify my use of the term displacement and my adoption of a definition of displacement as referring to either or both the physical removal of people and the loss of or restriction of access to resources.

### **2.2.1 Choice of terms**

Cernea (1999) and Dwivedi (2002) explain that politicians, technocrats, or those from a planning or managerial perspective prefer the terms “resettlement,” “involuntary resettlement,” or “rehabilitation” as opposed to what Cernea calls the “harsher” term “displacement.” As example, until recently, the phrase “R&R” (resettlement and

rehabilitation) was formally used in World Bank policies and reports. Dwivedi (2002:716) argues that such terminology focuses attention on the act of resettling people and, in the process, “engulf(s) any questioning of the act of displacement.” Dwivedi (2002) concedes that focusing on resettlement rather than displacement may be useful in drawing political attention to the challenges of resettling displaced people; however, he maintains that this is at the expense of focusing dialogue and attention on the question of whether or not displacement should have occurred in the first place.

Dwivedi (2002:716) further argues that references to resettlement or the noun “resettler” “disregards the historical truth that millions of people have been displaced worldwide in different development projects but have never been resettled.” Oliver-Smith (2005:191) presents a similar argument. He argues that there is not and has not been any necessary or inevitable relationship between the words in the phrase “development-induced displacement and resettlement” (DIDR). Development can occur without displacement or resettlement. And many people who are displaced by development are never resettled or are inadequately resettled.

For the purposes of this research, I use the term “displacement.” I use the term displacement rather than involuntary resettlement, or any other term, because much of the substantive focus of this research is on actions and actors who physically remove and restrict access to resources rather than actions and actors who place affected people in a new location or otherwise aid people to resettle. Furthermore, a focus of this research is to investigate decision-making resulting in displacement and not to allow the questioning of displacement to be “engulfed” by a focus on resettlement. I also use the phrases “displacement and resettlement” or “involuntary resettlement” or the acronym DIDR

(development-induced displacement and resettlement) when these phrases are applicable to a particular situation or a particular point being made or when I am quoting or paraphrasing another author who is using such phrases.

### **2.2.2 Defining displacement**

A second politically-charged debate regards the inclusiveness of the term displacement. Of specific issue is whether the concept of displacement includes physical removal of people *and/or* reducing peoples' access to resources. The World Commission on Dams' landmark report (2000) differentiates between two types of displacement: physical displacement and livelihood displacement. Physical displacement refers to removal of people from their place of residence. Livelihood displacement involves depriving or restricting people of "access to a series of natural resource and environmental inputs into their livelihoods" (WCD 2000:103). The implication is that livelihood displacement could occur with or without physical displacement. In this dissertation I define displacement as either or both physical relocation and restriction of access to resources. In this subsection, I first present differing arguments and then I justify my definition.

The inclusion of both physical and livelihood displacement is well supported in both protected area and development-oriented displacement literature. Brockington and Igoe (2006:425) argue that "people dwelling on the edge of a park but unable to gather firewood or wild foods, to hunt, or fish, or unable to walk to their farms on the other side of the park, would be unable to live as they were before. Exclusion of economic activity, which does not lead to moving home, still displaces that activity elsewhere." Similarly, Gebre and Ohta (2005:1-2) argue that "displacement" is "holistic" and "integrative" and



as such includes “all forms of disruptions due to forced uprooting of people from their physical, economic, social, cultural, and psychological placement.” Displacement, Gebre and Ohta (2005) continue, “does not necessarily imply geographical movement...migration to a distant or different location is an aspect of displacement rather than its pre-requisite.”

In a minority opposition stance, Agrawal and Redford (2007) argue that using displacement as an “omnibus” term including loss of access or restrictions on livelihood opportunities “actually obscures the plight of those who are physically separated from their land and homes.” Instead Agrawal and Redford limit the concept of displacement to physical removal of people from a place. This, they argue, corresponds closest to the dictionary meaning of the term: “removal of a thing from its place, putting out of place” (OED 1989 cited in Agrawal and Redford 2007).

In a tangential argument, Mascia and Claus (2007) argue that the concept of displacement (regardless of whether the definition includes restriction of access or not) “focuses just on one side of the coin (the excluded).” They argue instead for a focus on an explicitly property rights-based approach that enables investigation of the ‘losers’ of property rights and the ‘winners’ of such rights.

While debates in academic literature linger, definitions of displacement in policy are, as Krueger (2007:99) explains, moving “towards...consensus that restricted access is a form of displacement.” As evidence, in 2001, the World Bank revised its safeguard policy on involuntary resettlement to expand its application to include loss of or restriction of access to resources. Although the title of the World Bank’s safeguard policy uses the term “involuntary *resettlement*,” the policy defines “displacement” and

“displaced persons” as including either or both physical removal and restriction of access to resources.<sup>6</sup> This policy applies to projects and programs financed by the Global Environmental Facility and implemented by the World Bank, as well as to private sector projects that are co-financed by the International Finance Corporation which is a member of the World Bank Group (Cernea 2006). Since the inception of the World Bank safeguard policies, they have “become the standard used to judge the adequacy of [displacement and] resettlement initiatives” (Koenig 2001:15).

A more significant indication of policy consensus, however, is that soon after the World Bank’s actions, multilateral donors such as the Asian Development Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the African Development Bank, as well as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), replicated the World Bank’s actions (Cernea 2006). Not only do these agencies and their members finance and attach conditions to many development, conservation, and other environmental protection programs, they also influence national policies in countries around the world (Cernea 2006). In short, the policy shift to include restriction of access as displacement is consequential.

For the purposes of this research, I define displacement as either or both physical relocation and restriction of access to resources. I do so primarily because of the emerging policy consensus regarding displacement and because the World Bank

---

6 The policy covers “involuntary taking of land [and] “the involuntary restriction of access to legally designated parks and protected areas, resulting in adverse impacts on the livelihoods of the displaced persons” (World Bank, OP 4.12 para. 3(a) and (b). Further, “involuntary restriction of access covers restriction on the use of resources imposed on people living outside a park or protected area, or on those who continue living inside the park, or protected area, during and after implementation.” (World Bank, OP 4.12, Note 9).

safeguard policy plays a significant role in this research and I want to be consistent with the policy.

## **2.4 Interconnections of practice, problems, and theory**

Academic literature, institutional policies, and managerial practices specific to displacement have historically focused on understanding and mitigating the consequences of displacement. The Impoverishment Risk and Reconstruction framework (IRR) is a prominent tool used by academics and practitioners to understand and mitigate such consequences. IRR is a major component of the larger research framework that I employ in this research. In this section, I describe the context within which IRR was developed. This is necessary to understand why and how I use IRR as part of my research framework.

The development and purposes of IRR are intimately intertwined with the World Bank's role in DIDR, resistance to and impoverishment caused by DIDR, and the development, implementation, and revisions of what is now called the World Bank's safeguard policy on involuntary resettlement. As a leading player in the post-WWII infrastructure boom of the development era, the World Bank promoted and financed the construction of thousands of dams, highways, electricity grids, and other infrastructure that displaced and impoverished millions of people around the world. During this time, as Fox (2000:308) explains, the "conventional wisdom" within the World Bank was that "the immiseration of those evicted in the name of development was unavoidable and necessary." Lipton (1977) identified this conventional wisdom as an "urban bias." Lipton argued that the dominant development ideology in the World Bank and in other similar institutions as well as the power structures of most developing countries strongly favor

the interests of urban populations. Further, Lipton (1977) argued, this bias is applied at the expense of rural populations.

Around the time of Lipton's critique, the conventional wisdom regarding the urban bias was being challenged by a growing number of popular movements resisting displacement (Oliver-Smith 1996). In 1980, the World Bank adopted its first internal policy aimed at mitigating the social costs of involuntary displacement and resettlement. The new World Bank policy, kept confidential until 1988, was a first of its kind for a major international development organization.

As Cernea (2000) explains, the adoption of the 1980 policy triggered a long series of efforts to improve displacement and resettlement norms and practices (the policy was revised in 1986, 1988, 1990, 1994, and 2001). These efforts involved recurrent tensions and criticism within the World Bank,<sup>7</sup> between the World Bank and its borrowers, and between the World Bank, borrower governments, and an increasingly organized movement resisting displacement and challenging World Bank and government policies and projects. Of particular focus during this time were the many instances of inconsistency between World Bank or government policy principles and project implementation. In other words, policy was incongruous with practice. Peoples' movements (based mainly in Brazil, India, Thailand, Mexico, and elsewhere but aligned with human rights and environmental advocacy groups worldwide) which were organized to resist World Bank-financed large dam projects were particularly adept at highlighting these inconsistencies and pointing out the incongruities and inadequacies of displacement and resettlement policies and practices. These actions by resistance movements shifted DIDR to center stage in debates regarding development (Oliver-Smith 2005).

---

<sup>7</sup> Cernea's 1991 book "Putting People First" is emblematic of the criticisms from within the World Bank.

Most notably, pressure by DIDR resistance movements led to an unprecedented 1991 independent review of the controversial, World Bank-supported Sardar Sarovar Dam project on the Narmada River in India. The inconsistencies between policy and practice revealed in this investigation led the World Bank to withdrawal support for the Sardar Sarovar project and instigated an internal review of all projects in the World Bank's portfolio that involved displacement and resettlement (Fox 2000). The internal review, proposed and led by the World Bank's Senior Resettlement Specialist, Michael Cernea, aimed to assess the state of resettlement in the World Bank's portfolio and to improve institutional performance.

Cernea's review of nearly two hundred World Bank-financed development projects involving displacement identified and described the often devastating impacts of displacement. His intent, however, was not simply to "document unhappy outcomes;" rather his intent was "to create a theoretical and safeguarding tool capable of guiding policy, planning, and actual development programs to counteract these adverse effects" (Cernea 2002:3). The primary conceptual or planning-oriented output of Cernea's review was the development of the Impoverishment Risk and Reconstruction framework,<sup>8</sup> or IRR.

Besides the vast data produced from the review, Cernea was also building on and reacting to the then-small, but rapidly developing theoretical literature on displacement and resettlement. Most notably, Chambers (1969), Nelson (1973) Scudder and Colson (1982), Salisbury (1986) and Hansen and Oliver-Smith (1982) had developed various theoretical approaches to understanding and addressing the impacts of voluntary and

---

<sup>8</sup> Cernea initially labeled IRR as a "model." In later writings, Cernea has often referred to IRR as a framework. Throughout this dissertation, I refer to IRR as a framework, or simply as IRR. I discuss this distinction in a later section of this chapter.

involuntary displacement. Cernea (2000) argued, however, that there was a need to focus specifically on *involuntary* displacement and to do so in a way that would not only identify the impacts of displacement, but would also predict the cumulative impacts of displacement and provide a practical guide to address these impacts.

Cernea explained later that this call for an approach to understanding and addressing the cumulative impacts of displacement was best expressed by West and Brechin (1991) who were writing about the need for such in the context of protected area displacement:

What is too little understood both by professionals and scholars alike, is the social impact of displacement and relocation. When resident peoples are forced to move, certain general impacts can be expected. But the collective social impact on the community or other social organizations differs widely from case to case; to date no model exists to predict the cumulative effect (1991:17).

Providing a model or framework to predict such effects, Cernea explains, is the gap that IRR was meant to fill.

## **2.5 The Impoverishment Risk and Reconstruction Framework (IRR)**

IRR is premised by a set of major empirical findings, assumptions, and value positions.<sup>9</sup> Among these are the following:

1. There is an inequitable distribution of development's benefits and losses in cases where people are displaced. In short, "some people enjoy the gains of development, while others bear its pains" (Cernea 2000:12).
2. Impoverishment is the looming risk in DIDR.
3. Development projects and programs that displace people "are indisputably needed. They improve people's lives, provide employment, and supply better

---

<sup>9</sup> Unless otherwise noted, the following description of IRR is drawn from Cernea (1990, 1995, 1997, 2000, 2002, 2005), Cernea and Schmidt-Soltau (2003 and 2006), and Dwivedi (2002).

services....Development will continue...to require changes in land use and water use and thus make various degrees of population relocation at times unavoidable” (Cernea 2000:11-12). Cernea also explicitly expressed similar thoughts about the continued need for biodiversity conservation and protected areas (Cernea and Schmidt-Soltan 2003).

4. The inevitability of DIDR “does not mean that the inequitable *distribution* of development’s gains and pains is itself inevitable or ethically justifiable” (Cernea 2000:12).
5. It is possible to prevent or mitigate the large majority of adverse effects resulting from DIDR.
6. Conventional planning approaches (such as cost-benefit analyses) do not adequately protect against risks and loss of entitlements and rights.

IRR is further based on three conceptual building blocks: “risk,”

“impoverishment,” and “reconstruction.” Cernea defines risk as follows:

We use the sociological concept of risk to indicate the *possibility* that a certain course of action will trigger injurious effects—losses and destruction (Giddens 1990). The concept of risk is posited as a counter-concept to security (Luhman 1993): the higher the risks, the lower the security of the displaced populations.

Further, Cernea explains that although risk may be subjectively understood, risk in the context of IRR primarily has an objective nature.

Risks are often directly perceptible, and also measurable through science (Adams 1998), as they are an objective reality. The cultural construction of risk—be it a social or a natural risk—could emphasize or deemphasize (be-little) its seriousness, or could also ignore it, but this does not change the objective nature of risks (Stallings 1995)” (Cernea 2000:19).<sup>10</sup>

Through analysis of the consequences of DIDR in the World Bank’s portfolio, and based on previous theoretical and empirical work (both of which were described in the previous section), Cernea disaggregated “the syncretic, multifaceted process of displacement into its identifiable, principle, and most widespread components” (Cernea 2000:19). Cernea describes the components of the process of displacement as involving

---

<sup>10</sup> Competing definitions of risk and other similar terms are presented in section 2.7 of this chapter.

eight means by which displaced people become (further) impoverished. Cernea labels these components “impoverishment risks” and describes them as follows (1997:23-30):

- **Landlessness:** Expropriation of land removes the main foundation upon which people’s productive systems, commercial activities, and livelihoods are constructed. This is the principal form of de-capitalization and pauperization of displaced people, as they lose both natural and man-made capital...Unless the land basis of people’s productive system is reconstructed elsewhere, or replaced with steady income-generating employment, landlessness sets in and the affected families become impoverished.
- **Joblessness:** The risk of losing wage employment is very high both in urban and rural displacements for those employed in enterprises, services, or agriculture. Yet, creating new jobs is difficult and requires substantial investment. Unemployment or underemployment among resettlers often endures long after physical relocation has been completed.
- **Homelessness:** Loss of shelter tends to be only temporary for many resettlers; but, for some, homelessness or a worsening in their housing standards remains a lingering condition. In a broader cultural sense, loss of a family’s individual home and loss of a group’s cultural space tend to result in alienation and status deprivation. For refugees, homelessness and “placelessness” are intrinsic by definition.
- **Marginalization:** Marginalization occurs when families lose economic power and spiral on a “downward mobility” path. Middle-income farm households do not become landless, they become small landholders; small shopkeepers and craftsmen downsize and slip below poverty thresholds. Many individuals cannot use their earlier acquired skills at the new location; human capital is lost or rendered inactive or obsolete. Economic marginalization is often accompanied by social and psychological marginalization, expressed in a drop in social status, in resettlers’ loss of confidence in society and in themselves, a feeling of injustice, and deepened vulnerability. The coerciveness of displacement and the victimization of resettlers tend to depreciate resettlers’ self-image, and they are often perceived by host communities as a socially degrading stigma.
- **Food insecurity:** Forced uprooting increases the risk that people will fall into temporary or chronic undernourishment, defined as calorie-protein intake levels below the minimum necessary for normal growth and work.
- **Increased morbidity and mortality:** Massive population displacement threatens to cause serious declines in health levels. Displacement-induced social stress and psychological trauma are sometimes accompanied by the outbreak of relocation-related illnesses, particularly parasitic and vector-borne diseases such as malaria and schistosomiasis. Unsafe water supply and improvised sewage systems increase vulnerability to epidemics and chronic diarrhea, dysentery, and so on.



The weakest segments of the demographic spectrum—infants, children, and the elderly—are affected most strongly.

- **Loss of access to common property:** For poor people, particularly for the landless and assetless, loss of access to common property assets that belonged to relocated communities (pastures, forested lands, water bodies, burial grounds, quarries, etc.) results in significant deterioration in income and livelihood levels. Typically, losses of common property assets are not compensated by governments. Losses of access to various basic public services...also occur rather often and should be linked to this class of risks.
- **Social disarticulation:** Forced displacement tears apart the existing social fabric. It disperses and fragments communities, dismantles patterns of social organization and interpersonal ties; kinship groups become scattered as well. Life-sustaining informal networks of reciprocal help, local voluntary associations, and self-organized mutual service are disrupted. This is a net loss of valuable “social capital,” that compounds the loss of natural, physical, and human capital. The social capital lost through social disarticulation is typically unperceived and uncompensated by the programs causing it, and this real loss has long-term consequences.

These risks, Cernea explains, express themselves differently in different contexts.

“The individual situation is always richer and somehow different from the general pattern” (Cernea 2000:31). Impoverishment risks may exist at different temporal scales. Some impoverishment risks may be immediately evident to planners and affected people alike, while others may not become evident until much later. Impoverishment risks may also exist in different intensities; some stronger and some weaker in different contexts. Further, some impoverishment risks may decrease in intensity over time, while others may increase in intensity. Furthermore, different groups of people (rural and urban, indigenous and non-indigenous populations, tribal and non-tribal groups, men and women, children and the elderly, new arrivals, long term residents, and host populations) may be differently exposed to impoverishment risks. Despite these variations, Cernea argues, “the general model is present in all situations” (2000:31).

While Cernea lauds the benefits of distinguishing individual risks of impoverishment and their particular manifestations, he also argues that it is important to understand impoverishment as an interconnected and mutually influential system; some impoverishment risks may play a primary role and others a derivative role. Impoverishment risks represent a “pattern of variables.” A complete IRR analysis, as West and Brechin called for, identifies the “cumulative effects” of displacement. Cernea does not, however, prescribe any inevitable relationship among the impoverishment risks in the framework.

Just as there is no inevitable relationship between impoverishment risks, Cernea maintains that impoverishment from displacement is not inevitable. The existence of impoverishment risks are only potentialities that may or may not occur. Impoverishment can be avoided if anticipated and purposively counteracted through proper policy measures. But most often, Cernea (2005:10) explains, “these risks materialize into actual, real processes of impoverishment because they are not preempted or reduced through up-front counter-risk strategies and reconstruction plans, before displacement even begins.”

Another role of the IRR framework, therefore, is to aid in targeting and countering the risks of impoverishment. Similar to the way the framework disaggregates the displacement process into distinct risks of impoverishment, IRR also disaggregates the reversal of these risks into a set of interventions potentially able to lead “from landlessness to land-based resettlement,” “from joblessness to reemployment,” etc. Once again, however, Cernea does not explicitly outline a systematic relationship between reconstruction elements. In other words, IRR does not specify how

reconstruction efforts focused on one risk of impoverishment might affect another. This, Cernea argues, is also context specific.

Cernea's primary point is that the IRR framework is most useful "not when it is confirmed by adverse events, but, rather, when, as a result of its warnings being taken seriously and acted upon, the risks are prevented from becoming a reality, or are minimized, and the consequences predicted by the model do not occur" (Cernea 2000:33). The focus of research through the IRR framework, therefore, is how these "risks are arrested and preempted, or of how they sharpen and materialize into real negative impacts" (Cernea 2005:10).

Cernea envisioned IRR to have four primary functions: predictive, diagnostic, problem resolution, and research. The predictive function of the framework acts to anticipate and warn planners and affected people of the risks involved with displacement and resettlement. In its diagnostic function, the framework acts as a guide for assessing specific project conditions with regard to if, how, and to what severity risks are manifesting within different groups of affected people. In its problem resolution function, the framework can serve as a guide in helping planners and affected people take measures to prevent risks from manifesting or to mitigate the negative effects of risks that are realized. In this capacity, the framework may guide strategic reconstruction of affected peoples' lives and livelihoods. Finally, the framework can provide the conceptual scaffolding for conceptualizing, conducting, analyzing, and interpreting the findings of field research.

Since publishing IRR in 1994, Cernea's framework has been described by other contributors to displacement and resettlement research as "by far the most influential and

ambitious [model] shaping both policy and research” (Dwivedi 2002: 716-717).

Similarly, Koenig (2001:1) described IRR as probably “the dominant model used to approach involuntary resettlement within the context of large-scale projects.” As will be outlined in sections below, however, IRR has been the focus of numerous critiques.

## **2.6 World Bank Operational Policy 4.12 on Involuntary Resettlement**

The key objectives and principles of the World Bank’s Operational Policy 4.12 on Involuntary Resettlement<sup>11</sup> are as follows:

- Involuntary resettlement should be avoided where feasible, or minimized, exploring all viable alternative designs.
- Where it is not feasible to avoid resettlement, resettlement activities should be conceived and executed as sustainable development programs, providing sufficient investment resources to enable the persons displaced by the project to share in project benefits.
- Displaced persons should be meaningfully consulted and should have opportunities to participate in planning and implementing resettlement programs.
- Displaced persons should be assisted in their efforts to improve the livelihoods and standards of living or at least to restore them, in real terms, to pre-displacement levels or to levels prevailing prior to the beginning of project implementation, whichever is higher.<sup>12</sup>

Many resettlement specialists, including those critical of the World Bank, agree that the World Bank’s policy goes further than any other development institution policy in terms of providing proscriptions for the prevention and mitigation of the negative

---

<sup>11</sup> Henceforth, this policy will be referred to as “the involuntary resettlement policy,” “the World Bank’s policy,” or “the safeguard policy.” Readers should note that there are other World Bank “safeguard policies,” however, these other policies are not addressed in this dissertation.

<sup>12</sup> A more detailed description of the World Bank’s Involuntary Resettlement Policy as it applies to the specific project investigated in this dissertation is included in Chapter IV.

effects of displacement and resettlement. This consensus, however, does not equate with approval.

The criticism that is most pertinent to this dissertation is that inconsistencies still exist between policy and practice. Despite the World Bank's and other institutions' DIDR safeguard policies and guidelines (and their many revisions), examples of "successful" resettlement have been minimal. de Wet (2004:1) explains that successful resettlement "would seem to require resettled people being economically better off and living in socially stable and institutionally functional communities, in a sustainable manner." In the "overwhelming majority of cases" displaced people are left worse off than before and suffer socio-economic impoverishment. Why policies are not adhered to in implementation is a topic of dispute among many in the literature. Explanations are presented in various critiques of the World Bank policy and process and IRR in particular.

## **2.7 Critiques of IRR and DIDR safeguard policies**

A limited set of authors have critiqued IRR and, either directly or by implication, the World Bank or other DIDR safeguard policies. Oftentimes, critiquing authors are not explicit as to whether they are critiquing DIDR safeguard policies, the IRR framework that is supportive of such policies, or both. This section, therefore, addresses these critiques together. I outline some of the more prominent critiques and explain if and how these critiques influenced my use of IRR as part of my larger research framework.

### **2.7.1 Operational critiques**

Two primary operational critiques have been leveled at the IRR framework. Neither of these critiques influenced the substantive manner in which I operationalized IRR. Nonetheless, I briefly present them and explain why these critiques did not influence this research.

The first operational critique is that the segmentation of risks in IRR does not enable analysis of the links between risks, or what Dwivedi refers to as the “composite nature of risks” (2002). As Agrawal and Redford (2007:7) explain, this is especially problematic because the framework subsequently “lacks a concerted approach to reconstruction.” In other words, Agrawal and Redford claim that IRR is “silent” on how addressing one risk can affect outcomes related to other risks. Similarly, Dwivedi (2002) argues that directly addressing losses (i.e. land for lost land; jobs for lost jobs) may not allow the flexibility for affected people to choose how they wish to be compensated with, for example, jobs for lost land. While Cernea has not directly responded to this critique, his descriptions of IRR emphasize that IRR is purposefully abstract with regard to the specific configuration of the system of risks in any particular context. I accept the purposeful abstractness of IRR in this regard and argue that these critiques are inappropriate because they point towards IRR’s failure to perform a function that the framework was not intended to perform.

While I do not agree with the above criticisms, I do agree with Agrawal and Redford’s (2007) contention that Cernea initially mislabeled IRR as a “model” rather than a “framework,” possibly contributing to expectations that are not consistent with the intentions of IRR. Citing Ostrom (1999:39-40), Agrawal and Redford (2007) explain that a framework “identifies the elements and relationships among elements for guiding

analysis” whereas a model states “the precise relationships among the variables that lead to outcomes.” In recent writings, Cernea himself has used the term “framework” instead of model. In this dissertation I refer to IRR as a framework.

A second operational critique is that IRR neglects a temporal dimension. Displacement and resettlement, and especially the manifestation of the various consequences, unfold as a process. Dwivedi argues instead for a process-based framework that captures the complex sequence of displacement events. Again, Cernea has argued that context is important and that when and how risks will specifically manifest in a particular place and amongst a particular people will differ. While IRR does not directly address a temporal dimension, it is flexible enough to account for temporal differences.

### **2.7.2 Conceptual critiques: “Risk”**

As previously mentioned, the IRR framework relies on the concept of risk, which Cernea (relying on Giddens 1990) defines as the possibility that a certain course of action will trigger future injurious effects-losses and destruction. For Cernea, risk is an objective reality. This definition of risk is contested in displacement literature in particular and in the larger risk literature in general. In this section, I present two perspectives on risk from the displacement literature. I then clarify these displacement-oriented perspectives of risk by juxtaposing them with well-established perspectives in the general risk literature. I then explain how I define and use the term risk in this research.

Dwivedi (1999:46) argues that Cernea uses the term risk “almost synonymously with certainty.” Dwivedi suggests that this is a prudent use of the term for the purposes

of a “warning model”—one of the functions of IRR—but that it is important to maintain a conceptual distinction between risk and certainty. Drawing from Beck (1993), Dwivedi (1999:46) argues instead that risk is socially constructed; it is “the subjective probability calculations of actors.” These calculations are about the *uncertainty* of outcomes.

Dwivedi further explains that actors’ subjective probability calculations are influenced by political-economic and environmental conditions (in which actors are differentially embedded) and are affected by cultural norms as well as legal and policy frameworks for compensation.

de Wet (2004) positions himself in a middle ground between Cernea and Dwivedi. He agrees with Cernea that there are objective conditions and tendencies in DIDR which, if not countered, will likely lead to negative outcomes for displaced people. de Wet also agrees with Dwivedi that it is important to distinguish between certainty and uncertainty and between objective conditions and subjective calculations. de Wet suggests that the term “risk” is best suited for dealing with uncertainty and subjective calculations and that the term “threats” is more appropriate for the realm of certainty and objectivity that Cernea and IRR address. de Wet gives a dictionary definition of threats as “an indication of imminent harm, danger or pain; a person or thing that is regarded as dangerous or likely to inflict pain or misery” (Collins English Dictionary of the English Language, 1982:1513, cited in de Wet 2004:54).

Although often confounded in common non-technical language, the concepts of risk and uncertainty are specific and technically defined terms in risk literature. Frank Knight’s classic 1921 book “Risk, uncertainty and profit” defined the differences



between risk and uncertainty (and by implication, certainty). Adams (1995:25)

summarizes Knight's distinction:

- If you don't know for sure what will happen, but you know the odds, that's *risk*,
- If you don't even know the odds, that's *uncertainty*.

For the purposes of this research, and accounting for Knight's classic definition of risk, I use a definition of risk that borrows from each of the perspectives presented above.

Cernea consistently asserts that there is a *high probability* that eight types of impoverishment will manifest in DIDR if actions are not taken to prevent or mitigate them. Cernea is not stating that this is a certainty. Cernea is also not providing the specific odds that any or all of the impoverishment types will occur, nor is the IRR framework intended to determine these odds in specific contexts. Cernea is, however, clearly asserting that, based on consistent empirical analyses, the odds are high that impoverishment will occur and that it will generally follow the pattern outlined in IRR.

With regard to subjectivity, Cernea recognizes that different actors may perceive risk differently; however, he chooses to focus on what others in the risk literature refer to as "actual risk" (Adams 1995) or objectively measured risk. As Dwivedi (1999) points out, focusing on actual risk may be more effective at capturing the attention and financial support of the World Bank or borrower governments to address negative impacts on displaced people. Such a focus, however, may discount actors' behavior in response to subjective risk calculations. These behaviors may increase or decrease the probability that they or others will experience the negative effects of displacement and resettlement.

For this dissertation, I employ a middle ground position which incorporates both subjective and objective characteristics of risk. I use the term risk, in part, as Cernea does, as the objectively measurable probability of a certain negative outcome. In other

words, I accept that there is an objectively measurable probability that displaced people will, for example, suffer landlessness if actions are not taken to prevent or mitigate landlessness. In line with Dwivedi, however, I also accept that risk is subjectively perceived by actors who are differentially situated within political-economic contexts and who have varying levels of access to knowledge.

Also in line with Dwivedi, I accept that actors' behavior in response to perceived risk may influence how and why displaced people are affected. I, therefore, see it as important to investigate both the objective and subjective influences on the possibility that displaced people will suffer landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, etc. I detail the specific manner in which I operationalize risk and the IRR framework in Chapter III.

### **2.7.3 Why do people continue to be impoverished by displacement?**

A third set of critiques more directly addresses the issue raised at the end of the previous section: Why, despite advanced understanding of DIDR impoverishment risks and the adoption of safeguard policies intended to prevent or mitigate these risks, do affected people continue to be further impoverished by development?

In the subsections below, I present three responses to this question. These responses also serve as critiques of IRR and the World Bank's and other similar safeguard policies. In these subsections, I present these critiques to the best of my ability as their authors do, absent of my interpretation. All of these critiques either directly or indirectly suggest that IRR and the World Bank's and other safeguard policies do not address political issues regarding the causes of displacement. These critiques set up the following section that addresses how and why I address the causes of displacement in this research.

### 2.7.3.1 DIDR is inherently complex

The title of de Wet's (2004) critique is "Why do things so often go wrong in resettlement projects?" In responding to this question, de Wet presents a critique of IRR that challenges the basic assumptions of the framework and involuntary resettlement policy initiatives. As de Wet emphatically explains, however, his argument "is in no way an attempt to do away with existing policy initiatives or with Cernea's risk and reconstruction approach" (2004:66). Instead, de Wet is questioning the process of resettlement and the usefulness of beginning academic or planning interventions from the "boundedness of framework and procedure."

de Wet characterizes two distinct "diagnoses" of the problem of why things so often go wrong in resettlement: "inadequate inputs" and "inherent complexity." In the former approach, with which de Wet aligns IRR and the policies of the World Bank, resettlement is perceived to go wrong because of a lack of proper inputs, such as national legal frameworks and policies, political will, funding, pre-resettlement surveys, planning consultation, careful implementation, and monitoring. Lack of these inputs leads to the manifestation of the eight types of impoverishments identified in the IRR framework. The associated assumption is that with sufficient inputs, "the general risk pattern inherent in displacement *can be controlled through a policy response*" (Cernea 2000:34); and that impoverishment risks can be turned into reconstruction opportunities so that resettlement itself becomes a development initiative. The problems of resettlement are operational and can be overcome through adequate inputs.

In contrast, the "inherent complexity" approach, which de Wet aligns himself with, argues that the problem of failed resettlement is the result of a failure to examine decisions and processes at the systemic level. He argues that the nature of involuntary

resettlement is characterized by a complexity which leads to problems that cannot be addressed by providing the kind of inputs mentioned above (52). “There is a complexity in resettlement which arises from the interrelatedness of a range of issues of different orders: cultural, social, environmental, economic, institutional and political issues—all of which is taking place in the context of imposed spatial change” (62).

Similar to Cernea, de Wet argues that the basic characteristics of DIDR (including, among others, changing resource access, involvement of affected people in wider political structures, accelerated socio-economic change driven by powerful external entities) lead to risks of impoverishment. The basic characteristics of DIDR combine with problematic institutional factors, including: policy implementation challenges; mutually reinforcing critical shortages such as money, staff, skills, and time; the perception of resettlement as an external cost; and inadequate consultation and participation. These and other aspects of the resettlement process are not amenable to the rational planning approach that characterizes the “inadequate inputs” approach (other aspects include: politicized objectives and timelines, unanticipated outcomes, varying visions among actors, and unpredictable feedback into the process by actors). Further, de Wet argues, DIDR is imbued with challenging ethical issues that may also not be amenable to rational planning considerations. Some ethical questions include: Is it acceptable to impose a culturally specific view of development upon other people? Can we argue that, if there is no other way, that some should suffer for the greater good? Is compulsion ever acceptable?

Finally, the various complexities described above will likely lead to various consequences at and across different social and political scales: individual/household

level; community level; the level of the resettlement project as institutional process; national/regional level; and international level.

To summarize deWet's argument, the displacement and resettlement process is influenced by a complex interaction of all of the factors above. This results in outcomes that are not predictable and are not amenable to a rational planning process. Instead, de Wet argues for open-endedness, and flexibility to adapt to and take advantage of the inherent complexity of the displacement and resettlement process. "Trade-offs will have to be negotiated and lessons learned on an ongoing basis, project by project" (66). de Wet suggests building in the open-endedness and flexibility by:

1. employing a democratic, participatory approach to project planning and implementation;
2. making available a wide range of resettlement and compensation options; and
3. adopting a flexible, learning-oriented approach to resettlement projects.

de Wet recognizes that such an open-ended and flexible approach may be resisted by planners, implementers, and funders, all of whom might prefer clear boundaries, time lines, and generally greater control over projects. His recommendations imply a significant shift in the political dynamics of planning for displacement and resettlement.

#### 2.7.3.2 IRR has a managerial orientation

A second critique of IRR that addresses political dynamics is that IRR presents only a managerial perspective. Dwivedi (2002) frames his critique by drawing a sharp distinction between two broad categories of approaches to investigating DIDR—"reformist managerial" and "radical movementist" approaches. In summarizing the different areas of focus for reformist managerial and radical movementist approaches, Dwivedi explains that the reformist managerial approach focuses on displacement's

consequences and the radical movementist approach focuses on displacement's causes. Dwivedi characterizes IRR as part of the former approach.

Dwivedi associates the reformist-managerial approach with applied researchers and development planners and managers. In a reformist-managerial approach, DIDR is assumed to be 'necessary and inevitable' and resulting impoverishment risks are generally predictable and either preventable or capable of being mitigated. These scholars and development practitioners, whose perspective Dwivedi (1999) and de Wet (2004) refer to as "optimistic in tenor," focus on *the problem of achieving just and proper resettlement*. Dwivedi argues that this approach tends to "normalize displacement as a consequence of development that has happened in the past and will happen in the future" (Dwivedi 2002:712). Along with the many publications of Cernea, Dwivedi also associates publications by Cernea and McDowell (2000) and Picciotto et al. (2001) with this perspective.

Dwivedi argues that the planner orientation of IRR operates in a top-down manner that limits the ability of affected people to define their losses or to express their opinions on decisions regarding displacement. In short, Dwivedi argues that IRR fails to give a voice to affected people. IRR's "usefulness is mainly in providing a tool to sensitize planners to the different forms of losses confronting a displaced population...the primacy of this function makes the IRR model a planner's tool, reflecting the managerial standpoint that 'proper' resettlement is the main problem field" (Dwivedi 2002:717).

In contrast to the reformist managerial approach, Dwivedi associates the radical movementist approach with action research scholars. Such scholars do not focus on achieving just and proper resettlement, but instead focus on "more fundamental political

issues of rights, governance and negotiation” (Dwivedi 2002:712). Consequences, or outcomes of displacement may be investigated in such scholarship; however, consequences are investigated as a means to critique development structures and political processes that lead to displacement’s consequences. The politics of development is the problem area for radical movementists, and displacement and resettlement failures are “symptoms of developmental failures” (Dwivedi 2002:712). Rather than seeking just and proper resettlement, radical movementists “seek new ways of imagining and doing development” (Dwivedi 2002:712).

Dwivedi concludes that reforms focused on improving displacement’s outcomes “can only be a short-term policy corrective [and that] in the near future, policies addressing the question of displacement will need to move beyond a focus on damage control, as is the case with the managerial approach....The long-term policy objective must be to separate development from displacement. In other words, policy actions that have displacement as an outcome cannot qualify as developmental” (Dwivedi 2002: 730). Dwivedi recognizes that the image, let alone the practice of such an image of development “awaits a fuller exposition” (730).

#### 2.7.3.3 IRR does not explicitly address political dynamics

Numerous authors have written about the political dynamics that underlie DIDR, the implementation of safeguard-type policies, and the continued impoverishment of affected people. Oliver-Smith (2005:191) writes that although resettlement projects are often defined in economic terms, “resettlement is fundamentally a political phenomenon involving the use of power by one party to relocate another.” Turton (2000) focuses on the political tensions with regard to State sovereignty in situations when international

organizations, such as the World Bank, impose safeguard-type conditions on loans and other forms of financing. Fox (2000) focuses on institutional politics. He argues that the reasons for non-compliance with the World Bank's safeguard policy has to do with an "institutional logic" that dissuades World Bank project managers from raising concern and disrupting relations between the World Bank and borrower governments. Turton (2000) also notes that raising concern may have a negative impact on career advancement for World Bank employees. de Wet (2001:12) writes that development lending institutions' strong enforcement of safeguard policies and/or withdrawal from projects experiencing safeguard non-compliance might slow or bring to a halt development projects which are "integral to a capitalist-oriented bank's vision of development in the first place." These and other authors (Barutciski 2000) have written about the conflicting interests of the State as both the instigator of displacement and the entity safeguarding affected people. As Turton (2000:59) explains, "In forced resettlement...the state is both the problem and solution, the key player as well as the referee."

A foundational premise of the IRR framework is that there is an inequitable distribution of development's benefits and losses in cases where people are displaced. Further, the risks in the IRR framework, most especially the risks of social disarticulation and marginalization, can be interpreted as being imbued with political dynamics. In these ways, the IRR framework can be argued to *implicitly* address political dimensions of DIDR. The IRR framework, however, does not contain an *explicit* orientation towards the political dynamics influencing why and how displacement decisions occur and why and how displacement occurs the way that it occurs (often without adequate compensation or reconstruction of displaced persons livelihoods).



Numerous authors have commented on the absence of an explicit political dimension in IRR. Agrawal and Redford (2007:7) note that IRR “fails to consider the political and ethical context within which displacement occurs.” Dwivedi argues that IRR is “bereft of the causal dimension of displacement, the structures of power, and global political economic processes that generate it. These aspects,” Dwivedi argues “are crucial to any interrogation in displacement research.”

Consistent with Cernea and nearly every other author in displacement literature, Koenig (2001) argues that inequity, especially with regard to power relations, lies at the heart of understanding why and how people are (further) impoverished through DIDR. Koenig’s main argument is that analyses of DIDR have focused on the economic aspects of resettlement and neglected the political. “The focus has been mostly on the resettled communities themselves rather than on the relationship of the resettled communities to their national and regional systems.” She argues that neither IRR nor any other framework or model explicitly addresses the larger political processes underlining societal change or explicitly integrates these processes into planning. “...approaches to resettlement that overlook the distribution of societal power ignore crucial conflicts of interest among different stakeholders in the resettlement process. The first step in ‘doing resettlement as development’ is to define development in a way that takes distribution of both power and resources into account” (Koenig 2000:4).

## **2.8 Addressing the political dynamics of DIDR**

Various authors address the need to explicitly incorporate power inequities into DIDR planning. Koenig (2004) in particular outlines steps to be taken to address power inequities in planning for and carrying out DIDR. These authors, however, do not

directly address the power and politics of the decision to displace and resettle people. Addressing the power and politics of the decision to displace and resettle people is the heart of the first question this research investigates: ***What factors influenced decision-making regarding the displacement of BNP-area residents and how?***

As discussed earlier, a primary justification for DIDR is that it is done in the “public interest” and that the costs imposed on displaced people are for the benefit a larger society. Addressing the power and politics of a decision to displace and resettle people involves asking who is defining the public interest, based on what, and why?

There is a long and rich tradition of literature that addresses questions of the power and politics of decisions justified as being in the public interest. In this dissertation, I rely on three long-established perspectives on power: political economic, actor-centered, and post-structural perspectives. In this section I introduce these three perspectives and explain their relevance to DIDR and to my first research question.

In short, a political economy perspective assumes that historical and macro-scale structures constrain or enable actors’ decision-making behaviors. A political economic approach, therefore investigates these structures and their influences. An actor-centered perspective assumes that actors have free will regardless of the influence of political economic structures. An actor-centered approach, therefore, investigates the political dynamics among individuals and their roles as they advance their interests through decision-making processes. Like an actor-centered perspective, a post-structural perspective moves beyond the structural determinism of political economy. Unlike either an actor-centered or political economic perspective, however, a post-structural perspective assumes that decision-making is as much a subjective struggle over meaning

as it is a battle over real, material practices. A post-structural approach, therefore, investigates the influence of dominant meaning or ideas in decision-making.

During the last century, these three perspectives emerged and changed in response to one another with certain perspectives dominating social theory for various periods. Periods of dominance of one perspective have been followed by the revitalization of another. This constant shifting of dominance in social theory is evidence of the tensions between agency and structure, macro and micro, and material and symbolic influences. *By employing all three perspectives in this dissertation, I am aiming to understand the whole that these tensions help maintain.* Below is a brief outline of each of these perspectives, their relationships with each other, and their relevance to displacement decision-making.

### **2.8.1 Political Economy**

The term “political economy” is associated with neo-Marxist theories of Underdevelopment / Dependency Theory and World Systems Theory.<sup>13</sup> I do not provide a detailed explanation of these well-established theories; instead I present examples of and sufficient background to these theories so that I can discuss their application to the politics of displacement decision-making. The general point of this section is that a political economic perspective frames the influences on displacement decision-making as emanating from an historical, macro-scale focus on political and economic structures fueled by the logic of capitalist expansion. The focus on structures both establishes and perpetuates inequitable terms of economic exchange between so-called “developed” and “less-developed” states and regions as well as between classes and groups within those

---

<sup>13</sup> Galtung’s (1971) Theory of Imperialism is also often lumped in with Underdevelopment / Dependency and World Systems Theory as being part of the wave of neo-Marxist theories in the 1960’s and 1970’s.

states and regions. Actors' or actor groups' abilities to influence displacement decision-making is either constrained or enabled by their positioning within the political economic structure.

According to the political economic theories mentioned above, inequitable political economic structures long existed in tribal divisions and contests and were later strongly entrenched in the colonial division of labor. In this system of economic exchange, colonizers exploited cheap and unskilled labor to extract and export raw materials from colonized lands at low prices. Colonizers then manufactured these materials and sold them for significantly higher prices (oftentimes goods were sold back to colonized people and nations). Examples include the extraction and exportation of gold and diamonds from South Africa by Britain and their subsequent manufacturing and sale as jewelry and other goods (McMichael 2003). In Mozambique, the Portuguese colonizers transformed the rural economy to produce cotton as an export crop. The cotton was subsequently manufactured into textiles and sold by Portugal. The colonial division of labor briefly described here facilitated dependency of the raw material export-oriented poor countries on the manufacturing import-oriented rich countries and exacerbated inequalities between rich and poor.

According to a political economic perspective, the structure of dependency and exploitation established by the colonial division of labor was perpetuated after independence through bi-lateral and multi-lateral loan and other agreements that directed poor countries' development, overhauled their political and economic systems, and strengthened elitist local classes.<sup>14</sup> As example, the bi-lateral and multi-lateral loan agreements of the post-WWII decolonization and development era are particularly

---

<sup>14</sup> The strengthening of elitist local classes often overlapped racial and tribal divisions.

relevant to DIDR and displacement decision-making. Bi-lateral and multi-lateral loan agreements in this period were oriented towards developing major infrastructure, such as dams, roads, and electricity grids. As detailed in previous sections of this chapter, these projects displaced and, typically, inadequately resettled millions of people. While the source of operational decisions regarding who was displaced from where likely varied from case to case, a political economic perspective would argue that the initial decision to displace people for the “greater good of development” was heavily influenced, if not determined, by actors in powerful positions within the world capitalist system.

Also relevant to a political economic perspective on displacement decision-making are the political and economic conditions imposed on borrower nations through Structural Adjustment Programs. These World Bank and International Monetary Fund programs imposed major free-market reforms on borrower states that encouraged greater specialization and exportation of goods to increase foreign exchange and ultimately increase poorer nations’ capacity to pay off previously accrued loans. The radical adjustment of national economies often imposed shocks that directly or indirectly led to the displacement and /or impoverishment of people in poorer countries. Again, while operational decisions leading to displacement and /or impoverishment likely varied from case to case, a political economic perspective would identify the major forces leading to displacement as emanating from the imposition of certain policies by more powerful actors on less powerful actors. Further, the relative power of these actors is determined by their position within the global capitalist system.

In short, a strict political economic perspective maintains that the position of actors within the world capitalist system determines their ability to influence decision-

making regarding displacement. Investigating displacement decision-making in a specific context, therefore, involves investigating how particular states and actor groups within states are positioned within the structure of the world capitalist system. This requires investigating colonial economic arrangements that first established inequitable relations. It also requires investigating relevant bi-lateral and multi-lateral agreements that perpetuate such inequities. These agreements may be directly tied to a project involving displacement or they may be influential in structuring the political and economic policies of a country, region, or specific locality.

### **2.8.2 Actor-Centered**

Beginning in the early 1980's, strict structuralist interpretations of political economy were critiqued as too deterministic (Ortner 1984). Global capitalism in political economy was presented as not only shaping but determining heterogeneous local histories, cultures, societies (Moore 1996), and decision-making processes. Power in political economy was uni-directional and history was focused on the influence of capitalism (and westernization more generally) on societies, villages, individuals, and political decision-makers; people were regarded as passive reactors to political economic structures (Ortner 1984) or even victims of it.

By the late 1980's, authors such as Blaikie and Brookfield (1987), Guha (1989) and Hecht and Cockburn (1989), Neumann (1992), Peluso (1992), Neumann and Schroeder (1995), Peet and Watts (1996) all sought to demonstrate a more complex understanding of how power relations among people, cultures, castes, and other groups have additional logics and conflicts and therefore mediate human-environmental interaction and decision-making. Rather than analyzing only the structural dimensions of

the social distribution of power, these authors also focus on power and human agency. These studies investigated the micro-sociological aspects of power and embedded these investigations within larger political economic structures. This approach to understanding power relates to the tactical or strategic exercise of power through the mechanics of social interaction (Few 2002). I refer to this general family approaches as “actor-centered” perspectives.

Few (2002) outlines three key points of an actor-centered perspective that directly apply to investigations of factors influencing displacement decision-making. First, power is multifaceted; different types of power exist and they are dispersed throughout society, rather than concentrated solely in the hands of the ‘dominant.’ This implies that those facing the possibility of displacement as well lower-level political decision-makers are not destined to a fate or a particular decision determined by their positioning in the world economic system. Second, power is entangled in social relations between agents that differ in their interests, identities, and resources. This implies that the relations between actors and actor groups involved in or affected by displacement decision-making are influential. Third, social power is articulated through complex mechanisms including tactics of negotiation, resistance, and coalition. This implies that even if political economic structures and other forces prevent certain actor groups from fully achieving their aims, actors can influence outcomes to achieve smaller victories.

In short, those influencing decisions with regard to displacement are not passively responding to the constraining or enabling forces of the political economic structure within which they are embedded. Instead they are active agents with differing interests, identities, and resources, and they articulate power through negotiation, resistance, and

coalition with other actors within political economic structures. To understand the power or influence that actors or actor groups have in displacement decision-making it is necessary to identify 1) who is potentially affected by, or who has an interest in displacement decision-making, 2) what are their interests, 3) how do they pursue their interests, and 4) how do the political dynamics between groups influence the process and outcome of decision-making.

Another position in the debate regarding the relative importance of an actor versus a structural or political-economic orientation tends toward a middle ground that acknowledges the reciprocal influence of both. As example, Giddens theory of structuration claims that agency and structure are mutually produced; it is impossible to understand one without the other. Actors produce structures and structures constrain and enable human agency (Glaspell 2002). In Giddens's words, "social structures are both constituted by human agency, and yet at the same time are the very medium of this constitution." As such it is important to understand the interaction of agency and structure more so than it is to understand only the influence that one has on the other, or vice versa.

### **2.8.3 Post-structural**

Both political economic and actor-centered perspectives on power focus on issues of material struggles over access to and control of resources and on objective accounts of the struggle. Escobar (1999) and Peet and Watts (1996), however, claim that decision-making is as much a subjective struggle over meaning as it is a battle over real, material practices. Similarly, Bryant and Bailey (1997) argue that conflict over environmental resources is "typically a struggle over ideas as to what constitutes 'appropriate'



environmental use and management.” I refer to the influence of meanings and symbolism in decision-making as a “post-structural” perspective on power.

Reason, and the modernist belief in progress are critically reinterpreted in post-structural thinking “as a mode of social control that acts openly through disciplinary institutions, in more disguised forms through rationalized socialization and, most subtly, through rational self-discipline” (Peet 1998:195).

In modernity, reason legitimates its interventions into the open arena of public order, and into the most personal reaches of the private mind through an appeal to truth. That is, reason produces truth, and truth guides good social practices—reasoned practices are true practices (Peet 1998:195)

In contrast, Foucault maintained that modern philosophy’s claim to *universal truth* (based on traditions begun during the Enlightenment) acts as a claim to *universal power*. As Young (1990) points out, the French poststructuralists were particularly concerned with the ‘truth’ and thus power claims behind European colonization. In a poststructuralist view, “Enlightenment reason is a regional logic supporting, reflecting, and justifying a history of global supremacy rather than a universal path to absolute truth. Reason, in a word, is ideological” (Peet and Watts 1996:14). Escobar (1993) and Peet and Watts (1996) later shifted the focus of analysis from colonial truth and power claims to the truth and power claims of Western development in the Third World.

The concept of discourse plays a fundamental role in understanding struggles over meanings and subsequently symbolic influences in displacement and other decision-making processes. Peet and Watts (1996) define a “discourse” as “an area of language use expressing a particular standpoint and related to a certain set of institutions. Concerned with a limited range of objects, a discourse emphasizes some concepts at the

expense of others” (14). Barnes and Duncan (1992:8 cited in Peet and Watts 1996:14) elaborate on this definition by describing discourses as “frameworks that embrace particular combinations of narratives, concepts, ideologies and signifying practices, each relevant to a particular realm of social action.” Hajer (1995:44) defines discourse as “a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorizations that are produced, reproduced, and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities.” In simpler words, a discourse is an accepted way of thinking that emphasizes some concepts and values at the expense of others. Discourse regulates ideas (Bryant and Bailey 1997). Power, in post-structuralist thinking, is a matter of who gets to choose the language of how struggles are occurring and thus regulate those ideas and whose interests are and are not served by that regulation.

A classic example of the post-structuralist’s focus on regulation of ideas are the claims by political and economic elites who often seek to justify environmental management practices in terms of ‘the greater social good’ (Bryant and Bailey 1997; Hajer 1995). This view is presented as a justification often associated with arguments for DIDR or development more generally. Post-structural analyses would respond by asking how specific displacement-inducing words, terms, ideas, and practices came to be understood as being for the greater social good. Whose words, terms, ideas, and practices are these? Whose interests are served by such an understanding? Whose interests are not served? Whose interests are served by displacement? Whose interests are served by the status quo? What is the distribution of consequences? And finally, what are alternative words, terms, ideas, and practices?

Hajer (1995) explains that political conflict is often hidden in the definition of a particular problem (a form of discourse). Defining a problem inevitably includes certain aspects of a situation and leaves out others, which are therefore less likely to be discussed. Hajer (1995:44) argues that discourse analysis “primarily aims to understand why a particular understanding of the environmental problem at some point gains dominance and is seen as authoritative, while other understandings are discredited.”

With regard to understanding the factors influencing displacement decision-making, a post structural perspective would lead me to ask what problem decision-makers think they are addressing by displacing or not displacing BNP residents. How and why has this or these definitions of the problem come to frame decision-making? Whose interests are served by this problem framing? Whose interests are neglected?

## **2.9 A Framework for understanding the causes and consequences of displacement**

The purpose of this final section is to present the framework that guided this research. To do so, I first summarize the major points made in this chapter. The research framework is presented as the synthesis of these main points.

The major points from this chapter include the following.

- Despite academic literature, institutional policies, and managerial practices to the contrary, in this dissertation, I treat the causes and consequences of displacement as inter-related and mutually influential.
- I contextualize displacement relating to protected areas within the larger concept and literature of Development-Induced Displacement and Resettlement (DIDR).
  - I focus on the term displacement rather than resettlement or any other term because the focus of this research is on actions and actors who physically remove and restrict access to resources rather than actions or actors who place affected people in a new location or otherwise aid people to resettle.

- I define displacement as either or both physical displacement and livelihood displacement.
- DIDR literature is characterized by strong interconnections among practice, policy, theory, and key development organizations. Specifically, the World Bank's major role in displacement and (often insufficient) resettlement led actors internal and external to the World Bank to press for policy reforms. The Impoverishment Risk and Reconstruction (IRR) framework and the World Bank's safeguard policy on involuntary resettlement were developed to aid in the World Bank's policy reform and resettlement practice.
- IRR identifies eight main risks that contribute to the impoverishment of displaced people: landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalization, food insecurity, morbidity and mortality, loss of access to common property resources, and social disarticulation. The purpose in identifying these risks is to be able to prevent or counter them through reconstruction efforts during resettlement. The risks represent a pattern of variables that occur differently in different contexts. IRR does not prescribe any inevitable relationship among risks.
  - IRR is a major component of the framework employed in this research. In using IRR, I employ a definition of risk that includes both subjective and objective characteristics of risk.
- The World Bank safeguard policy, revised numerous times since first being created in 1980, aims to prevent or mitigate harm to people displaced in World Bank-financed projects.
- Despite advanced understandings of displacement-related impoverishment risks and the implementation of the World Bank's and other similar safeguard policies, displaced people continue to be impoverished by displacement. Numerous critiques have been leveled at both the IRR framework as well as the World Bank safeguard policy because of the continued impoverishment.
  - One critique is that neither the IRR framework nor the safeguard policy account for the "inherently complexity" of displacement decisions and resettlement processes. Such decisions and processes are influenced by various interrelated political, economic, and social factors (de Wet 2004).
  - Another critique is that IRR and the safeguard policy represents a managerial perspective that focuses on the operational problem of achieving a just and proper resettlement rather than focusing on the political question of whether people should be displaced.
  - These critiques are representative of a broader critique that in order to understand, prevent, and mitigate impoverishment related to displacement


and resettlement, we must understand the causes of displacement and not just the consequences of displacement.

- Although IRR implicitly addresses political issues regarding the causes of displacement, the framework was not created with the intention of guiding an explicit investigation of displacement's causes.
- Political-economy, actor-centered, and post-structural perspective on power represent three long-established social science traditions that investigate the political dynamics of decisions, like displacement decisions, which are justified as being in the public interest. I employ these perspectives in my investigation of the causes of displacement decision-making.

In order to address both the causes and consequences of displacement decision-making, in this research, I employ a single yet multidimensional framework. This framework, like IRR, addresses the consequences of displacement for displaced people. The consequences of displacement, however, are embedded within the political dynamics of the factors influencing (causes of) displacement decision-making. These causes are understood through the three perspectives on power mentioned above. Finally, in line with the emphasis on context in this research, I embed both the causes and consequences of displacement within a larger historical, political, and socio-ecological context. This three-level framework is the primary tool I use in this dissertation to address my research questions, to analyze my field research, and, hopefully, to make an original contribution to understanding the complex phenomenon of displacement.

I assume that each level of this framework is interrelated and mutually influential. In other words, I assume that the context influences the causes and consequences of displacement and that the causes of displacement influence the consequences of displacement. I further assume that investigating one level (context, causes, or consequences) will aid me in understanding the other levels. My research framework is illustrated in Figure 2.1.

**Figure 2.1 A Framework for understanding the causes and consequences of displacement**



## **CHAPTER III**

### **Methodology and the research process**

#### **3.1 Introduction**

One purpose of this chapter is to present and justify the major ideas, assumptions, and approaches that guided the methodology of this research. This methodology includes qualities of “interpretive” and “critical” approaches to science (Neuman 2003), is “inquiry-guided” (Mishler 1990), and is informed by “Extended Case Method” (Burawoy 1998). I describe these in section 3.2 of this chapter. A second purpose of this chapter is to describe the components of and relationships between the components of the actual research process. The research process was cyclical and iterative and involved multiple research methods, and multiple approaches to data analysis. This research process and its components, including a detailed description of specific methods, are presented in section 3.3 of this chapter.

#### **3.2 Methodological Framework**

##### **3.2.1 Interpretive and Critical Approaches to Science**

Interpretive and critical refer to two approaches to science that maintain different but overlapping assumptions about the nature of reality and knowledge, influences on human behavior, and the goals and roles of a researcher. Rather than detailing these two approaches, I will describe the assumptions I made in this research that are drawn from these two approaches and that shaped the methodology that I employed.

The emphasis in the framework presented in Chapter II on both objective, material as well as subjective, symbolic influences on the causes and consequences of displacement necessitated that I adopt more complex assumptions regarding the nature of reality than either a plural, dynamic, and subjective perspective or a singular, static, and objective perspective. In line with an interpretive approach, I assumed reality to be, in part, plural, fluid, and intentionally constructed through an ongoing process of social interaction and negotiation. Akin to a critical approach, I also assumed that the changing nature of reality was influenced by social, political, and cultural structures including factors of which actors may be unaware. For example, underlying individual perspectives and social relations may be unperceived structures of power such as in global, regional, or local political and economic systems. I assumed these structures to be “out there,” existent in the world regardless of whether individuals understood them or attached meaning to them. In other words, I assumed that individual perspectives and socially-constructed meanings are important to understand, however, they need to be understood within the larger social structures and situations in which they are embedded.

Behavior, I assumed, is not *determined* by socially constructed meanings or political, economic, or other structures (hidden or otherwise). Rather behavior is influenced by a dialectic of the two. People are neither masters of their own destinies nor victims of the structures that constrain them. “In a nutshell,” explains Neuman (2003:84) alluding to Marx, “people do shape their destiny, but not under conditions of their own choosing.”

My purposes in conducting this research also share characteristics of both interpretive and critical approaches to science. In short, these purposes were to



understand a phenomenon, both its objective characteristics and its social construction, and to change it. The former purpose is common and does not require further elaboration. The latter purpose requires explanation.

A critical approach to science emphasizes uncovering hidden, material structures in the world that lead to oppressive social relations, oftentimes involving marginalized groups of people. A goal of a critical approach to science is to reveal these structures in order to alter those social relations. As Neuman (2003:83) explains, doing so requires “intense and directed questioning, a good theory about where to look, *a clear value position*, and a historical orientation” (emphasis added). Value positions, Neuman (2003) later explains, may be adopted from various theoretical traditions, such as Marxism, feminism, and others.

Similar to the aims of a critical approach to science, part of the reason I conducted this research was to influence social change, specifically regarding the causes and consequences of displacement in BNP and elsewhere. The intended audience for this research extends well beyond fellow academics. Oral and written products of this research were (and will continue to be) aimed at helping research participants and others better understand the social order in which they are embedded so that they may better function in that social order and/or alter it. By doing so I am changing the phenomenon that I am studying. Unlike an ideal-type critical approach, however, I did not have a specific value orientation or social outcome in mind at the beginning of research. As example, although IRR is oriented towards a managerial perspective, I did not undertake this research for the sole purpose of aiding government or other managers. Furthermore, taken together, the perspectives on power presented in Chapter II do not privilege the

advancement of the interests of any particular person, group of people, or institution. In general, I aim for my research to be as helpful to managers as it is to displaced park inhabitants, and NGO and World Bank employees.

### **3.2.2 Inquiry-guided research**

The theoretical and methodological frameworks, methods, and findings are presented in this dissertation in a linear manner that is intended to aid a reader's understanding. These components of the research, however, were not developed, chosen, or employed in a linear manner. Instead, they were the outcome of an emergent iterative process over the course of the study. Mishler (1990) refers to this as "inquiry-guided" research.

Throughout the research process, I continually analyzed the continuity between my observations, framework, and interpretations and allowed them to shape and reshape each other. This continuous analysis influenced my choice of methods in specific circumstances and my choices of whom and what should be the focus of investigation. My evolving understanding of the phenomenon under study also influenced my choices with regard to the role that I played in relation to research participants throughout the research process. The implication of this is that I did not base research decisions on a pre-established set of rules or procedures. Rather I used my professional judgment to respond to new information, changing circumstances, and my continuous interpretation of events and contexts (Mishler 1990).

This is a particularly important point because the research context I was investigating was highly complex and dynamic. As example, I was unaware at the beginning of my main fieldwork period that certain actors had already made decisions

and taken actions to displace BNP-area residents. I had intended to focus my research on decision-making regarding the *possible* displacement of BNP residents. Upon learning that certain actors had made decisions and taken action regarding displacement of BNP-area residents, I altered my research to investigate this real and on-going decision-making process. I also chose to expand my research to investigate the unfolding real consequences of displacement decision-making.

As the research process continued, and specifically as I interacted with certain key informants knowledgeable about the consequences of displacement and resettlement, I decided to incorporate IRR<sup>15</sup> as a tool for investigating the consequences of displacement decision-making. As I progressed even further in the research process, I became more cognizant of the importance of understanding both the causes and consequences of displacement as well as the relationship between causes and consequences. This subsequently led me to adjust the framing of my research and led to the research framework presented at the end of Chapter II.

### **3.2.3 Moving beyond the particularities of a case study**

As described in Chapter I, this research was designed in part as a response to a call by certain authors (Brockington, Igoe, and Schmidt-Soltan 2006; Redford, personal communication 2006; Wilkie et al. 2006) for more case-specific investigations to understand under what conditions or contexts different protected area management approaches regarding displacement are appropriate. The focus of this research therefore is to understand, in-depth and detail, context-dependent causes and consequences of decision-making in BNP. Because my research focuses on understanding the

---

<sup>15</sup> I had read numerous articles and book chapters regarding IRR before my main fieldwork period and was generally familiar with the framework.

particularities of a group of people and a place, a case study is most appropriate for this research.

By “case,” I am referring not simply to a set geographical space (i.e. BNP) or a set group of people (i.e. residents of BNP). Rather I use the term “case” to also include social relationships or activities that extend beyond the physical boundaries of the park and its residents and include links to other social settings and external forces. In other words, the focus of this research is about both the particularities of a specific, geographically-bounded place and a specific group of people *and* the larger social context in which the case is embedded.

Because I focused, in part, on the *particularities* of a specific, geographically-bounded place and a specific group of people, I am not able to generalize my specific findings and interpretations to similar cases elsewhere. I am, however, able to contribute to broader debates regarding the appropriateness of displacement from strict protected areas and the usefulness of generalizable frameworks for analyzing displacement decision-making and its consequences.

To do this, I employed a methodological approach informed by Burawoy’s (1998) Extended Case Method. Extended Case Method involves four key components: intervention, process, structuration, and reconstruction. Below I briefly describe these four components and then explain how my methodological approach was informed by Extended Case Method.

First, like qualitative case study research, Extended Case Method recognizes the mutually-influential relationship between researcher and subject and embraces the “intervention” of a researcher. The influence of a researcher is not negative, rather it is an

inevitable part of research that is not controlled, but is a focus of reflection for the researcher. Second, a researcher employs a specific theory, model, or framework to understand the external social forces or processes at play in a particular case. Third, a researcher focuses on the “structuration” (Giddens 1991) of a case, or the dynamic and mutually influential relationship between case particularities and external forces and processes. Finally, a researcher analyzes how the unique structuration of a case might be anomalous to the theory, model or framework employed in the earlier stages of research. The purpose in doing this is to challenge existing theory and, if the anomalies are not so great, to alter or extend the theory to fit the anomalies understood in the study. In this sense, research employing Extended Case Method is generalizing. This generalization is not from a sample, exemplar case or cases to a population of similar cases. Instead the generalization is to theory. In this sense, Extended Case Method generates theory that, while holding the core postulates of previous theory, are more suited to contextual variations.

Theory is not always extended in this manner. At times the anomalies between cases and pre-existing theory are so great that the core postulates of previous theory are disputed. In such cases, a new theory is generated from the study. This theory is thus subject to extension and refutation by future studies.

The role of theory in this dissertation is not as straightforward as is presented above. As described in Chapter II, I am simultaneously employing “theories” (or what authors have variously termed “models,” “frameworks,” or “perspectives”) including the Impoverishment Risk and Reconstruction (IRR) framework and political economic, actor-centered, and post-structural perspectives. I did this by embedding my

investigation of consequences (guided primarily by the IRR framework) within my investigation of causes (guided primarily by the three perspectives on power). Further, I embedded these investigations within an investigation of the specific context. Together, these three levels of investigation represent the single framework I used in this dissertation to address my research questions, to analyze my field research, and, hopefully, to make an original contribution to understanding the complex phenomenon of displacement. I did not predetermine the relationship between these levels of investigation. Instead, the framework emerged from my analysis.

By combining IRR with the power perspectives to investigate both causes and consequences, I am not “extending” theory as specifically suggested by Extended Case Method (Burawoy (1998)). In other words, I am not suggesting that IRR or the long-established perspectives on power should be altered because they do not adequately explain the particularities of my case. Doing so would not be consistent with the purpose of either IRR or the power perspectives. As example, IRR was not created with the intention to investigate causes of displacement decision-making.

Rather than “extending” theory, I used existing “theory” as building blocks for a framework that was appropriate to address my research objectives. Because my eventual three-level framework played a focal role in my analysis, I can discuss at a general level the usefulness of this framework for broader debates regarding the appropriateness of displacement from protected areas.

#### 3.2.3.1 Case selection

I chose the case of displacement decision-making regarding BNP and its consequences primarily because the situation regarding BNP encapsulated the general

characteristics of the larger problem area described in Chapter I. BNP is an inhabited, strict protected area. Among other factors, recent funding provided primarily through the larger Transfrontier Conservation Area Program, is enabling management of BNP after more than a 20-year period of no management. Mozambican government officials explained to me during an initial field visit in 2005 that issues regarding the future of people living in and around BNP would be addressed sometime in the near future. In other words, there was an impending decision regarding whether or not BNP residents would be displaced.

Furthermore, BNP, like most protected areas around the world, is not famous. Even though BNP is part of a well-known transfrontier conservation area, many people in conservation circles in the region are unfamiliar with BNP or even unaware of its existence. The people living in and around BNP, like most people living in and around protected areas around the world, are likewise not famous. There is little to no popular romantic appeal to the Shangaan people who live in and around BNP. I chose BNP, in part, because I believe the lack of a public spotlight on BNP and the people in the area makes BNP more like the large majority of protected areas in southern Africa and around the world. Displacement decision-making regarding BNP is part of what could be considered the “silent majority” of people and park situations.

There are seven communities that are either partially or wholly within the boundaries of BNP and that are located near the wetland in the northeast portion of the park.<sup>16</sup> There are three additional communities that are located wholly outside the

---

<sup>16</sup> There are other communities that are partially or wholly within the boundaries of the park but that are located far from the wetland. Based on observations, consultancy reports, and discussions with Mozambican government officials, NGO representatives, and consultants, I chose to exclude these communities and focus on the wetland area communities. I did this primarily because the wetland portion

boundaries of BNP but are near the wetland. As will be further described later in this chapter, I conducted research in all ten of the communities surrounding the wetland during my initial visit to the park in the 2006 field season. I refer to these ten communities in the rest of this dissertation as “BNP-area communities.” Within the constraints of this research, I could not conduct in-depth, detailed analysis of all ten communities. I subsequently chose to intensively research two BNP-area communities: Tchove and Hocuanhe. See Figures 3.1 and 3.2 below. My goals in choosing communities to intensively research were to identify communities in which the issues that I was studying were relevant and where I anticipated that I might find a diversity of perspectives and conditions. Specific selection criteria included:

- Degree of reliance of the community on park and wetland resources for livelihood purposes.
- Degree of resistance among community leaders and members to displacement efforts.
- Location of community with regard to park boundaries.
- Location of communities’ resettlement area as suggested by district authorities. Specifically, are people in the community being encouraged to congregate within their community or to congregate on lands controlled by another community?
- Practicality of conducting research in the community.
- Proximity of community to the park’s main camp.<sup>17</sup>


---

of the park was where the majority of the park’s human population was located, the wetland was the ecological focal point of the park, and any future tourism was likely to focus around the wetland portion of the park. Furthermore, in reports and conversations with government representatives, consultants, NGO representatives, and others, it was suggested that the boundaries of the park may be changed to exclude the land and communities away from the wetland.


<sup>17</sup> This was a criterion because communities further from the main camp had less interaction with park staff, consultants, and other park-related outsiders. I suspected that this might have influenced perspectives and conditions relevant to this research.



**Figure 3.1: Overlap of BNP and Chigubo District within Greater Limpopo Transfrontier Conservation Area**



**Figure 3.2: Distribution of BNP-area communities within Chigubo District**



Adapted from TFCATDP PAD 2005: 148

I chose Tchove because, more than any other community, the people of Tchove were beginning to resettle in response to recent district administration actions. Both the government appointed community president and the traditional leader of Tchove were openly advocating that their people resettle in accordance with the district administration's expressed desire. Some community members had already started to resettle. The boundaries of Tchove straddle the boundaries of the park and Tchove residents were being encouraged to resettle within the boundaries of Tchove but on the portion of the community's land that was outside the park. Tchove residents are highly dependent on park and wetland resources and the community is located close to the park's main camp and was a practical place to conduct intensive research.

I chose Hocuanhe because, more than any other community, the leaders and people of Hocuanhe were openly resisting displacement. The traditional leader,

government appointed community president, and the large majority of people from Hocuanhe who participated in the research openly opposed displacement. The boundaries of Hocuanhe are wholly within the boundaries of BNP and the location of the resettlement area suggested to them was on lands controlled by another community. The leadership and people of Hocuanhe are also heavily dependent on park and wetland resources. Hocuanhe is located far from the park's main camp, but was still a practical place to conduct research.

### **3.2.4 Nested scales and chains of explanation**

Consistent with the theoretical and methodological frameworks employed, I did not limit the unit of analysis in this research to the scale of the community or the park. Rather the units of analysis were at multiple, nested social organizational, temporal, and (to a lesser degree) geographic scales. In other words, I investigated individuals and groups associated with communities, the government, NGO's, the World Bank, consultants, and others. I investigated issues at the organizational scales of communities, districts, provinces, nations, regions, and the world. I investigated issues relating to contemporary, post-independence, colonial, and pre-colonial times. I investigated issues within the park and within communities. I also investigated issues geographically close to the park and the communities as well as issues within the larger geographic region. In all cases, I aimed to follow "chains of explanation" within and across these scales (Blaikie 1985; Blaikie and Brookfield 1987).

I focused my multi-scale investigation on a particular event that I wanted to understand. This event involved the actions of the district administration to promote the displacement and resettlement of BNP-area communities. I then sought understanding of

this event backwards in time and up and down in social organizational scales (Vayda 1999). In doing so I was seeking understanding of why this event occurred and what the consequences of it were for affected people.


As mentioned above, my investigation of both causes and consequences spanned scales from individuals to global organizations and structures. Investigation of the causes of displacement, however, focused primarily at and *above* the social organizational scale of the district while investigation of consequences focused primarily at and *below* the scale of the district. As is suggested here, I focused considerable attention on the district scale.

### **3.3 Operationalizing the methodological framework**

I operationalized the methodological framework through an iterative research process that is illustrated in Figure 3.3. The components of this process serve as the title of subsections below and include: planning data collection; data collection; data processing; data coding; analyzing relations among data, theory, and interpretations; examining my role; and writing. Perhaps most important to keep in mind while reading about the individual components detailed below is that I was often engaged in many if not all aspects of the research process *simultaneously*. At any particular time I may have been planning for, collecting, and processing new data; been at various stages of coding data previously collected; analyzing relations between data, theory, and interpretations with still other data; and reflecting on my role as a researcher. Each component of the research process was consistently influenced by changing contexts and my emerging understanding of the phenomenon under study. Also important to understand is that there are two loops represented in the research process. The larger outer loop represents the

research process just before and during my main fieldwork period. The smaller loop represents the process that has been occurring since I left Mozambique in December 2006.

**Figure 3.3: Research Process**



### **3.3.1 Planning data collection**

Unlike a uni-linear research process, planning for data collection occurred before and throughout the main fieldwork period and continued more sporadically afterwards. In preparing for field research, I had anticipated using methods including many forms of participant observation, interviews of various types, and analysis of planning, policy, and historical documents. I had also identified numerous key actors and actor groups to

interview and observe, and key policies, plans, and other documents to acquire and analyze.

After initiating the research process, I was constantly making judgments regarding the specific data collection methods I employed. My judgments were influenced by the other components of the research process. Most especially, however, I would plan data collection based on the need to follow-up on themes identified in my emerging understanding of the relationships among data, theory, and interpretations (described below). In planning data collection, I would ask myself how I could further investigate emerging themes. Would interviews, informal conversations, formal observations, focus groups, or some other method be appropriate for further investigating a particular theme? If I chose to interview someone, who would I interview? What questions would I ask that person? How would I ask those questions? What logistical arrangements were necessary? etc.

Furthermore, my judgments were influenced by my reflections on my role as a researcher in relation to the phenomenon I was studying. I would ask myself if there were any potential implications of me pursuing a particular theme. Were there any implications of me not pursuing a particular theme? Specifics regarding my reflections on my role as a researcher are detailed below.

### **3.3.2 Data Collection**

My use of multiple methods was not for the purpose of ensuring objectivity through triangulation. Rather the purpose was to increase opportunities to view the phenomenon under study from different perspectives (Belsky 2004). Having a “toolbox”

of possible methods also enabled me to be pragmatic and responsive to new knowledge and shifting conditions.

I organized this description of specific methods in categories based on each method type. This is as opposed to describing methods as they were used sequentially (although I do occasionally mention sequence when it is important). Descriptions are divided between methods used in the BNP area (meaning in and around the park and the ten communities in and around the park) and methods used elsewhere, primarily in the relevant district and provincial capitals and in the national capital of Mozambique.

#### 3.3.2.1 BNP-area methods

By BNP-area I am referring to the land and communities inside and proximate to the boundaries of the park. In total we<sup>18</sup> visited the BNP area three times for a total of seven weeks between July and December 2006. I also made one three-day visit to the BNP area in 2005.

BNP-area methods included various types of interviews with community leaders and household representatives; participant observation techniques including guided walks, drives, and resource use demonstrations, and temporary accommodation in BNP-area communities; and focus groups. Before explaining these methods, I first describe the extensive process of gaining permission to conduct research in the BNP area.

##### *3.3.2.1.1 Gaining Permission and Informed Consent*

All engagements with BNP-area people were preceded by a process of permission granting by appropriate officials at multiple political scales. This process was practically

---

<sup>18</sup> First person plural references refer to me, a translator and research assistant with whom I consistently worked, and others who aided in the research. I elaborate on the roles of the research assistant and others later in this chapter.

necessary, but also served as a means for me to experience and better understand government power structures, to build relationships with many key government actors, and to hear key actors' initial reactions regarding BNP displacement decision-making and its consequences. I acquired permission from the Ministry of Tourism's National Directorate for Conservation Areas, the provincial directorate of tourism for Gaza Province, and the District Administration of Chigubo. On entering each BNP-area community, I also went through a process of formally asking for and receiving permission to conduct research from the community president (a government-appointed leader) or the traditional leader, or ideally, both.

In each of these cases I would present officials with a folder of materials, most of which were in Portuguese and were given to officials to keep for their records. Materials included mine and my research assistant's credentials, a letter from my academic advisor, a letter from Eduardo Mondlane University in Mozambique stating support for the research, a two-page version of my research proposal, photocopies of my passport and study visa, and any documentation from other government officials regarding my research.

Finally, before engaging or formally observing any individuals in BNP-area communities I would ask for their informed consent to participate. In doing so, I explained who my research assistant(s) and I were, what the purpose of the research was, who we were and were not affiliated with, and what we were asking of them. I also explained that their identity would remain confidential and anonymous. I then asked for their permission to conduct an interview or to formally observe them or their surroundings. An overview of the informed consent process is presented in Appendix A.

#### *3.3.2.1.2 Interviews with community leaders*

A primary goal of our first visit to the BNP area was to introduce ourselves to the leaders of the ten BNP-area communities, gain permission from them to conduct research, and conduct interviews with leaders. This involved driving, oftentimes long distances, to each of the ten BNP-area communities. On arrival in a community center (typically where the school was located), we would ask to meet with community leaders. Sometimes leaders were immediately available to meet, other times we would be given a time and day to return and meet with leaders.

Attendance at these initial meetings varied greatly between communities. Some meetings only involved one community leader, either a community president or a traditional leader. Other meetings involved some combination of the formal community leadership. Still other meetings involved some combination from the leadership and a number of community members (up to 60 people attended one meeting).

I addressed interview questions to the most senior-level official present. My questions focused on community governance structures, demographics, availability of basic services (water, schools, clinics, roads, etc.), livelihoods (specifically relating to the wetland), and histories of inhabitation, displacement, and resettlement. In these early interviews, I only addressed current efforts to displace people if interviewees raised such issues without my prompting. The interview protocol is included in Appendix B. Interviews were often longer than two hours and were completed in one to three sessions depending on the energy levels and attentiveness of participants, the translator, and myself.



#### *3.3.2.1.3 Household interviews*

Other than large community meetings and focus groups (described below), formal engagement with BNP-area community members was conducted through household interviews. The purpose of household interviews was to gain greater depth of understanding regarding livelihoods, the importance of the wetland, histories of inhabitation, displacement, and resettlement, attitudes regarding current displacement efforts, and, most importantly, the real and potential risks related to displacement. In a first round of household interviews (n=22), I asked open-ended questions with regard to current displacement efforts. This was helpful in getting a broad understanding of the current situation and also allowed me to gauge research participants' comfort levels with regard to the situation.

In a second round of household interviews (n=12) I asked more specific questions regarding current displacement efforts. The purpose of these household interviews was to more explicitly explore displacement-related impoverishment risks based on the IRR framework. I developed questions intended to explore the different functions of IRR (described in Chapter II), the different temporal, subjective, and intensity dimensions of each of the risks in the system, and the relationships between risks. An interview protocol for each round of household interviews is included in Appendix C. I further discuss how I operationalized IRR in subsection 3.3.4.1 on "Theory and coding."

I focused the second round of household interviews primarily in Tchove because displacement was actually in progress in Tchove as opposed to Hocuanhe where the leadership and the majority of people in Hocuanhe were openly resisting displacement. In total, I conducted 34 households interviews.

I sought to interview a diversity of community members including representatives of households with no, some, or a lot of livestock; households located inside the park, in the buffer zone, and outside the park; households near the wetland and far from the wetland; households headed by males and females; those who had already resettled, were in the process of resettling, and had not resettled; those who supported resettlement and those who opposed it.

Seeking diversity in household interviews enabled me to investigate a range of perspectives regarding the causes and consequences of displacement. Another benefit of seeking diversity was that I was able to interact with community members that I was more involved in purposefully selecting. This is as opposed to interacting with community members that were selected for me by community leaders.

#### *3.3.2.1.4 Participant observation*

Participant observation aims to gain a close, intimate familiarity with a group of people and their practices through participation and observation of such people and practices in their usual or natural environment (Neuman 2003). Participant observation aims to gain an ‘insiders’ view that is sensitive to the perspectives of study participants. As Burawoy (1998) emphasizes though, a researcher will undoubtedly alter the setting and influence study participants.

Participant observation is not one technique, rather it involves numerous techniques. Techniques employed in this study that fall under the participant observation umbrella include: informal interactions resulting from accommodation arrangements in the BNP area, and walks, drives, and livelihood demonstrations led by BNP-area residents.

*3.3.2.1.4.1 Accommodation arrangements:* During travels within and between BNP-area communities we slept in various places throughout the BNP area. Staying in various places allowed for a lot of time for informal observations and interactions. We spent many nights at the research facility in park's main camp where we interacted frequently with park staff, many of whom were from BNP-area communities. One park staff, who became a key informant, had been the president of one of the BNP-area communities for nearly two decades.

When away from the main camp, we would ask for and receive permission to stay in BNP-area communities. Specific accommodations included individual homes, schoolhouses, clinics, or in a tent in a community common area. We also spent numerous nights in the floodplain area of the wetland where we would stay in temporary shelters that had recently been constructed. When in BNP-area communities, we would oftentimes eat dinner with community leaders, teachers, or other community members. We would also take morning and evening walks to casually observe community spatial arrangement and community members' activities.

*3.3.2.1.4.2 Guided walks, drives, and resource use demonstrations:* After interviews with community leaders or members of individual households, I would often ask them to guide us around their homestead (current and previous, if applicable), farmlands, grazing areas, places where they would collect non-timber forest products, and to their various sources of water. We would also drive to see these places if distances were great (or if research participants wanted to ride in my vehicle). These guided walks and drives enabled me to observe and ask questions about livelihoods, the spatial distribution of homes, farms, kraals, grazing areas, wells etc., and other issues pertaining to the research.

I would also observe and sometimes participate in livelihood activities during walks and drives. Sometimes I would ask people to demonstrate specific livelihood activities or teach me how to do certain activities.

When traveling between communities we would almost always be asked for lifts from community leaders or community members. If we had space, we almost always accommodated people. These drives offered additional opportunities to interact. It also helped me to understand the social networks among BNP-area communities.

#### *3.3.2.1.5 Focus groups*

Focus group meetings were a final BNP-area research method employed. I conducted four focus group meetings, two in Tchove and two in Hocuanhe. The primary purpose of focus group meetings was to investigate the relationship between livelihoods and the hydrological regime of the wetland. This was important in order to understand the potential and real livelihood consequences of displacement away from the wetland and possible restricted access to wetland resources. Consultancy reports, observations, and initial interactions with BNP-area residents suggested that livelihood activities and the role of the land and resources in the wetland area varied greatly throughout the cycles of the hydrological regime. A “snapshot” of livelihoods, therefore, would not capture the dynamic nature of BNP-area livelihood portfolios. Focus group meetings focused instead on understanding livelihood activities throughout a cycle of the wetland’s hydrological regime.<sup>19</sup>

---

<sup>19</sup> Focus group meetings were oriented towards understanding broad patterns regarding livelihood portfolios and dependence on wetland resources. While these broad patterns were important for this research, it is important to remember that individual and household livelihood portfolios and patterns differ. As one resident of Tchove stated, “different people have different survival strategies” (4 October 2006). I also explored the relationship between livelihoods and the wetland’s hydrological regime in household interviews, walks and drives, and in other interactions and observations.

Community leaders assisted in selecting focus group participants. I asked that groups of 15-20 people be organized representing a diversity of community members (male and female; old and young; those with and without livestock; and community members from different geographic areas within the community). Having community leaders invite focus group members was not ideal; however, I determined that attempting to organize focus group meetings without community leaders' assistance would have strained relations with community leaders. Doing so also did not seem culturally appropriate.

In the two focus groups in Tchove and in the first focus group in Hocuanhe, the leaders chose 20-30 participants representing the diversity that I requested. In the second focus group in Hocuanhe, however, more than 100 people attended. The large group made it difficult for me to conduct the focus group as I intended. The large group meeting did, however, enable me to listen to many community members whom I had not interviewed, observed, or otherwise interacted.

Discussions in focus groups were oriented towards understanding the relative importance of "home-based" versus "wetland" livelihood activities at different times throughout the wetland's hydrological regime. The term "home-based," in this context, refers to livelihood activities that occur in forested or cleared areas nearby people's homes. Out of the many livelihood activities that are home-based, I focused on agricultural practices (primarily sorghum, maize, fruits, and vegetables); the gathering of roots, fruits, bark, nuts, leaves and other non-timber forest products; and the acquisition of water for livestock and household use from surface water, hand-dug wells, boreholes, and other local sources. I differentiated these home-based livelihood activities from

those that occur in the wetland. Out of the many resources and livelihood activities that occur in the wetland, I focused on agricultural practices (primarily maize, fruits, and vegetables); the gathering of aquatic, semi-aquatic, and terrestrial plants, roots, and sap; fishing (both aquatic and terrestrial<sup>20</sup>); and the acquisition of water from hand dug wells.

In each focus group we would identify indicator livelihood activities (home-based and wetland) that were associated with periods when the water level in the wetland was high, medium, low, and dry. Together we would work through a year-by year timeline and discuss the relative importance of these livelihood activities. I would then compare this to mine and the groups' estimations of wetland water levels in different years.

I used the livelihood activities indicators and wetland water level estimates primarily as tools to guide conversations in the focus group meetings towards discussing the relationship between livelihoods and the wetland's hydrological regime. This technique enabled me to understand broad patterns in what is a much more complex relationship.

### 3.3.2.2 Non-BNP-area methods

Methods used in the BNP-area differed from those used outside of the BNP-area. These other areas primarily included relevant district and provincial capitals and the national capital of Maputo. I would also travel to various places in South Africa and Swaziland to interact with consultants and other key actors living outside of Mozambique. I was based in Maputo for five weeks in 2005 and for six months in 2006. I also returned to Maputo for five days in 2007. I had previously spent approximately six

---

<sup>20</sup> "Terrestrial fishing" refers to the capture of lungfish. Banhine-area lungfish burrow into the soil as the wetland dries and estivate, or become dormant. Lungfish can survive many years in dormancy before a major storm event fills the wetland and restores them. BNP-area people seek out and harvest lungfish in the banhine and consume them as a famine food.

weeks in Mozambique on numerous trips between 2001 and 2003 while I was living in neighboring Swaziland. I also visited Washington D.C. twice in 2007, primarily to interact with key actors associated with the World Bank.

#### *3.3.2.2.1 Semi-structured interviews*

I conducted interviews with park staff (from the lowest to the highest levels) (n=12)<sup>21</sup>, provincial and national employees of the Ministries of Tourism, Environmental Coordination, Planning and Development, and the numerous directorates associated with these ministries (n=24). I also conducted interviews with employees of Chigubo District and the administrative posts with jurisdiction in the BNP area (n=10). Other interviews were conducted with relevant consultants (n=7), NGO employees (n=8), and World Bank employees in both Mozambique and Washington, D.C. (n=5). These n values do not include dozens of open-ended interviews I conducted in 2005 with government, NGO, and World Bank employees and consultants involved in Mozambican and BNP-specific displacement issues.

I chose initial interviewees based on my early understanding of major actors and actor groups. I chose subsequent interviewees based on the need to follow-up on themes that emerged from early data gathering and analysis and on my choices regarding my role as a researcher. After identifying themes to be followed up, I would rely on key informants to help me identify interviewees that could elaborate on these emerging themes. I would also purposefully seek out interviewees that could help me understand

---

<sup>21</sup> Interviews with most lower-level park staff were conducted in the BNP-area, but are included in the description of non-BNP area methods because the interview techniques employed were similar to non-BNP area interviews.

these themes at different political and historical scales. This technique enabled me to be flexible and responsive to new information and changing circumstances.

Most interviews were conducted in person and a majority of non-BNP-area interviews were conducted without translation. In most cases, the translator was present during interviews with Portuguese speakers even if the conversation was in English. This enabled interviewees to speak in which ever language they felt most comfortable. I conducted some shorter interviews over the phone; these were always in English. I also conducted one interview via a series of e-mails.

Before each interview, I would prepare a list of questions and potential probes that would help structure the interview. Generally, questions were oriented towards investigating interviewees perspectives on the formal structures, rules, processes, and policies involved in displacement decision-making; the major actor groups involved in and affected by displacement decision-making and their interests; and the dominant ideas influencing decision-making.

The specific nature of questions varied depending on the specialization of the interviewee, the themes that were emerging through the ongoing analysis, and my judgments regarding my role as a researcher. In most situations I aimed to develop a relationship with interviewees in which I was the interested student and the interviewee was the expert on the topics being addressed.

#### *3.3.2.2.2 Informal conversations and interactions*

I attempted to engage relevant actors in less formal and sometimes social situations. This usually meant stopping by individuals' offices if other business was taking me to their building. Other times I would engage key actors on street corners, in



restaurants, or other places in or around Maputo. Conversations were often short and acted mainly to develop rapport. Other times what began as a short, informal conversation would turn into an hour or more long conversation deeply relevant to my research.

I would also plan social engagements with certain key and peripheral actors. Other times I would circumstantially interact with such actors in social settings. Regardless of the informality of such situations, I always made actors aware that I was a researcher investigating displacement issues regarding BNP.

#### *3.3.2.2.3 Formal Observations*

I also attended workshops, conferences, and certain meetings at which I was able to observe key actors and engage in informal conversations. Most valuably, in my first month in Maputo, I attended a three-day protected area management effectiveness workshop in which many high-level government officials attended. Nearly all administrators from parks and other protected areas around Mozambique were in attendance at this particular workshop. Lunch and tea time conversations enabled me to learn about people, park, and displacement situations around the country.

#### *3.3.2.2.4 Review of planning and policy documents*

Research also involved analysis of planning and policy documents. Documents analyzed included government and donor project planning and evaluation documents, consultancy reports, historical documents, national policies, strategic plans, donor policies, and legal contracts. Analysis of documents focused primarily on identifying and conceptually mapping the formal structures, processes, rules, and actor groups involved with displacement decision-making. Certain documents also provided valuable insight

into the history of formal planning and management activities that directly or indirectly influenced displacement decision-making and its implications. I included a list of documents that I analyzed in Appendix D.

#### *3.3.2.2.5 Reporting back to key actors*

While in Maputo, I was asked by an employee of the World Bank's African Safeguard Unit to present preliminary findings of my research to the unit. I subsequently spent three days in Washington, DC in February 2007 interacting with employees of the safeguard unit. Although I was asked to present information, I used the opportunity as an additional data gathering exercise. I interacted formally and informally with numerous World Bank and NGO employees during these days. These conversations enabled me to learn more about relevant World Bank policies, legal agreements between the World Bank and the Government of Mozambique, and World Bank employees' perceptions of the challenges—within the World Bank and between the World Bank and Government of Mozambique—of enforcing and abiding by these policies and agreements.

I also returned to Maputo for five days in July 2007 with the primary intention of reporting tentative findings to key government and NGO actors, to listen to their reactions to and suggestions regarding my tentative findings, and to discuss the possible application of the research. Before and after this formal meeting, I engaged key government and NGO actors in extended informal conversations regarding BNP-area displacement. Also on this 2007 visit, I attended a conservation-oriented workshop that enabled me to interact informally with many key actors unable to attend the formal meeting specifically regarding my research. Prior to arriving in Maputo, I attended the Society for Conservation Biology's annual meeting in Port Elizabeth, South Africa,

where I interacted at length with many actors engaged in Mozambican protected area management in general and Mozambican displacement issues in particular. I considered this another data gathering exercise.

### **3.3.3 Data Processing**

Across all of the methods employed, the data gathered were primarily in the form of extensive field notes. As Fetterman (1989 cited in Neumann 2003:383) states, “[g]ood notes are the bricks and mortar of field research.” I wrote field notes before, during, and after engaging in the methods described in this section. I spent significantly more time composing notes than practicing the various methods. My field notes primarily contained text, but also included maps, diagrams, photographs, and some tape recordings. I composed four types of field notes: jotted, direct observation, inference, and analytic (Neuman 2003: 383-388). I would also occasionally write personal notes.

My jotted notes typically consisted of words, phrases, or diagrams that I used primarily to trigger my memory when writing longer, more detailed direct observation notes. The purpose of writing jotted notes was so that I could keep my attention focused on the phenomenon I was observing or participating in, rather than concentrating on writing notes. Also, certain circumstances did not allow me to take longer notes. Whether engaged in formal research activities or in casual social situations, I always carried a pen and small notebook to make jotted notes.

I used direct observation notes to create a detailed picture of conversations and observations in concrete and specific terms. My direct observation notes were my primary form of notes. I wrote direct observation notes during and immediately after conversations and observations. I used direct observation notes to record interviews. I

would record as many direct quotations as possible and would paraphrase when direct quotation was not possible or necessary. I would also record notes on the physical and social context in which I conducted interviews. As is further described in the subsection below, a research assistant would sometimes act as a second note-taker in interviews.

I chose to take notes rather than tape record interviews for numerous reasons. First, I wanted to promote research participants' comfort as much as possible. I had learned from other researchers that in their experiences, government officials expressed discomfort on being tape recorded. Second, the type of analysis I was conducting did not necessitate understanding of the minutia of in-depth analysis of word-for-word transcripts of interviews; I was confident that I could capture the coarse meanings in interviews necessary to advance my analysis. Third, creating the various types of field notes from interviews also made these data consistent in form to data gathered through the various participant observation techniques employed.

After, or sometimes while recording direct observation notes, I attempted to interpret or add meaning to the conversations and observations recorded in my direct observation notes. My interpretations were based, in part, on comparing a specific observed phenomenon to other observed phenomenon as well as the larger context that the phenomenon is taking place within. In other words, I tried to situate the part (the specific observed phenomenon) in relation to other parts, as well as within the whole (larger social and physical context). I would often link these inference notes directly to specific direct observation notes; however, I made sure to keep the two separate. I relied heavily on these notes to identify themes in analysis.

I had two types of analytic notes: methods and theory. I used my methods-oriented analytic notes to record the plans, tactics, ethical and procedural decisions I made during the research process. I also often included a self-critique of these choices. This is necessary because I made many methods-oriented choices in the field. I relied on these notes to describe many of those choices in this chapter. My theory-oriented analytic notes included my ongoing analysis of the relationship between my observations, interpretations, and theory. I would also write theory-oriented analytic memos. Writing theory-oriented analytic memos during the research process allowed for a more iterative theoretical analysis than would have analyses conducted after the field research component of this project.

Occasionally, I would write personal notes. Personal notes are akin to a personal diary and provide a means to cope with stress and to further contextualize other types of notes. In short, personal notes can be a tool used to better understand the subjective influence of a researcher. Rather than writing personal notes, I consistently communicated verbally with fellow researchers in Mozambique, friends, family, my advisor, and other committee members. Oftentimes, discussions with these people about my personal condition and feelings would inspire new thoughts regarding my inferences and ongoing analysis.

As soon as I had time and access to my laptop computer I would type my hand-written notes. I would generally elaborate significantly on my hand-written notes while typing, still being careful to distinguish between direct observation, inference, and analytic notes. I would also produce analytic memos. I would then upload individual notes files into QSR Nvivo software. I would also upload electronic versions of

important policy and planning documents to be coded. When electronic versions of documents were not available, I would transcribe important passages of such documents and upload them into QSR Nvivo.

By the time I began the formal coding process, it was typically the third, fourth, or fifth time I would have been interacting with notes relevant to a particular interview, observation, or other data gathering experience (1. writing jotted notes; 2. transforming jotted notes into direct observation notes; 3. writing analytic memos based on direct observation notes; 4. transcribing direct observation notes and analytic memos and uploading them; and then 5. rereading the notes and coding them). These many interactions with the data enabled me to develop a deep familiarity with them before formal coding began.

#### **3.3.4 Data Coding**

Coding served as my primary means of analysis and took three distinct but often overlapping forms: open, relational, and storyline coding. In open coding, I reduced the data into broad categories based on concrete themes, generic concepts, or other general features relevant to my research questions and my chosen theories (I describe the role of theory in coding in following sections). In relational coding, I revised previously created open codes (splitting, lumping, and creating new codes as appropriate) and identified relationships between categories that helped to structure the data in ways relevant to my research questions. In a third phase, I focused on what I determined to be the primary storyline emerging from the data and would further investigate and elaborate on this storyline by reorganizing categories and relationship patterns.

As with the research process as a whole, I was often engaged in all three components of the coding process simultaneously. For example, I did not code all documents in an open manner and then initiate relational coding. I would code data resulting from a particular observation as soon as I could after I processed it. When there were lulls in data collection, processing, and open coding, I would conduct relational coding. As I collected and processed new data, I would code them in an open manner (adding new categories when appropriate) and a relational manner (including new open codes in previously established relational codes or creating new relational codes). As my understanding advanced and I could identify a tentative storyline(s), I would selectively code for that storyline, elaborating open codes and relational codes as appropriate. As I collected and processed new data, I would code them in an open, relational, and storyline manner. This process enabled me to investigate themes, relations, and storylines both within and across data from a particular observation.

Perhaps the most important thing to understand about the coding process was that the three forms of coding were intimately and iteratively linked and the coding process as a whole was intimately and iteratively linked to the other components of the research process. This is elaborated below.

#### 3.3.4.1 Theory and coding

When coding for factors influencing decision-making, I started the process with a basic set of pre-established codes that were generically related to the perspectives on power described in Chapter II. These codes, however, quickly morphed to represent context-specific themes and relationships.

When coding for consequences of displacement for affected people I did not start with a pre-established set of codes. As previously mentioned, I had not intended to investigate the consequences of displacement. After learning of the existing displacement and resettlement efforts and deciding to employ the IRR framework, I created codes that were informed by the IRR framework. I used these codes to analyze new data and I also recoded previously coded data with the IRR framework as a guide.

Based on the different functions of IRR and the differing dimensions of each of the risks in the system (described in Chapter II), I developed 12 questions to be asked of each of the risks in the framework. I based coding and analysis of the consequences of displacement on these questions.

1. How is the risk currently manifesting?
2. How might the risk manifest?
3. How is the risk perceived by affected people?
4. How is the risk addressed by affected people?
5. How is the risk perceived by planners, politicians, and other key, non-local actors?
6. How is the risk addressed by planners, politicians, and other key, non-local actors?
7. Is the intensity of the risk high or low?
8. Will the intensity of the risk increase or diminish over time?
9. Does the risk manifest differently among groups and subgroups within a community? How?
10. How does the risk affect or how is it affected by hosts or potential hosts?
11. How is the risk affected by resistance to displacement and resettlement?
12. How does the risk relate to other system risks?

### **3.3.5 Analyzing relations among data, theory, and interpretations**

As is discussed in the methodological framework section of this chapter, my research was inquiry-guided, meaning that the development of theoretical frameworks, methods, and findings was iterative and not uni-linear. Furthermore, I was seeking to generalize to or extend theoretical frameworks as informed by extended case method. I



was also aiming to understand the particularities of this case. These characteristics of my methodological framework led me to iteratively analyze the relationships among data, theory, and my emerging interpretations throughout the research process. I used this ongoing analysis to aid in my decisions regarding how, where, why and what data I would collect in the future and how I coded these data.

As the coding process advanced, and especially as a storyline(s) was emerging, I specifically asked myself if the analysis fit the theories presented in Chapter II (relating to both impoverishment risks and power); did these theoretical perspectives explain what I was finding in this particular situation? To do this, I would isolate a single theoretical perspective, for example political economy, or a single component of the IRR framework, for example, landlessness, and ask myself, if this theoretical perspective adequately explains the codes, relations, and storyline(s) that are emerging? What themes could I further investigate that might better highlight the role of political economy or landlessness? What themes could I further investigate that might help me better understand the gaps between a political economy perspective and the emerging analysis? I would do the same for other perspectives on power and components of the IRR framework.

I would also specifically ask myself about the relationships among the power perspectives, and the relationship among the components of the IRR framework. And finally, I would ask myself about the relationship between the power perspectives and the IRR framework. In every case, my goal was to identify themes I could pursue in future data collection efforts that might help me better understand these relationships.

### **3.3.6 Reflecting on my role as a researcher**

One of the assumptions of my methodological framework is that I would influence and be influenced by the phenomenon I was studying. Recognizing this, it was necessary to spend significant amounts of time reflecting on the way in which this reciprocally influential relationship was manifesting and, more importantly, to consciously direct it. How and why I directed my role as a researcher, like other components of the research process, was influenced by changing circumstances and my emerging understanding.

I placed the reflection component of the research process just prior to the component regarding planning future data collection because I felt that my own judgments resulting from this reflection influenced planning for and actual data collection more than it influenced the other components of the research process. I was, however, constantly reflecting on my role as a researcher and recognize that this reflection was influential in all components of the research process. I illustrate below what was probably the most challenging situation with regard to reflecting on and directing my role as a researcher.

#### **3.3.6.1 Responding to changing circumstances**

One of the many challenges of conducting research on this topic was that I was investigating a process that was still unfolding. Many key actors involved were not aware that displacement was occurring in BNP. I was confronted with a dilemma regarding whether or not I should inform key actors that displacement was occurring. And if I were to inform key actors, which actors should I inform, what information should I provide, and when? I determined that either informing or not informing key

actors was going to influence the phenomenon that I was investigating. I also determined, in line with my methodological framework, that my influence on the phenomenon under study was not necessarily negative or to be controlled for; instead my relationships with research participants were part of the phenomenon that I was investigating. I further determined that I did not and could not have full awareness of exactly how my actions and inactions would be influential. I eventually made my decisions to inform, not inform, and to strategically wait to inform key actors based on two, occasionally conflicting objectives: 1.) to do no harm to research participants and others and 2.) to rigorously pursue the objectives of this research.

In some cases, such as with representatives from Mozambique's protected area management agency and the TFCA Program's Project Implementation Unit, I informed key actors about the district administration's efforts. In other cases, such as with consultants, government representatives from other directorates or ministries, and other research participants, I did not inform actors of the district administration's efforts. And in even other cases when I knew that informing certain key actors could have significant implications, I cautiously and strategically timed my divulgence of information. This was the case with regard to representatives from the World Bank. As example, before interacting with the World Bank, I asked for and received permission to communicate with the Bank from representatives of Mozambique's protected area management agency and the TFCA Program's Project Implementation Unit.

### **3.3.7 Selecting data for inclusion in text**

The final text of this dissertation includes only a small portion of the data collected, processed and analyzed in this research. During the writing process, I selected

specific excerpts to illustrate dominant themes, relationships between themes, as well as the overall storyline presented. There were almost always numerous possible quotations or paraphrases from interviews or observations that I could have included; however, for brevity and clarity, I chose one, two, or at times, three or four quotations for illustrative purposes. I selected quotations that most clearly and concisely conveyed the theme, relationship, or storyline.

As was often the case, research participants' perceptions varied on certain topics. When such variation occurred, and when it was important in illustrating the overall storyline, I included quotations or paraphrases to illustrate these differences.

It is very important in this research to associate quotations with particular types of research participants. This is in part because perceptions among actors varied, but also because the positionality of actors is central to understanding the findings presented. Quotations, therefore, are not representative of all research participants; they are, instead, representative of the particular group or subgroup of which I identify them. Throughout, however, I maintain the anonymity and confidentiality of all research participants.

### **3.3.8 Translation and research assistance**

Conducting research in Mozambique and in an extremely remote area in Mozambique presented numerous challenges, communication was a major one. I employed a single translator, Celso Inguane, to assist in my interactions with research participants who spoke either Portuguese or Shangaan (the primary language spoken in the BNP area). In addition to conducting oral and some written translation, Celso also provided general research assistance. This research assistance included discussion of his own direct observations, inferences, and analysis. His assistance also included access to

his professional social network, insights into cultural norms, and help with logistical and other arrangements. Celso is a student and practitioner of anthropology and had translated professionally for numerous donor-funded research projects.

In addition, Laurie Ashley accompanied Celso and me on our second visit to the BNP area. Laurie served as a second note-taker during interviews and also contributed many questions and comments to the interviews. Laurie took the lead in some household interviews. Outside of these specific duties, Laurie also contributed her own observations, interpretations, and analysis before, during, and after our time in the field. Future first-person plural references (i.e. “we”) include myself, Celso, and/or Laurie.

### **3.4 Chapter Summary**

The purpose of this chapter was twofold: 1.) to present and justify the major ideas, assumptions, and approaches that guided the methodological framing of this research; and, 2.) to describe the components of and relationships between the components of the actual research process. I addressed the first purpose by presenting a methodological framework that involved qualities of “interpretive” and “critical” approaches to science (Neuman 2003), that is “inquiry-guided” (Mishler 1990), and that is informed by “Extended Case Method” (Burawoy 1998). I addressed the second purpose by presenting the operationalization of the methodological framework through a cyclical and iterative research process. This process involved multiple research methods, analytic approaches, and means for me to understand relationships between data, theory, and my interpretations.

## **CHAPTER IV**

### **Context**

#### **4.1 Introduction**

The purpose of this chapter is to provide the contextual background necessary to understand the factors influencing displacement decision-making in BNP (detailed in Chapter V) and the consequences of displacement for affected people (detailed in Chapter VI). The chapter begins by outlining the history of inhabitation, displacement, and resettlement in the area now known as BNP. This history is important because the history of inhabitation and previous occurrences of displacement and resettlement in the area influenced recent displacement decision-making as well as affected peoples' meanings and behavioral reactions to displacement and resettlement.

Section 4.3 briefly illustrates the relationship between ecological functioning, inhabitation, and livelihoods in the BNP area. This relationship is important to understand because the current displacement and resettlement is altering this relationship and this alteration has consequences for affected people.

Section 4.4 describes the overlap between BNP and the District of Chigubo and explains the situation in the district with regard to available social services and plans to provide them. This is important because social service provision was a factor influencing displacement decision-making and because changing access to services is a factor in understanding the consequences of displacement and resettlement.

Section 4.5 briefly outlines the legal ambiguities regarding protected area residence and resource use in Mozambique. These are important because different

interpretations of the laws by different actors influenced both the formal displacement and resettlement decision-making plan in BNP as well as the actual decision to displace and resettle people.

Section 4.5 introduces the basics of the three-phase, World Bank-administered Transfrontier Conservation Area Program in Mozambique, of which BNP is a part. This section explains the problems that emerged in the first phase of the TFCA Program with regard to people living in and around protected areas. This section also describes how these problems influenced the design of the second phase of the TFCA Program, including the application of the World Bank Safeguard Policy on Involuntary Resettlement. Finally, this section outlines the formal decision-making structure regarding involuntary resettlement that was created through the policies, principles, and procedures that are part of Phase Two of the TFCA Program.

## **4.2 History of inhabitation, displacement and resettlement in the area now known as BNP**

We were here when Ngungunhane came. We were here when the Portuguese came. We were here when the park came. We were here when FRELIMO came (B43).<sup>22</sup>

This quotation is from a BNP-area resident and it illustrates his sense of the longevity of inhabitation in the area and identifies some of the many historical factors and people who tried or did gain control of the land in the BNP area. This section will briefly outline these and other historical factors relating to inhabitation, displacement, and resettlement in the BNP area.

---

<sup>22</sup> The identities of research participants are kept anonymous and confidential. Quotations from interviews, focus groups, and other data collection methods are identified using a letter and number. Letters indicate the type of actor: G=government; W=World Bank; B=BNP-area resident; U=Mozambican university faculty; N=NGO; C=consultant; and O=other. The number has no significance to a reader.

#### **4.2.1 19<sup>th</sup> century and prior**

Prior to the 19<sup>th</sup> century, southern Mozambique, including the area now known as BNP, was inhabited by Khoisan-speaking San hunter-gatherers and various groups of Nguni agro-pastoralists (Newitt 1995). In the early 19<sup>th</sup> century, in response to severe drought, clashes between Nguni groups, and an increasing European presence, the people of Southern Mozambique were consolidated (oftentimes involving displacement) by Soshangane into the Gaza kingdom (Newitt 1995). The Gaza kingdom, under the control of Soshangane and his heirs Umzila and Ngungunhane, maintained control over the region until the Portuguese eventually captured Ngungunhane and conquered the kingdom in 1895 (Newitt 1995).

Oral history of the people of Hocuanhe, a community located inside current-day BNP, dates back at least to the period of Ngungunhane. Current residents of Hocuanhe tell stories of how their ancestors fled from Ngungunhane's men and can identify specific areas of land where their traditional leader lived before and after fleeing Ngungunhane's men.

#### **4.2.2 Portuguese colonial influences**

Inhabitation, displacement, and resettlement in southern Mozambique since the mid-1800's was influenced by numerous Portuguese colonial policies and practices. Among the policies and practices that BNP-area residents mentioned to me as being influential were tax laws that forced residents off their land in order to create a cheap pool of labor. Residents also mentioned "Native labor codes"—known generally as *chibalo* or forced work—which forced Mozambican men and women to leave their



families and work for wages that were typically not large enough to allow any remittance capabilities (Azevedo 1991).

BNP-area residents also reported to me that they migrated under duress (oftentimes to avoid *chibalo*) as well as voluntarily to work in the mines in South Africa during the Portuguese colonial era. Centro de Estudos Africanos (1963 cited in Isaacman and Isaacman 1983:33) estimate that more than 400,000 Mozambicans were legally exported to work in South African gold mines between 1902 and 1961; most of these people came from southern Mozambique. Legal and illegal migration to South Africa continues today in the BNP-area, albeit to a lesser degree, and migrants are working in a greater variety of skilled and unskilled positions. During colonial times and now, such migration often removes male heads of households for extended periods of time and some BNP-area women reported that their husbands “never return” (B54).

While labor migration significantly affected inhabitation, displacement, and resettlement in the BNP area and in the south of Mozambique, the Portuguese practice of resettling peasants into villages (known as *aldeamentos*) mainly affected people in the north of the country (Bowen 2000) and did not directly affect people in the BNP area. Although there were no *aldeamentos* in the BNP area, it is important to understand this colonial policy because, as many authors contend, later post-independence policies and dominant ideas which did affect BNP residents resembled those of the Portuguese *aldeamentos* (Newitt 1995). The stated purpose of the *aldeamentos* were to aid in crop-growing campaigns, and to make easier the taxation, administration, and conscription of Mozambican peasants (Newitt 1995). During the war of independence, the Portuguese

intensified efforts to create *aldeamentos* in an effort to buffer Mozambican peasants from revolutionary forces.

The most dominant and most recent physical presence of the Portuguese in the BNP area involved the establishment of a colonial-era cattle ranch in the eastern portion of the banhine wetland in the mid 1960's.<sup>23</sup> The wetland is a critical resource for BNP-area residents. When asked about the influence of the colonial cattle ranch on local residents' lives and livelihoods, respondents from BNP-area communities consistently reported that their employment on the ranch was not forced and that the rancher paid good salaries, provided wells for people and their cattle, and did not restrict access to wetland resources for their own subsistence livelihood needs. Respondents did, however, report that the rancher did not allow local residents' cattle to access the wetland where local cattle might mix with the rancher's herd. The rancher abandoned his operation between 1974 and 1975 at the time of Independence.

#### **4.2.3 Establishment of *Coutada 17* and BNP**

In 1969, the 7,000 square kilometers of land within and around which BNP-area communities are located was gazetted by the Portuguese colonial government as a hunting reserve (*Coutada 17*). The combination of drought and European hunting and game capture in the 1960's and early 1970's significantly reduced wildlife numbers, especially roan, sable, tsessebe, and waterbuck, and led the Portuguese to declare *Coutada 17* as Banhine National Park in 1973 (BNP Draft Management Plan 2005). On-the-ground management of *Coutada 17* and BNP during colonial times restricted hunting

---

<sup>23</sup> Colonial-era cattle ranches were also established in the Machailla area north of the park and in the Solane area southeast of the park. The ranch owned by Pio Cabral in the eastern portion of the banhine wetland, however, was closer in proximity and had significantly more of an influence on people in BNP-area communities that were the focus of investigation for this research.

and the use of fire by local people. But, according to a biologist working in the area at the time and substantiated by BNP-area resident, colonial management of the hunting reserve and park did not involve the physical relocation of resident populations (C4).

#### **4.2.4 Post-independence, government villagization schemes**

In 1975, after a protracted war for independence, the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO-Portuguese acronym) formally took control of the government. A central component of the self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninist FRELIMO party's program for development included the nationalization of all land and the resettlement of peasants into what the government termed "communal villages" (*aldeia comunais*). According to the FRELIMO government's development strategy, the creation of communal villages (otherwise known as "villagization") fulfilled two objectives: "the concentration of the rural population to provide basic social services (schools, stores, and health posts) and political facilities (party cells and state apparatus) while simultaneously laying the foundation for new forms of collective production" (Bowen 2000: 43). Bowen (2000: 43) explains that villagization was also seen as the "most efficient method for bringing the peasantry under direct state control" and creating a sense of national identity. By 1982, only seven years after independence, the Mozambican National Commission of Communal Villages reported that more than 19 percent of the rural population (1.8 million people) were living in more than 1,300 communal villages (cited in Isaacman and Isaacman 1983:155).

Despite the apparent success implied by these figures, villagization practices were controversial. Geffray (1990, cited in Bowen 2000:16), contends that the construction of communal villages was "not a strategy of development but a strategy to impose the new

state apparatus in the countryside and to displace the population from their ancestral lands.” Numerous peasants resisted resettlement into communal villages or resisted communal labor initiatives in the villages (Bowen 2000; Newitt 1995). Controversy, resistance, and macro-structural economic changes in the mid-1980’s led to the dissolution of communal village efforts (Bowen 2000; Newitt 1995).

Gaza Province, within which BNP is located, had the highest rate of villagization in southern Mozambique. Most of the villagization efforts in Gaza were in response to floods in 1977 which inundated the Limpopo Valley. Soon after the floods, the FRELIMO government resettled hundreds of thousands of people in villages above the floodplain. Other FRELIMO government resettlement efforts targeted drought-affected populations in the interior of the province (Roesch cited in Bowen 2000:12).

With the onset of the post-independence war (1977-1992) between the FRELIMO government and the National Resistance Movement (RENAMO), many of the FRELIMO government’s villagization efforts were carried out by the military for security purposes. BNP-area residents, who at the time lived dispersed in household-based units, were resettled into security villages near their home areas. Leaders and residents of Hocuanhe explained that the military tried to convince them and others to join neighboring communities to make fewer, larger villages, but the people of Hocuanhe refused and instead formed a village on their lands. BNP-area security villages were created at different times throughout the 1980’s and early 1990’s. Community leaders reported that some villages existed for many years while others existed only months before they became unsafe and residents fled to larger towns in Mozambique (primarily to Combomune and Mapai) or to South Africa or Zimbabwe.

#### **4.2.5 FRELIMO-RENAMO war-caused displacement and death**

Nearly all BNP-area residents, along with approximately one-third of Mozambique's 16 million people (UNHCR 2000), were displaced during the FRELIMO-RENAMO war. Few BNP-area residents were able to flee with their livestock; most were forced to leave them and other assets behind. As one BNP-area resident explained, "the war made us poor" (B48). The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR: 2000) estimates that approximately one million Mozambicans died as a result of the war. War-related deaths in the BNP area are unknown. Without specific prompting, however, leaders and other BNP-area residents reported significant numbers of deaths. For example, leaders of Mapungane, located just north of the park, reported that more people from their community died during the war than survived (24 August 2006).

#### **4.2.6 Post-war repatriation and reintegration**

The FRELIMO government and RENAMO signed a peace accord in October 1992. In the four years after the war, the Governments of Mozambique, Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, South Africa, and Swaziland, UNHCR and other UN agencies, and numerous NGO's coordinated efforts to repatriate the 1.7 million war refugees and assist in the return of approximately 4 million internally displaced people, including BNP-area residents. UNHCR reported in its 2000 "State of the World's Refugees" report that the Mozambican operation was one of the largest repatriation and reintegration projects with which the agency had ever been involved (UNHCR 2000). A primary goal of the operation was to facilitate the return of refugees and internally displaced people to their "places of origin." As one resident of Hocuanhe explained,

“After the war, we were dropped off in the village by the big trucks... We were told to return to our places of origin, but to try to stay near the road” (B20). Some BNP-area returnees occupied or built new houses in the area of the previously established security villages, while the majority of BNP-area residents either returned to the residences they occupied before the security villages were created or constructed new homes and farms away from the security villages. In any case, for displaced BNP-area residents, returning to their places of origin meant returning to live in or around the park.

### **4.3 All land is not equal: Ecological functioning, inhabitation, and livelihoods**

To understand the factors influencing displacement decision-making in BNP and its consequences for resident people it is necessary to understand the relationship between ecological functioning, inhabitation, and livelihoods. The primary point of this section is that while population density in the BNP area is low and land is seemingly abundant, natural resources important for local livelihoods (especially in times of drought, crop failure, and famine) are only available in certain areas within the park and households are spatially organized to facilitate access to these resources. The relationship among ecological functioning, inhabitation, and livelihoods is important because the current displacement and resettlement is altering this relationship; and this alteration has consequences for affected people.<sup>24</sup>

---

<sup>24</sup> Much of what is presented in this section is informed by a draft management plan for BNP that was written based on numerous ecological and social technical assessments. These assessments were, in most cases, the first such assessments conducted in the BNP area. Consultants working on these assessments had no baseline data. Even basic data, such as for rainfall and temperature, were incomplete and of limited use. The ecological functioning subsection below relies heavily on the draft management plan and associated ecological technical reports. I conducted my own investigation of inhabitation and livelihoods. I relied on the draft management plan and associated social technical reports, however, as a starting point for my own investigation.

### 4.3.1 Ecological functioning

BNP lies in a semi-arid climatic region with hot, wet summers and cool, dry winters. Temperatures range from a mean monthly minimum of approximately 15°C (59°F) to a mean monthly maximum of just below 30°C (86°F), with summer temperatures often reaching 40°C (104°F). More importantly with regard to ecological functioning, however, is that mean annual precipitation ( $\approx 500\text{mm}$ ) is roughly one fourth of evaporation rates ( $\approx 2000\text{mm}$ ).

While the park is dominated by sandveld and mopane landscape types, the key ecological feature of the BNP area is a dynamic wetland system situated in a depression in the northeastern part of the park. The wetland is fed through ephemeral streams originating near the Zimbabwean border to the northwest. The schematic on the map in Figure 4.1 illustrates the approximate location of the wetland and catchment area.

**Figure 4.1: Banhine wetland and catchment area**



Map source: [www.greatlimpopopark.com](http://www.greatlimpopopark.com); schematic adapted from Stalmans 2004

The wetland system is charged by intense, sporadic storm events—occurring roughly every seven years—that produce large amounts of runoff which is captured in the

depression. Such storm events also cause the Save River to the north and the Limpopo River to the west to overflow their banks and flood into the depression. In contrast, runoff from less intense, seasonal rains is generally not enough to reach the depression or overflow the rivers.

Outflow from the wetland into the Changane River to the east is slow, resulting in a gradual drying out of the wetland over the course of years. As the wetland drains, water, nutrient-rich sediment, and aquatic fauna concentrate in smaller, isolated wetland systems. If another major storm event does not occur, these smaller wetland systems eventually dry out completely. The smaller wetland systems are of different sizes and types and take differing amounts of time to dry out.

This hydrological regime results in high degrees of biodiversity and productivity within these smaller wetland systems. As is explained in the BNP draft management plan:

The continuous transition between terrestrial and aquatic condition as a result of the cyclic flooding and drying of the Banhine system creates a dynamic ecotone supporting an array of diverse temporal habitats and rich fauna and flora...[T]he pulsed nature of the inflows from within the catchment bring with it a rich sediment load high in nutrients...As a result of this pattern, and the concentration affected through high evaporation rates, nutrient levels within some of the smaller wetland systems would appear to be extremely high (2005:20).

#### **4.3.2 Inhabitation and Livelihoods**

BNP-area residents refer to the wetland area as “the banhine” and they live spatially dispersed but in socially operational communities near the banhine’s outermost extent. See Figure 4.2. By dispersed I mean there are no village structures. Rather people live in household units nearby their farms, fallow fields, livestock kraals, grazing areas, and water sources, which are themselves spatially separated from each other.



Household areas, farm plots, and community boundaries are well known to local households.

The banhine is not within the boundaries of any one of the BNP-area communities; however, there are six BNP-area communities that control access and use of specific lands and ephemeral water bodies in the banhine. These communities include: Hocuanhe, Tchove, Hlecane, Harriane, Madil, and Ntchai Ntchai. More specifically, the traditional leaders of these six communities control access and use of the banhine, with two *Regulos*, or paramount chiefs having additional power.<sup>25</sup> People in nearby communities, such as Catine, Zinhane, Machailla, Mapungane, and others may access the banhine, but they do not control any territory in the banhine. The traditional leaders of Tchove, Hocuanhe, and other communities explained that members of communities from as far away as Dindiza, approximately 100 kilometers from the edges of the banhine, come to the banhine in times of famine.

BNP-area residents maintain diverse livelihood strategies that are dependent on wetland resources in different ways and to different degrees throughout the wet and dry cycles of the system. As BNP-area residents consistently emphasized in interviews with me, however, they are most dependent on wetland resources in times of drought, crop failure, and famine, such as was the case in 2006. As one Tchove resident explained, “When we are hungry and our wells are dry, we go the banhine” (B52).

The following analysis of livelihood dependence on wetland resources is based on reported livelihood activities in the years after the major storm events and subsequent flooding of the wetland in late 2000 and early 2001. At the time this research was

---

<sup>25</sup> The system regarding access and control of the banhine wetland is controlled by traditional leaders and is not a state apparatus.

conducted in 2006, there had not been another major storm event in the banhine catchment area since 2001 and I did not observe any surface water in the wetland area. Many BNP-area residents described 2006 as one of the driest years in recent memory.

I distinguished my analysis of livelihoods between those activities that take place in forested areas near (within a few hundred yards) residents' permanent homes and those activities that occur in the banhine wetland (which could be many kilometers from peoples' permanent residences. Out of the many livelihood activities that occur near residences, I focused on agricultural practices (primarily sorghum, maize, fruits, and vegetables); the gathering of roots, fruits, bark, nuts, leaves and other non-timber forest products; and the acquisition of water for livestock and household use from surface water, hand-dug wells, boreholes, and other local sources. Out of the many resources and livelihood activities that occur in the banhine wetland, I focused on agricultural practices (primarily maize, fruits, and vegetables); the gathering of aquatic, semi-aquatic, and terrestrial plants, roots, and sap; fishing (both aquatic and terrestrial<sup>26</sup>); and the acquisition of water from hand dug wells. Many of these livelihood activities are illustrated with pictures and descriptive text on pages ??.<sup>27</sup>

BNP-area residents have also been receiving occasional food donations since their return to the area after the FRELIMO-RENAMO war and through subsequent droughts in the 1990's. Donations became more regular after the floods of 2000 and 2001 and continued through the following drought. Since the 2000/2001 floods, the UN World

---

<sup>26</sup> "Terrestrial fishing" refers to the capture of lungfish. Banhine-area lungfish burrow into the mud as the wetland dries and estivate, or become dormant. Lungfish can survive many years in dormancy before a major storm event fills the wetland and restores them. BNP-area people seek out and harvest lungfish in the banhine in dry times and consume them as a famine food. See picture in text below.

<sup>27</sup> More specific descriptions and analysis of livelihood activities is provided in Chapter VI through the analysis of the consequences of the current displacement and resettlement on affected people.

Food Program via contracting NGO's has been the primary supplier of food donations. Based on conversations with BNP-area residents and World Food Program and contracting NGO staff, donations primarily consist of rice, maize, and oil. Except in times of emergency, food donations target vulnerable groups (widows, elderly, and orphans). Non-vulnerable groups may receive food in exchange for work in community development projects.

Also important to note is that there are very few machine-drilled wells (commonly known in the southern African region as boreholes) and those that do exist generally produce undrinkable brackish or saline water. Some BNP-area residents with access to boreholes reported that they do not even use the water to wash clothes. Shallow hand-dug wells, however, produce what residents call "tasty water." An NGO opened a new borehole in Tchove in September 2006, however, it also produces brackish to saline water. There is no borehole in Hocuanhe.

It is important to remember that individual and household livelihood strategies differ. As one resident of Tchove stated, "different people have different survival strategies" (B55). Among the reasons why strategies differ include whether or not households own livestock, the location of households in relation to the wetland, household members' access to off-farm employment, and whether household members had skills such as the ability extract palm wine.

Residents of Hocuanhe and Tchove reported that they were least dependent on banhine-area resources when the wetland was full immediately after the 2000 and 2001 storm events. Residents reported good local harvests of sorghum, maize, fruits and vegetables in 2001 and 2002 with less success reported in 2002. People consumed

products gathered near their residences and relied on then-abundant local water sources for both livestock and household use. Residents reported some fishing in shallow, peripheral pans that filled from the storms.

In 2002, 2003, and 2004, wetland waters receded and smaller wetland systems became isolated. BNP-area residents reported that seasonal rains in these years generally failed to produce substantial harvests in fields near their residences (with the exception of sorghum). Those who planted crops in the banhine, however, reported harvests of maize, fruits and vegetables. Aquatic fishing and the harvest of aquatic and semi-aquatic plants in and around the smaller wetland lakes were reported as important livelihood activities in these years. Forest products gathered near residences remained important foods. Residents also reported, especially for 2003 and 2004, that some households harvested *chikutzi*, a root harvested near residences that is boiled, squeezed and made into tea. *Chikutzi* was described as a famine food. Most people continued to acquire water from sources near residences, however, some livestock-owners, especially cattle-owners, were forced to find water in hand-dug wells in the banhine.

Aquatic fishing continued in some of the larger and longer-lasting lakes through 2005. Residents of both Tchove and Hocuanhe described 2003-2005 as being very good years for fishing. No one reported fishing in 2006.

Both 2005 and 2006 were described by people as famine years. Rain-fed crops, including sorghum, that were planted in fields near residences generally failed to produce in these years. Some people, especially those in Tchove, were able to harvest crops in the banhine in 2005. Very few people reported planting crops in the banhine in 2006. Forest products gathered near residences, especially *chikutzi*, were described as being very

important. Of great importance, BNP-area residents emphasized, were banhine-area terrestrial plants and roots. Specifically, palm wine, or *utchema*, was described as being a valuable source of nutrition. While palms occur in forested areas near peoples' residences (some people also plant palms near their homes), they report there are considerably more palms in the banhine.

In November 2006, during my last field visit to the BNP area, many people were still acquiring water from sources near their residences. There were, however, very few such water sources that had not yet completely dried, and these sources often ran dry on a daily basis before everyone's containers could be filled. An increasing number of people, beginning primarily with livestock owners, were relying on hand-dug wells in the banhine for their water.

As previously described, people live dispersed in household units nearby their farms, fallow fields, livestock kraals, grazing areas, and water sources in forested areas outside the banhine. In times of drought, crop failure, and famine, such as was the case in 2005 and 2006, people are more heavily dependent on the banhine for survival. Beginning primarily in 2005, people in Hocuanhe and neighboring Hlecane began to migrate to the banhine to establish temporary homes and kraals, harvest famine foods, and acquire water for livestock and household use. Migrants explained that they planned to live in the banhine until the rains came. In most cases, only certain members of households migrated to the banhine. Others would stay home to gather forest products and care for the household. Banhine migrants reported that they would occasionally return home with water for members of their household and then would go back to the banhine with harvested forest products and food donations.

Migrants in the banhine explained that they always establish themselves in the same places in the banhine. “This is the place my ancestors showed me” one migrant from Hocuanhe explained. Another migrant, renowned for his abilities to extract palm wine, explained that he goes back to the same place because he prefers to tap the plants that his ancestors tapped.

Tchove residents had not yet migrated to the banhine at the time of my fieldwork. Tchove residents gave four reasons for this: 1.) some residents believed that their access to the banhine had been restricted as part of current displacement and resettlement efforts (this is further explained in Chapter VI); 2.) water sources near residences were not yet dry; 3.) there are few cattle owners in Tchove; and, 4.) Tchove is located closer to the banhine allowing people to go to and from the banhine in a day. Numerous residents of Tchove reported to me, however, that if water sources near their residences dried completely, they would migrate to the banhine.

In summary, the dynamic nature of the wetland’s functioning influences livelihood portfolios that BNP-area residents maintain as well as BNP-area residents’ inhabitation patterns. Most importantly with regard to understanding the implications of the current resettlement, people are dependent on the banhine in different ways and to different degrees throughout the wet and dry cycles of the system. And, people are most dependent on the banhine in times of famine. The relationship between ecological functioning, inhabitation (especially in times of great vulnerability), and livelihoods is important because this relationship is being altered by the current resettlement and this alteration has implications for affected people.



**Image 4.1: Agriculture near permanent residences**

When rains allow, BNP-area residents practice shifting agriculture in cleared forest areas near their permanent homes. (left) A household's maize harvest from 2006. Very few households harvested maize in 2006 because of the lack of rain. (right) A woman clears a forested area in preparation for planting.



**Image 4.2: Non-timber forest products near residences**

BNP-area residents gather a large variety of fruits, nuts, bark, roots, leaves, and other non-timber forest products in both dry and wet seasons and throughout the wet and dry cycles of the wetland. (left) A woman demonstrates how to harvest *chikutzi*, a root that is boiled, squeezed and made into tea during times of famine. (right) Tinyihi is a sweet fruit that is harvested nearby residents' homes.





**Image 4.3: Water sources near residences**

BNP-area residents collect water for livestock and household use from local surface water, boreholes and hand-dug wells. (left) Women collect water from one of the last hand-dug wells in Hocuanhe that was still providing water in October 2006. (right) A hand-dug well in a dried riverbed in Harriane. This well was almost dry by November 2006. When these water sources dry, people who rely on them will acquire their water from hand-dug wells in the banhine.



**Image 4.4: Food Donations**

BNP-area people have been receiving food donations since their return to the area after the FRELIMO-RENAMO war. (left) A bag of donated cornmeal. (right) A BNP guard loading donated food onto my roof rack. Access to vehicle transport is rare in the BNP area.





**Image 4.5: Banhine-area agriculture**

When there is surface water in the banhine, people plant along the waters edge. (right) In 2006, because the banhine was dry, these women from Ntchai Ntchai irrigate their farms in the banhine by carrying 20-25 liter containers of water many hours every day. Here they are taking a break. (right) One of the few farms in the banhine planted by people from Tchove in 2006.



**Image 4.6: Gathering banhine-area aquatic, semi-aquatic, and terrestrial plants, roots, and sap**

Especially in times of drought, crop failure, and famine, BNP-area residents harvest plant materials from the banhine. (left) A man harvests palm wine. (right) A woman shows off some *tchagadja* that she just harvested



**Image 4.7: Aquatic and Terrestrial Fishing**

BNP-area residents harvest fish using different techniques depending on conditions. (left) Large community fishing events are held when fish are concentrated in smaller pans. (right) Lungfish are harvested as a famine food when the banhine is dry.



**Image 4.8: Banhine water sources**

BNP-area residents rely on water sources in the banhine for human and livestock consumption. (left) A fenced livestock watering hole in the banhine. (right) A man from Tchove drinks water from an emergency well in the banhine.



**Image 4.9: Temporary housing in the banhine**


BNP-area residents construct temporary housing when they migrate to the banhine. Examples of temporary housing are depicted in the images to the left and right.




#### 4.4 Social services in the district of Chigubo

The social-ecological-system described above is overlain by the political boundaries of the district of Chigubo. The boundaries of BNP and the district of Chigubo are highlighted on the map of the Greater Limpopo Transfrontier Conservation Area in Figure 4.4. The hexagons on the enlarged version of the map in Figure 4.5 roughly illustrate how BNP-area communities are situated within Chigubo District. The hexagons illustrating the approximate locations of Hocuanhe and Tchove are identified. The banhine wetland is located approximately in the area in the middle of the hexagons.

**Figure 4.2: Overlap of BNP and Chigubo District within Greater Limpopo TFCA**



**Figure 4.3: Distribution of BNP-area communities within Chigubo District**



Adapted from TFCATDP PAD 2005: 148

People in these communities as well as others in the district generally live far from clinics, schools are few and elementary, boreholes are few and the water is often

salty, formal employment is almost non-existent, and the road infrastructure is extremely rough, making Chigubo a very poor and remote place. The situation in Chigubo with regard to social services is important because the lack of services and attempts to provide them influenced displacement and resettlement decision-making.

As example of the limited services, the nearest clinic to Tchove is in Zinhane, approximately a day's walk to the north.<sup>28</sup> The stick and mud schoolhouse in Tchove only services students to the fourth grade. The government provides one teacher for approximately 70 students at the

**Image 4.10: Stick and mud schoolhouse in Tchove**



school. As previously mentioned, a new borehole in Tchove was opened by an NGO in September 2006, however, the water is brackish and not drinkable. Roads leading to Tchove and throughout the BNP area are sandy, bumpy, and must be traveled at low speeds.

Limited social services is also the case in Hocuanhe. The nearest clinic to Hocuanhe is in Zinhane and is approximately a two day walk through the park to the northeast.<sup>29</sup> Hocuanhe has two stick and mud school houses and three government teachers for well over 100 students. There is no borehole in Hocuanhe. There is a borehole in neighboring Harriane, approximately a half day's walk away, however, the

---

<sup>28</sup> In November 2006, as part of a cooperative government-NGO initiative, a resident from Tchove was trained in basic first aid with the intention of establishing a first aid clinic in the community.

<sup>29</sup> Hocuanhe residents constructed a first aid clinic in June and July 2006 in anticipation of a member of their community completing first aid training and returning to operate the clinic.

**Image 4.11: Author and the Permanent Secretary of the District of Chigubo**



water from that borehole is also brackish.

Roads leading to Hocuanhe are similarly sandy, bumpy, and must be traveled at low speeds.

Provision of basic social services including clean water, schools, health clinics, and roads, is a major component of the District of Chigubo's development agenda (G3). This mandate comes from the strategic

plan of the Province of Gaza, within which Chigubo is located. The Gaza strategic plan is based on the Government of Mozambique's Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty (PARPA, Portuguese Acronym), an umbrella plan for economic development in Mozambique. PARPA is an example of an International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan (PRSP). According to an IMF factsheet, PRSPs are "comprehensive country-based strateg[ies] for poverty reduction" that "provide the operational basis for [IMF] and Bank concessional lending and for debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative." PRSPs "aim to provide the crucial link between national public actions, donor support, and the development outcomes needed to meet the United Nation's Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which are centered on halving poverty between 1990 and 2015"

(<http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/prsp.htm> accessed 26 March 2007). The primary points of this section are that access to social services BNP-area communities is poor; social service provision is a major component of poverty reduction in Mozambique;

and poverty reduction in Mozambique is structured according to World Bank and IMF policies and prescriptions.

#### **4.5 Ambiguous local rights to inhabit, manage, and use protected areas**

Virtually all of the protected areas in Mozambique, including national parks, are inhabited and residents and other local people's livelihoods are dependent on protected area resources. Despite the ubiquity of inhabitation and use of protected area resources, government officials, consultants, NGO officials, and others engaged in protected area and resident people issues explained that there is ambiguity regarding the legal status and rights of people living in and using protected area resources. Also explained was a related challenge that there is no explicit national policy addressing resettlement. These legal ambiguities are important because different interpretations of the laws by different actors influenced the displacement and resettlement decision-making plan in BNP and the eventual decision to resettle people.

Several major pieces of legislation and corresponding regulations relevant to the status and rights of protected area residents have been enacted since 1997. These include the Land Law (n° 19/1997); Forestry and Wildlife Law (n° 10/1997) and Regulations (Decree n° 12/2002); Environmental Law (n° 20/1997) and Regulations (Decree n° 45/2004); and Tourism Law (n° 4/2004). The draft Land Use Planning Policy is also relevant.<sup>30</sup> Underlying all of these laws and regulations is the 1990 Mozambican Constitution. Relevant excerpts from the Constitution, Land Law, and Forestry and Wildlife Law and Regulations are included in Table 4.1.

---

<sup>30</sup> The Land Use Planning Policy was enacted in early 2007, after the major fieldwork period for this research.

Each of these laws makes clear that ownership of land and natural resources is vested in the State and that the State may expropriate land or terminate land use rights with “just compensation,” which is determined by the State. State ownership of land and natural resources clearly extends to “nature conservation zones,” “total protection zones,” and “legal reservations,” all of which refer to (among other entities) national parks such as BNP. It is also clear that the State has the power to determine the conditions for use and enjoyment of the land and natural resources, and that such decisions shall be made with regard to the State’s determination of what is the “national interest” and what is “respecting the right of all Mozambicans to use and enjoy the land.”

With regard to prior occupation, Article 48 of the Constitution states that “the State shall recognize and protect rights acquired through inheritance or occupation.” More specifically, Article 12 of the Land Law states that individual Mozambicans shall acquire the right of land use and benefit by occupying and using an area of land in good faith for at least ten years. Both the Constitution and the Land Law, however, make an exception for cases involving “legal reservations” or “total protection zones.” Article 9 of the Land Law clearly states that “No rights of land use and benefit can be acquired in total and partial protection zones.” The above can be interpreted to mean that people living in and using resources in BNP and other national parks do not have legal rights of land use and benefit within parks.

Article 9 in the Land Law (1997), however, states that “special licenses may be issued for specific activities” in partial or total protection zones. Article 1 of the Land Law defines a “special license” as “a document that authorizes the carrying out of any economic activity within total or partial protection zones.” The nature of the “special



license” and extent to which it may apply to current national park inhabitation and resource use activities is not directly stated in the Land Law and no court decision has directly addressed the subject.

The Forestry and Wildlife Law and Regulations are also ambiguous with regard to rights of inhabitation and resource use for protected area inhabitants. The Law (specifically Articles 3, 10, and 31) and Regulations clearly assert “local community”<sup>31</sup> rights to draw benefit from conservation actions that use land and resources over which they have tenure or hold rights of access and use. The Forestry and Wildlife Law and Regulations also clearly assert the right of local communities to participate in management decision-making that affects them. Participation in the creation of protected area management plans is specifically mentioned. And while Article 11 of the Forestry and Wildlife Law states that game hunting, forestry, agriculture, animal breeding, and resource modification are strictly prohibited in national parks; the Article also makes exceptions when such activities are prompted by “management needs.” Furthermore, a principle of the Forestry and Wildlife Law, stated in Article 3, is that conservation and sustainable use of resources should harmonize with local communities and local state bodies within the framework of decentralization and without prejudice to customary practices. The extent to which local communities may participate in management decision-making to ensure that they benefit from conservation through continued inhabitation and use of national park and other protected area resources is not specified.

---

<sup>31</sup> Article 1 of the Forestry and Wildlife Law defines “local community” as “groups of families and individuals living in a limited territorial space, with the size of a locality or smaller, and who wish to safeguard common interests, through the protection of their areas of residence, agricultural land (both under cultivation or fallow land) forests, sites of cultural significance, grazing fields, water sources, hunting and expansion areas.” Proximity to the protected area is not recognized in the definition.

A final source of ambiguity regarding the status and rights of national park inhabitants stems from the word “acquire” in Article 9 of the Land Law. “No rights of land use and benefit can be *acquired* in total or partial protection zones” (emphasis added). It is unclear if current national park inhabitants and resource users can *maintain* any *existing* rights to inhabitation and use.

In addition to the legal ambiguity outlined above, there is also no explicit national policy addressing resettlement. Specific language in existing legislation regarding resettlement is minimal; however, the Constitution, Land Law, and Environmental Law make explicit that compensation shall be provided when use rights to land or natural resources are expropriated or terminated. Furthermore, the Regulations for the Environmental Law stipulate the need for an Environmental Impact Assessment in cases involving resettlement.

The lack of an explicit policy on resettlement and the legal ambiguity regarding the status and rights of people living in and using resources in BNP and other national parks is important to understand for three reasons. First, these ambiguities were recognized by the designers of the TFCA Program which BNP is a part and influenced the substance and design of the Program (the TFCA Program is described below). Second, these ambiguities influenced the manner in which the World Bank safeguard policy on involuntary resettlement (also described below) was intended to function in the TFCA Program, specifically with regard to the coordination of Mozambican law and World Bank policies. Third, these ambiguities, or more specifically, the perception of certain key actors that people in parks do not have rights of use and benefit, contributed to the decision to resettle people from BNP. This will be described in Chapter V.

**Table 4.1: Mozambican legislation addressing the status and rights of people in national parks**

	<b>Land / natural resources ownership</b>	<b>Determination of land and natural resource use rights</b>	<b>References to national parks or other protected areas</b>	<b>Expropriation of land / termination of use rights</b>
<b>Mozambican Constitution (1990)</b>	- Ownership of land (Article 46) and natural resources (Article 35) are vested in the State.	- The State shall, with regard for the national interest, determine the conditions for the use and enjoyment of natural resources (Article 36).  - “[T]he use and enjoyment of land shall be the right of all the Mozambican people” (Article 46).  - “[T]he State shall recognize and protect rights acquired through inheritance or occupation” (Article 48).	- Land use rights are recognized “unless there is a legal reservation” (i.e. protected zone) (Article 48)  - The public domain of the State includes “nature conservation zones” (Article 35)	- “[E]xpropriation may only take place on grounds of public need, use or interest, as defined by law, and there shall be just compensation” (Article 86).
<b>Land Law (1997)</b>	- “The land is the property of the State and cannot be sold or otherwise alienated, mortgaged or encumbered” (Article 3).	- “National, individual persons who, in good faith, have used a land area for at least ten years shall acquire the right of land use and benefit.” (Article 10)  - “[L]ocal communities shall participate in the management of natural resources, the resolution of conflicts, the process of titling...the identification of boundaries of the land that the communities occupy” (Article 24).	- “No rights of land use and benefit can be acquired in total or partial protection zones, although special licenses may be issued for specific activities” (Article 9)	- “The right of land use and benefit shall be extinguished by [among others] revocation of the right of land use and benefit for reasons of public interest, preceded by payment of fair indemnification and/or compensation” (Article 18).
<b>Forestry and Wildlife Law (1997) &amp; Regulations (2002)</b>	- “[T]he natural forest and fauna resources existing in the national territory are the property of the State” (Article 3)	- Advances the principle of local community participation in sustainable natural resource management inside and outside protected areas that affects livelihoods and community well-being (Articles 3, 10, 31).  - Local communities have a right to draw benefits from conservation that uses land and resources over which they have tenure or hold rights of access and use.	- Game hunting, forestry, agriculture, animal breeding, and “any activity that tends to modify the land aspect or vegetation characteristics, as well as cause water pollution, and in general, any act that, by its nature, is likely to disrupt flora and fauna” is strictly prohibited in national parks, unless otherwise stipulated in a management plan (Article 11).	

## 4.6 The Transfrontier Conservation Area Program

The policy and planning context for displacement decision-making in BNP includes both the laws outlined in the previous section as well as the policies, principles, and procedures of the Transfrontier Conservation Area (TFCA) Program. The TFCA Program is a three-phase, World Bank-administered program with a long

**Figure 4.4: Location of BNP within Greater Limpopo TFCA**



Source: [www.greatlimpopopark.com](http://www.greatlimpopopark.com)

term objective “to conserve the biodiversity and natural ecosystems within the TFCAs, and to promote economic growth and development based on sustainable use of their natural resources by local communities, with a particular emphasis on ecotourism”

(TFCATDP PAD 2005:2). BNP is a core protected area that is part of the larger Greater Limpopo Transfrontier Conservation Area (GLTFCA).<sup>32</sup> Support for the development of

<sup>32</sup> GLTFCA is the largest and most well-known of the three gazetted TFCA’s of which Mozambique is a part. GLTFCA encompasses Kruger National Park and adjoining private and provincial wildlife reserves on the South African portion; Gonarezhou National Park, Manjinji Pan Sanctuary, Malipati Safari Area, and portions of Sengwe communal land on the Zimbabwean portion; and Limpopo, Banhine, and Zinave National Parks and interstitial areas on the Mozambican portion.

Mozambican institutional and management capacity of this and other TFCA's is provided in part through the TFCA Program.<sup>33</sup>

The first phase of the TFCA Program,<sup>34</sup> titled the "Transfrontier Conservation Areas Pilot and Institutional Strengthening Project" (1997-2003), as its name suggests, focused on creating an enabling policy and institutional environment for TFCA initiatives and assisted in the implementation of pilot community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) programs (TFCAPISP ICR 2004:2). This phase was supported by a \$5 million Global Environment Facility grant.

The second and current phase, titled the "Transfrontier Conservation Area and Tourism Development Project" (2006-2012), focuses on implementation of the TFCA concept in three TFCAs that were created in Phase One, including GLTFCA in which BNP is located. Phase Two has four primary components: 1) an institutional strengthening component that directly follows up on Phase One activities, 2) preparation of an integrated and decentralized development planning framework that focuses at the district level, 3) capacity development to promote tourism through partnerships between communities and the private sector, and 4) protected area management (TFCATDP PAD 2005:2-8). The second phase has a budget of \$33.7 million and is funded through a full-sized Global Environment Facility grant (\$10 million), an International Development Association credit (\$20 million), and a Japan Policy and Human Resource Development Fund grant (\$3.7 million). The third phase of the TFCA Program, currently unnamed, is

---

<sup>33</sup> Funding for various projects related to the TFCA's or specific protected areas within the TFCA's has also been provided by various development agencies, development banks, and non-governmental organizations.

<sup>34</sup> Each phase of the TFCA Program is organized as a separate World Bank "project." For ease of understanding, I will refer to the three projects that compose the TFCA Program as Phases One, Two, and Three.

“expected to support the replication and scaling up of models tested during the first two phases, and integration with other regional tourism initiatives” (TFCATDP PAD 2005:3).

BNP is, therefore, one national park within one TFCA which is formally designated as part of the Government of Mozambique and World Bank-administered TFCA Program. This relationship is important to understand because the principles, policies, and procedures of the World Bank and Phases One and Two of the TFCA Program (outlined below) are significant components of the displacement decision-making context in BNP.

#### **4.6.1 TFCA Program Phase One**

What is necessary to understand about Phase One is that, although the project was designed to account for people living in and around protected areas, the extent and complexity of this situation, according to World Bank reports, was not adequately anticipated or addressed by the project and subsequent problems became well publicized and controversial (TFCAPISP ICR 2004). As the Bank also reported, the problems were, in part, the result of a lack of commitment to the project by the Government of Mozambique and because of acknowledged Bank weaknesses regarding issues of involuntary resettlement. This is important because these problems influenced displacement decision-making policies, plans, and principles in Phase Two of the TFCA Program (TFCATDP PAD 2005).

The Phase One Project Document, written by Bank representatives, government implementers, and consultants prior to commencement of the project, details a project design involving “new approaches” for “reconcil[ing]... protected area management with the needs and development of...communities” (TFCAPISP PD 1996:7). The Project

Document specifies that “no involuntary resettlement will be conducted” (TFCAPISP PD 1996:16) and that instead the project will support a community-based natural resource management approach that “aims to mobilize communities living in or near the TFCAs for conservation action” (TFCAPISP PD 1996:9).<sup>35</sup>

In the Implementation Completion Report for Phase One, the Bank evaluated both the CBNRM component and the overall project design, as “unsatisfactory.” Numerous technical, logistical, and capacity-oriented reasons are given as to why the CBNRM approach failed. Deeper operational and systemic-level reasons are identified for the failed project design (TFCAPISP ICR 2004).

Problems with project design were highlighted by a conflict between “the project” and the government regarding the gazettement of an inhabited hunting reserve (*Coutada 16*) as a national park (Limpopo National Park) and the introduction of wildlife to the area in 2001 (TFCAPISP ICR 2004:11). The Bank report explains that the government gazetted the hunting reserve as a park “[d]espite the efforts of the Bank staff and project team to resolve the fate of communities living in *Coutada 16*” (TFCAPISP ICR 2004:11). In 2006, approximately 6,500 of the 27,000 residents of Limpopo National Park were being involuntarily resettled out of the park. The gazettement, introduction of wildlife, subsequent conflicts with resident people, and the current involuntary resettlement resulted in a lot of media attention and controversy relating to the project. As the Bank further explains:

The project did not plan to resettle communities, as part of the project design was for communities to participate in all conservation and tourism activities as appropriate; however, this view of the options for communities living in protected areas was not shared by all stakeholders (TFCAPISP ICR 2004:5).

---

<sup>35</sup> “Community mobilization and pilot programs” was one of four components of Phase One. The other components included “Institutional and policy development” (including capacity building), “Habitat and wildlife management,” and “Monitoring and evaluation” (TFCAPISP PD 1996).

The lack of a shared vision with regard to communities living in protected areas is partially explained by the Bank as resulting from a lack of “sufficient ownership” of the project from the Government of Mozambique (TFCAPISP ICR 2004:4). The Bank claims in the Implementation Completion Report that the lack of government “ownership” was because “the importance of the project was not fully appreciated by many officials within [the Government of Mozambique]. The Bank suggests in the report that the reason for this lack of “ownership” is because the link to poverty reduction and economic growth was not obvious to many government officials (TFCAPISP ICR 2004:2).

While the Bank makes clear in the Phase One Report that they “were not to blame for the controversy” the Bank acknowledges that “policy options for communities living in [protected areas] could have been explored further during design” (TFCAPISP ICR 2004:11). In part because of this, the Bank also evaluated as “unsatisfactory” its own lending performance for the project. As the report explains,

[t]he design should have better anticipated the resettlement issues, in particular, through an involuntary resettlement safeguard or some more robust policy on the options for communities living in protected areas. During preparation, involuntary resettlement was not recognized by the Bank (or GEF) as the significant issue it is today; therefore, this omission by the project designers is more of a weakness of the Bank than any individuals” (TFCAPISP ICR 2004:13).

As is alluded to in this passage, during Phase One, the Bank was undergoing an internal review and institutional change with regard to issues of involuntary resettlement. An outcome of this review and institutional change was the revision and enactment of World Bank Safeguard Policy on Involuntary Resettlement (Operational Policy 4.12). This policy (explained in Chapter II) along with the aforementioned problems in Phase One



are important to understand because they influenced the design of Phase Two of the TFCA Program with regard to resettlement decision-making (TFCATDP PAD 2005) and because they aid in understanding the factors that influenced resettlement decision-making in BNP.

#### **4.6.2 TFCA Program Phase Two**

Phase Two of the TFCA Program was, according to Bank documents, designed in response to the learning that occurred in Phase One and also in response to the policy changes within the Bank regarding involuntary resettlement (TFCATDP PAD 2005). That response involved the immediate triggering of the Bank's Safeguard Policy on Involuntary Resettlement, the adoption of a plan to integrate resettlement and TFCA planning into the larger economic development plans of the Government of Mozambique, and the securing of a legal commitment from the Government to the core principles, policies, and procedures of the safeguard policy and the project as a whole. Project documents for Phase Two provide specific detail of how decision-making and, if necessary, implementation of involuntary resettlement is to occur. In this subsection, I will briefly review the components of this planned decision-making structure and how it is intended to regulate relations between major actors with regard to resettlement.

##### **4.6.2.1 Triggering the safeguard policy and choosing safeguard instruments**

Paragraph 3 of the safeguard policy explains that the policy covers “the involuntary taking of land...whether or not the affected person must move to another location; or the involuntary restriction of access to legally designated parks and protected areas resulting in adverse impacts on the livelihoods of the displaced persons.”

Paragraph 4 states that the policy covers involuntary resettlement even when it is not

directly financed by the Bank or even part of a Bank-financed project. The policy applies to

other activities resulting in involuntary resettlement that, in the judgment of the Bank, are (a) directly and significantly related to the Bank-assisted project, (b) necessary to achieve its objectives as set forth in the project documents; and (c) carried out, or planned to be carried out, contemporaneously with the project (OP4.12 para. 4).

Whenever the involuntary resettlement safeguard policy is applied or “triggered,” the Bank’s “task team” determines which of the three possible policy “instruments” is appropriate. The possible instruments include a “Resettlement Plan,” a “Policy Framework,” and a “Process Framework.” A Resettlement Plan is necessary<sup>36</sup> when projects involve the “involuntary taking of land.” The Plan specifies the details of the impending resettlement (OP4.12 para 6). A “Resettlement Policy Framework” is prepared when the extent and location of resettlement cannot be known before the project begins. The Policy Framework is a binding public document that establishes the policy principles to be used for the eventual development of specific Resettlement Action Plans (TFCATDP PAD 2005:93). Finally, a “Resettlement Process Framework” is developed when conservation projects restrict access to legally designated parks or protected areas without acquiring land outright (OP4.12, para.7). “The purpose of the framework is to describe the process by which potentially affected communities will participate in planning” (World Bank IRS 2004:29).

The Project Appraisal Document written prior to commencement of Phase Two provides two factors that led to the triggering of the safeguard policy and two safeguard policy “instruments” employed to address and mitigate impoverishment risks related to involuntary resettlement. The first factor is the planned restrictions on and

---

<sup>36</sup> Certain circumstances may only require an abbreviated resettlement plan. See OP4.12 para 25.

“incompatibility of local communities’ livelihood activities with the objectives of the TFCAs and PAs” (TFCATDP PAD 2005:93). Project activities such as the establishment of boundaries, possible creation of new protected areas, and regulations related to planning and management of the TFCAs “imply the restriction of access to natural resources by local communities inside the protected areas and in buffer zones” (TFCATDP PAD 2005:93).

The Bank’s Task Team determined that a “Resettlement Process Framework” was an appropriate instrument to facilitate the participation of affected people in decision-making and therefore mitigate costs to affected people and make it more likely “that they will comply with conservation plans” (TFCATDP PAD 2005:93). The details of the Process Framework are not important for the purposes of this research, however, the intended participatory function of the Framework is important.

The second factor leading to the triggering of OP4.12 was that the project may cause displacement of people from their homes and areas because of the “threat of wildlife” that may be introduced and because of the need to acquire land for nature tourism-oriented infrastructure development. According to the Phase Two Project Appraisal Document, because the details of the possible land acquisition and displacement were not known prior to commencement of Phase Two, the Bank Task Team determined that a Resettlement Policy Framework was appropriate (TFCATDP PAD 2005).

#### 4.6.2.2 Integrated District Development Planning

As outlined above, according to the Bank, a major challenge in Phase One of the TFCA Program with regard to issues of people and parks was the lack of “sufficient

ownership” of the project by the government. Bank representatives explained the lack of a sense of ownership of the project emanated from Mozambican government officials’ perception that the link between the TFCA Program and poverty reduction and economic growth was not obvious. Subsequently, the Phase Two project appraisal document states that “the success of the TFCAs may depend on the degree to which [TFCA] plans are mainstreamed into [the Government of Mozambique’s] economic development plan (TFCATDP PAD 2005:6).

A primary mechanism for mainstreaming Phase Two of the TFCA Program is a planning framework called Integrated District Development Planning (IDDP). IDDP aims to coordinate all government entities and interests that are relevant to the project, including those related to poverty reduction and economic growth. Doing so at the district level is also in line with a larger government program of decentralization.

The specifics of IDDP are not necessary to understand for the purposes of this research; instead, what is important to know is that the emphasis on IDDP made it the primary mechanism for the coordination of various government entities with regard to the TFCA Program in general and displacement and resettlement decision-making in particular. As the Phase Two project appraisal document also stated, the success of the TFCA Program may also depend on “the commitment and capacity of [the Government of Mozambique] and its partners at the local and central level to implement these [IDDP] plans (TFCATDP PAD 2005:6).

#### 4.6.2.3 Legal agreement


The specific policies and plans governing the TFCA Program are outlined in numerous documents that are developed and approved by both the Government of

Mozambique and the World Bank at various times throughout the project cycle. The major components of the TFCA Program along with certain legal obligations, however, are specifically detailed in a legal agreement between the Government and the Bank. This agreement was signed by both parties before Phase Two of the Program could commence. Among the legal obligations that are specified in the agreements is that the Bank's safeguard policy on involuntary resettlement applies to this project.

#### 4.6.2.4 Involuntary resettlement decision-making structure

Figure 4.8 illustrates the planned decision-making structure and how it regulates the relationships between major actors with regard to resettlement decision making. In summary, the World Bank and the Government of Mozambique agree via a legal contract to a set of policies, principles and procedures regarding, among other things, displacement decision-making related to the TFCA Program. The TFCA Implementation Unit and the relevant District Administrations are mandated through the agreed upon plan to coordinate decision-making that may displace project affected people, in this case, people living in and around parks and other protected areas.

**Figure 4.5: Mechanisms regulating relationships between major actors regarding resettlement decision-making**



## 4.7 Chapter Summary

The purpose of this chapter was to provide the historical and contextual background necessary to understand the factors influencing displacement decision-making in BNP (detailed in Chapter V) and the consequences of displacement for affected people (detailed in Chapter VI). To achieve this purpose, this chapter addressed 1) the history of inhabitation, displacement, and resettlement in the BNP area; 2.) the relationship between ecological functioning, inhabitation, and livelihoods; 3.) existing social services and plans for social service provision in the District of Chigubo; 4.) the

legal ambiguities regarding the status and rights of people living in and using the resources of parks and other protected areas; and 5.) the three-phase, World Bank administered TFCA Program of which BNP is a part. Specifically, this final section outlined the decision-making structure regarding involuntary resettlement that was created through the policies, principles, and procedures that are part of Phase Two of the TFCA Program.

## **CHAPTER V**

### **Factors influencing displacement decision-making in Banhine National Park**

#### **5.1 Introduction**

Building on the context described in Chapter IV, this chapter presents the factors influencing decision-making regarding the displacement of BNP-area residents. The primary challenge of presenting findings for this chapter is that there are dozens of factors which influenced who made decisions based on what and why. Each of these factors has differing degrees of influence and may operate at different and often multiple spatial, temporal, and social organizational scales. The perspectives on power introduced in Chapter II—political-economic, actor-centered, and post-structural—frame three ways of thinking about how and why actors made certain decisions. Employing all three power perspectives allowed me to keep my analytical perspective broad and follow varying chains of explanation to identify the unique interplay of power in this particular case. What emerged were six factors that each combines political-economic, actor-centered, and post-structural forms of power.

These factors are: 1) a lack of coordination between TFCA program and district government officials; 2) a dominant idea that people in parks are impoverished and a subsequent pressure from international organizations and the national government to reduce poverty; 3) a dominant idea throughout government that dispersed rural populations must be concentrated in villages so that basic services can be provided and poverty can be reduced; 4) diverging perceptions among key actors regarding the voluntariness of government resettlement schemes; 5) a rapid governmental



decentralization process that pressured district government employees to take the lead in displacement decision-making; and 6) a dominant idea among key government, NGO, and private sector actors that wildlife will be introduced to BNP, that human-wildlife conflicts are inevitable, and that residents will, therefore, have to move out of the park.

## **5.2 Lack of coordination between TFCA Program and Chigubo District officials**

The latter part of Chapter IV outlined the formal TFCA Program decision-making structure with regard to displacement and resettlement. In short, the World Bank and the Government of Mozambique agreed through a legal contract to the policies and procedures of the TFCA Program.<sup>37</sup> Among the policies agreed to is the safeguard policy on involuntary resettlement. According to this agreement, the TFCA Program Implementation Unit was charged with orchestrating the coordination of numerous ministries, directorates, provincial governments, and district administrations to abide by the policies and plans of the TFCA Program.

In the case of BNP, a major conclusion of this research is that the involuntary resettlement safeguard policy instruments,<sup>38</sup> which are intended to govern displacement and resettlement decision-making and implementation, were not being followed. Key actors within the Chigubo District Administration, who took responsibility for the decision to displace BNP-area residents, were not aware that the involuntary resettlement safeguard policy or its instruments existed and had been legally agreed to by the World Bank and the Government of Mozambique. No one affiliated with the TFCA Program contended that these instruments were being followed with regard to the BNP

---

<sup>37</sup> Phase Two in this case

<sup>38</sup> In the case of BNP, these instruments include a Policy Framework and a Process Framework.

displacement and resettlement or that coordination with the District Administration in general had occurred; few affiliated with the TFCA Program had even been aware that displacement and resettlement were occurring in BNP. One of the factors, therefore, that influenced displacement and resettlement decision-making in BNP was the lack of coordination between government entities and the subsequent lack of influence of the involuntary resettlement safeguard policy instruments. This lack of coordination is illustrated in the following subsections which explain that 1) there was no functioning plan for coordinating TFCA and district activities; and, 2) without such a plan, coordination was reliant on previously established but weak government frameworks for coordination.

#### **5.2.1 There was no functioning plan for coordinating TFCA and district activities**

As is briefly outlined in Chapter IV, the primary mechanism for coordinating the various government entities with regard to the TFCA Program in general and displacement and resettlement in particular is a planning framework called Integrated District Development Planning (IDDP).<sup>39</sup> Because of capacity constraints, IDDP was not functioning in Chigubo District at the time of the displacement and resettlement.

According to a TFCA Unit employee, in the early planning stages of TFCA Phase Two, the intention was to do IDDP in all eleven districts that the project overlaps. The Bank and the Government of Mozambique agreed, however, that the government lacked the capacity to implement IDDP in all eleven districts and subsequently the plan was scaled back so that IDDP was to be piloted in only two project districts (Matutuine and Vilankulos) and implemented later in the other districts. Chigubo district, which includes

---

<sup>39</sup> Integrating TFCA Program planning at the district level is also in line with the larger (and also World Bank-sponsored) program of decentralization, which is discussed in a later section of this chapter.

BNP, was not included as a pilot district. A TFCA Unit employee explained that this was necessary because of the great complexity of IDDP. Even in only two project districts, the TFCA Unit employee explained, “IDDP is too complicated; we do not have the capacity to do that type of planning” (28 November 2006).

Planned TFCA Program activities in BNP instead included, among other things, a habitat analysis to help determine if and how the boundaries of the park should be changed to better incorporate representative habitat types. As was explained by numerous TFCA Unit employees, decisions regarding displacement and resettlement would be made *after* identifying if and how the boundaries of BNP are to be redrawn. TFCA Unit employees did not provide a timeline for when decisions about displacement and resettlement might occur, but said that it might be “years away” (G9). As a TFCA Unit employee explained, “resettlement [in BNP] is not yet our priority. We have not allocated any financial support for it...there are many other challenges that we are facing that we must deal with first” (G27).

The primary issue is that TFCA Program coordinated planning with regard to, among other things, displacement and resettlement decision-making, was not functioning in the district in which BNP is located.<sup>40</sup> Furthermore, there was an expressed intention among TFCA Unit employees to wait to address the issue of displacement and resettlement in BNP until other initiatives were completed. The delay in addressing BNP displacement issues meant that decision-making and other actions associated with BNP were, according to legal agreements between the Bank and the Government of Mozambique, bound by the instruments of the involuntary resettlement safeguard policy.

---

<sup>40</sup> BNP actually overlaps three districts, but the majority of the park and nearly all of the park’s inhabitants are in Chigubo District.

The plan to coordinate decision-making and other actions associated with BNP, however, was not in place. Because the TFCA Program's plan for coordination was not in place, coordination between different government entities relied on previously established government frameworks for coordination.

### **5.2.2 Barriers to coordination in established government frameworks**

The government of Mozambique is structured so that there are two lines of authority that are intended to interact in different forums at different political scales. One line of authority descends directly from the president to the provincial governors to the district administrators to the *chefes do postos* to local authorities. The district administrator of Chigubo is in this line of authority. Another line of authority descends from the council of ministers to individual ministers to national directorates to provincial and district directorates and departments. DNAC, Mozambique's protected area management agency, is in this line of authority. Coordination between these lines of authority is intended to happen at both the provincial and district levels through consultative councils and other forums.

These established means of coordinating were described to me by various people in different parts of the government as being "sensitive," "generally weak," and highly dependent upon personalities and individual perspectives. In the case of coordination regarding displacement and resettlement in and around BNP, the perspectives of key actors presented barriers to coordination. These perspectives are presented below.

An official in the Chigubo district administration expressed a strong belief that the district should not be coordinating with the TFCA Program because resettlement is a

district government responsibility and the Park is subordinate to their authority.<sup>41</sup> The district official explained that

The Park is subordinate to the District Administration...The Park is like a son to the District who is the father. The district administrator is like a father of the Park...The district government makes decisions [about resettlement] and then we inform the Park...The Park is not involved [in resettlement]. The park administrator is not allowed to talk to communities about resettlement... The [district] government is the only entity dealing with resettlement...If you have more than one entity involved, it can get confusing. The Park does not make decisions (G4).

Similarly, another official from the Chigubo District Administration explained, “we don’t consult with the park, the park is not involved [in resettlement], they do nothing...once the park is developed then they will be involved” (G6).

Coordination was also hampered by the perspective that responsibilities of the district administration and the park are distinct. This was expressed by a provincial employee from the Ministry of Tourism, a directorate of which manages protected areas in Mozambique including national parks such as BNP.

The District Administration is responsible for territorial management and is responsible for people. [The Ministry of Tourism] is responsible for natural resource issues in parks; not people issues (G23).

When asked about responsibilities with regard to people living inside parks, the Ministry employee explained,

The responsibilities of the park administrator [representing the Ministry of Tourism] and the district administrator are clear. The problem is that there are people in the park. But it is still clear. The district administrator manages people. The park administrator manages natural resources...The park administrator is not oblivious to the fact that there are people in the park, but his focus is on natural resources...He can help people if he can. For example, he can give lifts to people, open roads for people...The idea

---

<sup>41</sup> In interviews regarding coordination, representatives of the Chigubo District Administration generally made reference to “the Park.” By this, I understood them to mean the park administrator and others in the National Directorate for Conservation Areas, the Ministry of Tourism, and the TFCA Program.

is to have no people in the park, but people are there, so we must deal with them (G23).

Throughout this conversation about the possible overlap of “people” and “natural resource” issues, the Ministry of Tourism employee maintained that the issues were separate and that there was a clear distinction of responsibility.

The perspective that there is a strong division of responsibilities was also expressed by a Ministry of Tourism employee at the national level, illustrated by a quotation from this person below:

The Constitution says that local administration is responsible for human development. [Ministry of Tourism] is responsible for parks... We [Ministry of Tourism] do not look first to issues of human development. Of course, we do not want to do anything to hurt development. This is why we have all of those [World Bank safeguard] policies (G27).

Another national level employee of the Ministry of Tourism explained that the Ministry of Tourism “has no authority over the District Administration... There is not a clear line between the park and the district administration” (G1). Similarly, yet another national-level employee of the Ministry of Tourism explained that the current resettlement

falls totally under the district government... it is not part of the [Tourism] Ministry’s program. It is the district and province’s program. They are not accountable to us. We are respecting that there is a district and they have their own plans... we cannot change decision-making at a district level, we can only encourage them to do things to make the process better. (G10).

### **5.2.3 District Administration expectation of resettlement funding from the TFCA Program**

Although there was little coordination between the District Administration and the TFCA Program and the district employees were unaware of the safeguard policy or its

instruments, the district employees expected that “the Park” would compensate people who were resettled from BNP. As a district employee explained,

The government doesn’t have resources to provide people incentives [to resettle]. The park has resources that can stimulate people to move... When the resettlement funds come, the government hopes to provide better conditions for the people [who have been resettled]... This money will be important for transportation and for schools, clinics, boreholes, and also as an effort to show that the government is doing something (G4).

#### **5.2.4 Section summary**

A lack of coordination between the TFCA Program and the Chigubo District Administration allowed Chigubo District Administration employees to make decisions and take actions regarding displacement which were not guided by the safeguard policy instruments. This occurred, in part, because there was no functioning plan for coordination in Chigubo District in part because of a lack of capacity within the Government of Mozambique. This lack of capacity was recognized by the World Bank. Because there was no functioning TFCA Program plan, coordination relied on established government frameworks. These frameworks, however, are highly dependent on individual personalities and perspectives and many key government actors’ perspectives’ were not facilitative of coordination. Despite the lack of coordination with TFCA Program, the district administrator expects TFCA Program funds to be used to compensate displaced people.

### **5.3 District employees intended for resettlement to reduce poverty**

While employees of the Chigubo district administration were unaware of the World Bank’s safeguard policy, employees were aware of and responsive to other

policies, actors, and dominant ideas within and external to the Mozambican government. The most dominant policy issue in Mozambique to which employees of the district administration were responsive to and by which they justified displacement and resettlement in and around BNP was the reduction of poverty. With regard to parks such as BNP, a dominant idea among those in the district administration as well as those involved in the TFCA Program is that people in parks are impoverished and that if they remain in parks, where basic services will not be provided, they will always be impoverished. The combination of the power of the poverty reduction agenda and this dominant idea of poverty in parks was a factor influencing displacement and resettlement decision-making in BNP, as described below.

### **5.3.1 The poverty reduction agenda is supported by powerful external actors**

Since independence in 1975, Mozambique has consistently rated among the poorest countries in the world. Poverty reduction has long been a priority for the Government of Mozambique and external aid has played a major role in influencing the poverty reduction agenda (Falck et al 2003). In the mid-1980's, in response to severe drought, war, and diminishing support from the Soviet Union, the Government of Mozambique turned to the World Bank and IMF for support. This began a period of structural adjustment of the Mozambican economy (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1995). External aid to Mozambique by other sources also increased dramatically at the end of the FRELIMO-RENAMO war in 1992 (Pitcher 2002). Whether because of or despite of these external factors, the Mozambican economy grew by an average of nine percent between 1997 and 2003, and poverty was reduced. Mozambique has consistently been referred to by many donors as an example of a development success story in Africa



(Pitcher 2002). Many of these same donors, as (Hanlon 2006) claims, have a large stake in maintaining this perception. In recent years, approximately 50% of government spending and 75% of public investment have been financed by external aid (Falck et al 2003). In response, the Government of Mozambique is pressured by such donors to continue to show results.

Attention to poverty reduction by international financial institutions and other donor organizations has helped make poverty reduction the most prominent and well-funded initiative of the Government of Mozambique. Specifically, in 2000, the World Bank and IMF made the development of a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) a requirement for concessional loans and debt relief under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries program. PRSP's are intended to guide poor countries towards halving poverty by 2015 in line with the United Nation's Millennium Development Goals.

The National Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty (PARPA<sup>42</sup>) is Mozambique's PRSP. Unlike previous sector-based poverty reduction policies and strategies, PARPA is a broad, macro-level development plan (Falck et al 2003); specifics, especially as relating to district-level actions, are limited. These specifics are to be provided in provincial and district-level strategic development plans. These plans, however, were not in place at the time decisions were made to displace and resettle BNP-area residents. As one development aid worker within the Ministry of Planning Finance explained, because there are few specifics to guide provincial and district-level officials, PARPA is interpreted in many ways and used to justify a wide variety of actions. "PARPA is like the bible," this aid worker explained, "you can use it to justify anything" (12 September 2006).

---

<sup>42</sup> Plano de Acção para a Redução da Pobreza Absoluta

### **5.3.2 Service provision is an indicator of poverty reduction**

While definitions of poverty are often contested, and have changed in different iterations of PARPA,<sup>43</sup> the provision of basic services, such as potable water, health care, education, and roads have consistently factored into the various indicators used to measure progress towards reducing absolute poverty. Service provision and the overall goal of poverty reduction were emphasized by employees of the Chigubo District Administration as the primary justification for displacement and resettlement. As an employee of the district administration explained:

Resettlement in the district is part of a general government program of development and poverty reduction. In the process of doing development in Chigubo, we realized that people were living dispersed and that there was a need to aggregate people... We assessed life conditions. If people are suffering, then they may be resettled so that water, schools, clinics, and roads can be provided (G3).

As another district employee explained, “We are not aggregating people because we like people aggregated. We are trying to fight poverty. It is easier to fight poverty when people are living together” (G25).

### **5.3.3 People in parks are impoverished**

Employees of the district administration explained that the lack of service availability in BNP-area communities was not acceptable. “People should not have to live like animals,” a key employee said numerous times (G4). This and other employees of the district administration explained that they, however, could not provide services to BNP residents because “the government is not investing in areas where people will have to move from” (G17). Therefore, unless people resettled out of the park, they would not have access to services and would continue to be poor.

---

<sup>43</sup> PARPA I covered the period between 2001 and 2005. PARPA II covers the period between 2006-2009

Numerous people involved with the TFCA Program also expressed this idea. A consultant who worked for the TFCA Program bluntly stated that “If you leave people in Banhine [National Park] they will never be better off than they are” (C1).

An employee of the TFCA Unit explained:

I am not in favor of having everyone in the same place. I am also not in favor of having people in areas where they cannot get support [from the government]. I respect peoples’ wishes to live in the parks, but life is short and we must allow people to live with dignity (G9).

Similarly, a government employee working with the TFCA Program described a moral dilemma that the government of Mozambique confronts with regard to people, parks, and poverty. “We have a difficult choice in Mozambique. The people may have a right to live in the parks. But they are poor. We know that this is not the best way for them to live. So do we allow them to live in such a state of poverty?” (G16).

This same government employee also explained how the pressure to reduce poverty is influencing park management. “Mozambique is pressured by the global community to raise the standards of living for the poor. If people stay in the parks, they will always be poor. If they are poor, there is less of a chance that Mozambique will achieve the Millennium Development Goals” (G16).

#### **5.3.4 Section summary**

Poverty reduction is a powerful policy issue in Mozambique and is heavily supported by the World Bank, IMF and many other international actors. Mozambique’s national poverty reduction plan provides a macro-level framework that had not been operationalized at provincial and district levels. Nonetheless, service provision is consistently highlighted as a measure of poverty reduction. Because people in BNP (and other parks) do not have access to basic services such as boreholes, schools, health

facilities, and good roads, they are generally considered to be impoverished. Employees of the district administration explained that they cannot provide services inside BNP and that people must move out of the park if they are to have access to basic services.

## **5.4 Villagization + Service Provision = Poverty Reduction**

As the previous section described, the power of the poverty reduction agenda and the associated dominant idea that people in parks are impoverished was an influencing factor in displacement and resettlement decision-making in BNP. A related influencing factor is the dominant idea that service provision, and thus poverty reduction, can only occur if dispersed rural populations are concentrated in areas where basic services can be provided. This dominant idea was consistently expressed by a variety of respondents as a rationalized and seemingly unquestioned formula that ‘villagization + service provision = poverty reduction.’ This logic has historical antecedents in previous government villagization efforts. Many district, provincial, and national-level Mozambican government employees, however, explained past villagization failures as being operational in nature and continue to promote the logic of concentrating dispersed rural populations. This logic was influential in decision-making regarding the displacement and resettlement of BNP-area residents, as described below.

### **5.4.1 Perceived operational flaws of past villagization efforts**

The overt aims of the Mozambican government’s 1970’s and early 1980’s villagization schemes were to provide basic services, establish political facilities, generate a sense of national identity, and lay the foundation for collective production (Bowen 2000). The covert aim of villagization, according to Geffray (cited in Bowen

2000), was to bring the peasantry under direct state control. Villagization efforts were often resisted by the peasantry and are generally considered to have failed.

Nearly all government employees and consultants interviewed described operational failures of past policies, but maintained that the basic premise of concentrating rural populations is sound. For example, an employee of the Gaza Provincial government (Chigubo District and BNP are within Gaza Province) pointed to resource deficiencies as a reason for failure. “Previous [villagization] efforts failed because of the war. The government didn’t have enough resources to support those initiatives” (G2). An employee of the District of Chigubo identified communication problems,

Because I am a Mozambican, I know that after independence we had some problems with communal villages because the message was not delivered in the appropriate ways. But there are positive aspects of the idea of aggregating people (G6).

An employee of the Directorate of Rural Planning and Development referred to the involuntary nature of past villagization efforts and associated challenges of collective production. “The downfall of communal villages was its implementation. Peasants were forced....People were not ready to share in collective associations of rural farmers” (G29).

This respondent also explained the failure of villagization efforts as resulting from a lack of understanding of social dynamics. “Resettlement was not bad, implementation was a problem...we must do research before resettlement is done. There is a social-anthropological component [that was neglected in past efforts]. You cannot do development if you do not understand the social equation” (G29).

#### **5.4.2 Framing the problem of dispersed rural populations**

Embedded in these perspectives are the ideas that poverty reduction, and development more generally, is hindered by the dispersed living arrangements of rural populations and that concentration of rural populations is an appropriate solution to this problem. For example, an employee of the Directorate of Rural Planning and Development explained that “It is a mistake to think that we can achieve development with people living in such a dispersed manner... There is a need to concentrate people with regard to public investment. Investment is more cost effective if people are concentrated” (G28). Similarly, an employee of the TFCA Unit stated that “[i]t is very difficult for the government to address poverty because people are living spread” (G9). An employee of the Chigubo District Administration also adamantly proclaimed, “There is no possibility for development when people are living dispersed.... Nowhere in the world can development occur where people are dispersed” (G4).

These few examples from key actors in the District Administration, the TFCA Program, and a government Directorate addressing rural planning issues are illustrative of a dominant idea that permeated nearly all conversations about poverty reduction, resettlement, or protected area management in BNP in particular and in Mozambique in general. While some respondents acknowledged challenges with regard to how to respond to the ‘dispersed people problem,’ very few, outside the actual people living dispersed in rural areas, questioned that dispersed living arrangements were a problem.

#### **5.4.3 Villagization logic in current government policies, plans, and principles**

The Government of Mozambique is currently engaged in numerous, complex and overlapping planning initiatives in which the logic that villagization + service provision =

poverty reduction is applied. Since 2003, the Government of Mozambique has been developing a potentially broad-sweeping territorial planning bill that has a goal to “more rationally organize the landscape to make more efficient use of the human and natural resource base.” Although there is no specific language in the bill about concentrating rural populations, relevant government officials and consultants explained that this initiative would help address the problem of people living dispersed in rural areas. An employee of the Ministry of Environmental Coordination, which is developing the bill, explained that an objective of the bill is to “mobilize and sensitize people to reorganize themselves on the landscape” (G5). With regard to rural areas, this employee explained that the bill focuses on creating “sustainable villages” that will “aggregate dispersed rural populations” (G5).

Similarly, the Province of Gaza recently developed and approved a Strategic Development Plan. Similar to the territorial planning bill, the logic of concentrating rural populations is in the plan, however, there is no specific language advocating such. An employee of the Gaza Provincial government explained that “The [Gaza Strategic] Plan is not written in a way that it explicitly encourages the aggregation of people. But it is difficult to provide services for a dispersed population. Through the provision of economic infrastructure, communities will see that it is better for them to come together” (G2).

While neither the territorial planning bill nor the provincial strategic plan were in effect before the displacement and resettlement of BNP-area residents, they are illustrative of the dominance of the villagization logic. When specifically asked about the policy justification for the current resettlement in and around BNP, Chigubo District

employees explained that their actions were in line with the proposed territorial planning bill, the provincial strategic plan, and the overall government development policy of poverty reduction. A key district employee explained, however, that there is no specific government *policy* which the BNP-area resettlement is in response to; rather, “[i]t is a government *principle* to organize people into villages” (G3).

#### **5.4.4 Connecting past villagization efforts and the current resettlement of BNP-area residents**

The perceived connection between past villagization efforts and the current displacement and resettlement of BNP-area residents differed between key actors. An employee of the district administration explained a direct connection.

The process of villagization is an old process....During the war, people were organized in villages. After the war, there was no mobilization for them [to return to villages]....The people of Chigubo returned to dispersed areas. Now we are rebuilding what was destroyed by the war...The people need to be reorganized (G3).

Recognizing the operational failings of past villagization efforts, employees of the District Administration were adamant about pointing out the differences between the current displacement and resettlement in BNP and previous villagization efforts. As an employee of the district administration simply explained, “We must take the positive aspects of past policies but implement it in a better way” (G24). Another employee of the district administration more specifically explained that previous villagization efforts “involved very strict boundaries and involuntary resettlement. The current effort is not as strict, not as well demarcated.... [and] people get to define where they live (G25).

Others were hesitant about drawing connections between past villagization efforts and the current situation. “This is a different strategy. This is a different context” an



employee of the Gaza provincial government explained (G2). Others were not even willing to address the issue. For example, in response to a question about past villagization efforts, a professor from University of Eduardo Mondlane explained “We don’t talk about communal villages [because] it brings up tensions related to our history” (U1).

Similarly, an employee of the Directorate for Rural Planning and Development explained that “villagization is linked to past policies which were a bad experience.” When asked if efforts to concentrate rural populations for the purpose of service provision was “open,” the government employee replied, “Yes and no. We admit that people should not be living dispersed, but people are hesitant to discuss it openly. The implementation of communal villages was very traumatic. We must have the political courage to say that people should not be living in a dispersed manner” (G30).

#### **5.4.5 Section summary**

Another factor that influenced decision-making regarding the displacement and resettlement of BNP-area residents was a dominant idea that service provision, and thus poverty reduction, can only occur if dispersed rural populations are concentrated. This logic has historical antecedents in previous, controversial government villagization efforts. The logic is also apparent in current government planning initiatives. Actors differed, however, in their comfort regarding the association between past villagization efforts, current planning initiatives, and the resettlement of BNP-area residents. The “problem” of dispersed living arrangements was questioned by very few respondents (except BNP-area residents).

## **5.5 Differing perceptions of voluntariness**

In the previous section, I described that, among various types of government employees, the dominant idea of villagization was a factor influencing displacement decision-making regarding BNP-area residents. The previous section also described different perceptions regarding the relationship between previous villagization efforts and current actions, policies, and plans at district, provincial and national levels to resettle BNP-area and other people. This section describes different actors' perceptions of the distinction between past villagization efforts and current resettlement efforts. The differences in perceptions among different actors centers on differing understandings of the concept of “voluntariness.” These differences are important to understand because different groups of people’s perceptions of voluntariness influenced how they perceived the appropriateness of displacement.

### **5.5.1 Non-TFCA Unit government employees perceive resettlement to be voluntary**

Non-TFCA Unit government employees at district, provincial, and national levels and in various sectors emphasized that, unlike past villagization efforts, current resettlement efforts are voluntary. As an employee of the Directorate of Territorial Planning bluntly stated, “We cannot do [resettlement] like in the past. It must be in a voluntary manner” (G5).

Government employees justified “voluntary resettlement” as being a rational choice that rural people were expected to make based on the availability of services in resettlement areas. As an employee of the Directorate of Rural Planning and Development explained,

We must accept that rural people are rational in their actions...if there are better conditions, people will move, but the incentives must be clear (G28).

The role of services as incentives was also emphasized by an employee of the Directorate of Territorial Planning who referred to such services as “attracting facilities” (G5).

Government employees, however, often conflated or used synonymously the concepts of voluntariness and participation. Government employees described both voluntariness and participation as being dependent on incentives, compensation, or benefits (in the form of social services). As an employee of the Gaza provincial government explained,

People are moving voluntarily, but in the spirit of getting compensation.... Communities are willing to participate as long as there are benefits for them....There is a lot of concern about how to compensate people. The government is very concerned about benefits for communities. (G2).

Conversations with this and other government employees about the meaning of voluntariness and participation often focused on a process of “sensibilizing and mobilizing” rural populations. Government employees described sensibilization and mobilization as “a process of convincing” or “a process [of] chang[ing] people’s mentality” (G5).

When asked about the specifics of the process of sensibilization and mobilization, an employee of the Gaza provincial government explained that “there is no methodology for sensibilizing and mobilizing people” (G2). This government employee, nonetheless, acknowledged that there were government imposed limits to voluntariness and participation in the process of sensibilization and mobilization. As he stated,

We must let communities decide about their own future, but we recognize that communities follow the guidance of provincial and district

governments. The extent to which communities can participate depends on how the authorities let them do it (G2).

### **5.5.2 TFCA Unit employees perceive resettlement to be *involuntary***

The perspective of TFCA Unit employees differed from other government employees. TFCA Unit employees differentiated between the concepts of voluntariness and participatory and made clear that any government-induced displacement and resettlement is *involuntary*. As this TFCA Unit employee explained, their perspective had previously been different, but had changed in large part in response to resettlement experiences in Limpopo National Park, a park that, along with BNP, is part of the World Bank-financed Greater Limpopo Transfrontier Conservation Area Project.

In Limpopo [National Park], we tried to pursue a voluntary resettlement, however, at some point you realize that the choice to resettle is not voluntary. We have to avoid saying that resettlement is voluntary and instead talk about it as participatory. People do not have a choice to stay; they have a role to play in the process of resettlement (G16).

The “realization” by TFCA Unit employees that the resettlement in Limpopo National Park was not voluntary was prompted by pressure from the World Bank. A task team from the World Bank determined that the resettlement in Limpopo National Park conflicted with the World Bank’s safeguard policy on involuntary resettlement. As another TFCA Unit employee bluntly explained,

“The Bank asked us to stop voluntary resettlements in LNP. Resettlement in Mozambique will never be voluntary [according to definitions of voluntary provided by the World Bank]. Voluntary resettlement does not exist” (G8).

Another TFCA Unit employee explained that,

Voluntary resettlement is possible if people move for opportunities. But once someone from government suggests that people should move, then it is not voluntary; people will view it as a rule. Resettlement, [from a

TFCA] perspective is always regarded as involuntary. If the government suggests that people move, then it is involuntary” (G27).

### **5.5.3 District administration employees perceive resettlement to be voluntary**

In the case of BNP, a key employee of the Chigubo District Administration made it very clear that the government wants people to move out of the park and into aggregates or villages. As he explained, “Our policy is to convince the people to leave the park....What we want is for people to be together. We want people to be organized” (G4).

Although the district administration clearly expressed their policy that people should resettle from inside the park, employees of the district consistently emphasized that resettlement was still voluntary. In maintaining this position, district administration employees often conflated or used synonymously the concepts of voluntariness and participation. The most significant instance of this was that employees of the district justified the voluntariness of the resettlement by explaining that the district did not specify to BNP-area people as to exactly which village or aggregate people were to move. In short, people were able to decide where they resettled but not whether or not to resettle. As an employee of the district administration explained,

People are able to go to whatever community they want to. The government is not using any force (G24).

Or as another district administration employee more bluntly stated,

I wouldn't say that [resettlement] will be forceful, but the people will have to move (G6).

When specifically asked if BNP residents could continue to live where they do, district employees consistently explained, as this employee did, that BNP residents “are told that they can stay, but that there are disadvantages” (G6). As one district employee

explained, “if you want to move people, you must explain the disadvantages of staying where they are” (G4). These disadvantages, as a district employee explained, were that BNP residents would not receive services and that they would have to live with wildlife that was to be introduced to the park.<sup>44</sup>

A district employee also explained that

If you want to mobilize people to move, you have to give them incentives... We want to make sure the conditions in the final area are as good or better than conditions in the previous areas. We cannot move people without clear conditions at the final destination (G25).

While district employees stated that their intent was to provide services such as boreholes and schools in resettlement areas which would act as incentives, these same employees acknowledged that they did not have the resources to provide such services. And in places where they did help to provide boreholes, the water produced was salty and not potable. District employees often lamented the lack of funding to provide services. As a *Chefe do Posto* acknowledged “resettlement would be more effective if we provided services first [before people move].”

The conflict between the district government’s words and actions regarding the voluntariness of resettlement and the role of services as incentives was encapsulated by a head ranger for BNP who explained,

People were told that they have to move. Not that they would be forced to move. The government doesn’t have the means to build a village. They said that people who wanted to move could move but at the end everyone must move, but not by force. Eventually the government will build a borehole for the people (G11).

---

<sup>44</sup> At the time of field research, there was no formal plan to introduce wildlife to BNP, although there had been a lot of discussion about it. This is discussed later in this chapter.

#### **5.5.4 BNP-area residents claim resettlement is involuntary**

BNP-area residents consistently reported that they were told by the district administration that they were to congregate in villages or aggregates in areas outside the park where there were services or where services could be provided. Without exception, BNP-area residents explained that they had no choice as to whether they could continue to live in the park. “I was told to leave the park,” said one community member from Tchove. “I wouldn’t have moved if it were not a park” (B29). As another Tchove community member stated, “We would stay where we were if it were up to our will. It was a place that we had invested in. We are supposed to stay there because we invested in that land” (B33).

BNP-area residents also consistently explained that the district administration employees made it clear that community members had a choice as to which resettlement area to move to. As one community member from Hocuanhe stated, “The government has said that there is a new rule and people have to move to villages again, but we can choose where” (B30).

#### **5.5.5 Section summary**

Perceptions of voluntariness and participation differed between TFCA Unit employees and other district, provincial and national level government employees. Affected BNP-area residents unanimously reported that they were not given a choice as to whether or not to move. They were, however, given a choice as to where to move. As mentioned in Chapter IV, and as will be addressed again in the final discussion chapter, the concept of voluntariness is critical in determining the applicability of the World Bank Safeguard Policy on Involuntary Resettlement.

## **5.6 The district administration was emboldened to decide and act**

Employees of the Chigubo district administration claimed direct responsibility for the decision to resettle BNP-area residents. No government employees or other people interviewed for this research contested the proximate role of the district administration in resettlement decision-making in BNP. Many of the factors presented so far in this chapter have described policies, actors, and dominant ideas that, this research concludes, influenced the decision of the district administration. Another factor of influence is that employees of the district administration felt emboldened to make the decision to displace BNP-area residents and to take action to carry it out. This section argues that employees of the district administration were emboldened to decide and act, in part, because of a rapid but constrained process of decentralization of government decision-making, a corresponding pressure applied to district administrations to be the primary ‘poles of development,’ and the encouragement from higher-level government officials, including the president of Mozambique, to concentrate dispersed rural populations.

### **5.6.1 “A very rapid process of decentralization” of decision-making**

Decentralization has been a focus of the Government of Mozambique and major donors since the early to mid-1990’s. The movement towards decentralization, however, gained tremendous momentum in recent years. In 2005, the Government of Mozambique, in coordination with UNDP, World Bank, GTZ, and other donors, unified and scaled up to a national level previously separate provincial decentralization pilot projects. PARPA II, the government’s primary plan for economic development and poverty reduction, was enacted in 2006 and strongly emphasizes decentralization as a key



to good governance.<sup>45</sup> Decentralization received another boost from the 2003 Law for Local State Bodies<sup>46</sup> (nº 8/2003), which formally gave districts the power to plan, budget and implement local initiatives, and the corresponding 2006 *Orcamento de Investimento de Iniciativa Local* that allocated funds to go directly to districts. Decentralization also plays a prominent role in the 2006 Gaza Provincial Strategic Plan. In each of these policies, programs, and plans, a major theme is that the district is to be the primary governing authority and the “pole of development.” As a high-ranking employee of the Gaza Provincial government explained, these actions have led to “a very rapid process of decentralization that is giving district administrator’s decision-making power” (G2).

Despite these policy and program advances, the extent to which district administrations have real decision-making power and the money to implement decisions is limited. As numerous government employees explained, capacity constraints, legal contradictions and inconsistencies, and a top-down orthodoxy of a still highly centralized government challenge decentralization. Many of these same government employees expressed concern that the intensity of the decentralization process was placing high expectations on district administrations without the policy, institutional, or financial support to enable them to live up to those expectations. In short, district administrations are being emboldened to lead economic development and poverty reduction initiatives without yet being empowered to do so.

---

<sup>45</sup> The strong focus on decentralization in PARPA II is a departure from its predecessor, PARPA I which covered the period 2001-2005.

<sup>46</sup> *Lei dos Órgãos Locais do Estado*

### **5.6.2 BNP-area resettlement was the decision of the district administration**

When asked to tell the story of how the decision to resettle BNP-area residents was made, a key employee of the Chigubo district administration explained that he and his consultative council made the decision after touring the district and discussing possible means of development. He explained that the provincial and national governments provided guidelines for reducing poverty and promoting economic development, but that “the districts decide how to implement it...the districts are the poles of development” (G4). Another employee of the district administration more bluntly stated that “The central government has an interest in (resettlement), but the ones who are pushing it is the district government” (G6).

### **5.6.3 Encouragement from above**

Employees of the district also justified the decision to resettle BNP-area residents based on encouragement received from the president of Mozambique. The president visited Chigubo District in May 2005 to celebrate the creation of the new district capital. As a district employee explained, “I informed the president of the condition of dispersed people in the district and told the president what we were doing. The president agreed...and told us to continue” (G3). As another district employee explained, “the president gave a general recommendation; he did not give specifics...the president wanted us to prevent people from living dispersed. How to implement was up to the district government to figure out” (G6).

### **5.6.4 Section Summary**

The primary point of this section is that a recent, strong government focus on decentralization helped embolden the district administration to decide to resettle BNP-

area residents and to take action to carry it out. Employees of the district administration justified this decision as being within the guidelines of the provincial and national government and in line with a “government principle of organizing people into villages.” Although emboldened, the district administration was not financially or institutionally empowered to make such a decision or to carry out the resettlement as intended.

## **5.7 “A park is a place for animals, not for people”**

A final, but significant factor influencing resettlement decision-making in BNP is the dominance of an uninhabited wildlife park model. As discussed in Chapter IV, virtually all national parks (and other protected areas) in Mozambique are inhabited. The legal rights and status of people living inside parks is unclear. Furthermore, there are no formal plans to reintroduce wildlife to BNP. Despite these, there is a dominant idea among TFCA Unit employees, employees of the Chigubo district administration, and others that wildlife will be reintroduced to BNP, that human-wildlife conflicts are inevitable, and that people will, therefore, have to move out of the park. The dominance of the uninhabited wildlife park model was exemplified by an employee of the district administration who stated that, “a park is a place for animals, not for people” (G3).

### **5.7.1 No formal plan for wildlife introduction**

As described in Chapter IV, most of the large mammals that existed in the BNP area were extirpated by colonial-era hunters and by FRELIMO and RENAMO military forces. In 2005, a team of consultants, as part of a multi-year, USAID-sponsored initiative, produced a draft management plan for BNP. This draft plan promoted a co-management model in which there would be no involuntary resettlement, and BNP-area

residents would participate in decision-making regarding whether or not wildlife would be reintroduced, and, if so, which species. Despite going through all the requisite procedures for approval, the Minister of Tourism never formally approved the draft management plan. This meant that in 2006, there was no formally-accepted, functioning management plan for BNP and no formal plan to reintroduce wildlife.

### **5.7.2 Resettlement was motivated by perceived impending wildlife introduction**

Despite there being no formal plan for wildlife reintroduction, the displacement and resettlement of BNP-area residents was, in part, motivated by district employees' perceptions that wildlife would be reintroduced to BNP and that this would inevitably lead to conflicts with residents. As a *chefe do posto* in Chigubo District explained, the Minister of Tourism told him that "the people in the park will have to move because people and animals can't live together" (G18). Similarly, an employee of the district administration justified the "sensibilization and mobilization" of people to resettle outside the park by explaining that, "The way that a park is doesn't allow for people to live with animals. A park is a park" (G24).

Another district employee explained that resettlement of BNP residents was "urgent" because the TFCA Program "will reintroduce animals that can be dangerous to people....People and wildlife should not be living together" (G4). This employee also explained that the district was prioritizing the resettlement of BNP communities, over other communities in the district, because of the impending wildlife reintroductions. As he stated, "communities in the park are being treated differently because the people are endangered" (G4).

### **5.7.3 Uninhabited wildlife park model dominant among TFCA Unit employees**

While TFCA Unit employees did not condone the actions of the district administration with regard to displacement and resettlement of BNP-area residents, one TFCA Unit employee explained that, “In principle, I support the argument that people cannot live with dangerous wildlife....Our goal is to avoid having people inside national parks. We are following the model of our neighboring countries” (G9). Another TFCA Unit employee explained that, “The reality is that there is a desire to reintroduce wildlife and this will inevitably lead to human-wildlife conflicts” (G16).

“If we have people,” another TFCA Unit employee explained, then we will never have wildlife. If people are in the parks, they will hunt. We are against hunting. We will see if this logic is good or bad, but this is what we have been defending....We are not going to have parks if people continue to live in parks. There is a conflict between economic activities and ecological functioning. This is our situation (G8).

### **5.7.4 Perceived human-nature disharmony**

The sentiment that there are inevitable conflicts between local inhabitation and livelihoods and the conservation of BNP resources and that this justifies an uninhabited wildlife park model was also expressed by a consultant who worked in BNP in the early years of TFCA Program Phase One. “There are basically two options in BNP,” the consultant explained, “let the resources continue to be used unmanaged, or resettle the people and make Banhine a park” (C1). When asked if there was any local management of natural resources in the park now, the consultant replied, “No, there are very few game guards and they are ineffective.” I clarified my question to ask if the consultant thought that local people were managing the resources themselves. The consultant replied, “No....It’s a free-for-all in there” (C1).

This consultant also explained that tourists' perceptions of human-nature disharmony between BNP-area residents and park resources would inhibit the success of future tourism.

Mozambique needs to commit to making parks attractive to tourists. There are no marketable traditions in Banhine. These are not Bushmen or Maasai.....tourism marketing is cut-throat. Tour companies will not go to BNP if their clients are going to see people grazing their cattle in the park (C1).

### **5.7.5 Parks are easier to manage without people**

An additional justification used to support an uninhabited wildlife park model that was presented by a TFCA Unit employee was that people living inside parks and using resources complicates management. "It is much easier to manage a park without people," said a TFCA Unit employee (G27).

The district [employee] probably thinks that by convincing people to leave the park, he is helping with park management....It is logical that parks are easier to manage without people...ecological systems can operate freely, you can put tourism facilities where you want....It is possible to have tourism with people living inside the parks, but it must be coordinated with the people. We would need more expertise and more resources to integrate these. When there are people in the park, you always need more resources for management" (G27).

This TFCA Unit employee emphasized, however, that "there is no formal government decision to exclude people from parks" (G27).

### **5.7.6 Section Summary**

A dominant idea that wildlife will be introduced to BNP, that human-wildlife conflicts are inevitable, and that residents will, therefore, have to move out of the park was influential in decision-making regarding displacement and resettlement of BNP-area

residents. This idea permeated among TFCA Unit employees, district, provincial, and national government employees, and others engaged in the TFCA Program.

## **5.8 Chapter Summary**

This chapter described six factors that combined to influence decision-making regarding displacement of the residents of BNP. These factors are: 1) a lack of coordination between the TFCA Program and the District Administration; 2) the power of the international and national-level poverty reduction agendas and the associated dominant idea that people in parks are impoverished; 3) a dominant idea at a national, provincial, and district government level that the provision of basic services can only occur if dispersed rural populations are concentrated; 4) diverging perceptions of “voluntariness” by key actors; 5) a rapid governmental decentralization process that emboldened but did not empower the district administrator to decide and act to resettle BNP-area residents; and 6) a dominant idea among key government, NGO, and private sector actors that wildlife would be introduced to BNP, that human-wildlife conflicts would be inevitable, and that residents would, therefore, have to move out of the park. Each of these factors combines aspects of political-economic, actor-centered, and post-structural forms of power.

## **CHAPTER VI**

### **Consequences of displacement and resettlement for BNP-area residents**

#### **6.1 Introduction**

The previous chapter described the many factors that combined to influence the decision to displace and resettle BNP-area residents. This chapter identifies and describes the consequences of displacement for BNP-area residents and efforts by displaced people and the district government to address those consequences. I employ the IRR framework to do this.

Based on the characteristics and functions of the IRR framework as presented in Chapter II, I developed 12 questions that I asked of each of the eight risks. The following analysis is based on these questions:

13. How is the risk currently manifesting?
14. How might the risk manifest?
15. How is the risk perceived by affected people?
16. How is the risk addressed by affected people?
17. How is the risk perceived by planners, politicians, and other key, non-local actors?
18. How is the risk addressed by planners, politicians, and other key, non-local actors?
19. Is the intensity of the risk high or low?
20. Will the intensity of the risk increase or diminish over time?
21. Does the risk manifest differently among groups and subgroups within a community? How?
22. How does the risk affect or how is it affected by hosts or potential hosts?
23. How is the risk affected by resistance to displacement and resettlement?
24. How does the risk relate to other system risks?

These questions provide the basis for an analysis of each of the impoverishment risks and their mutual connections. For the purposes of this research, however, I limit my analysis to the risk of landlessness and its relation to other system risks. This approach



enables analytical depth regarding one system risk and analytical breadth in illustrating the connections between landlessness and other system risks.

I chose to focus on landlessness because, as Cernea explains, it is the principle risk to which displaced and resettled people are exposed. Cernea (1997:1572) describes the risk of landlessness as follows:

Expropriation of land removes the main foundation upon which people's productive systems, commercial activities, and livelihoods are constructed. This is the principal form of de-capitalization and pauperization of displaced people, as they lose both natural and man-made capital... Unless the land basis of people's productive system is reconstructed elsewhere, or replaced with steady income-generating employment, landlessness sets in and the affected families become impoverished.

Sections 6.2 and 6.3 of this chapter address the perceptions of the risk of landlessness among two key actor groups: BNP-area residents and employees of the Chigubo District Administration. In section 6.4, I address some of the objective characteristics of the risk of landlessness in this situation, specifically with regard to the quality of land in the park and in resettlement areas. In section 6.5, I describe some of the consequences of the subjective and objective characteristics of the impoverishment risks outlined above, specifically how the risk of landlessness influenced the risk of social disarticulation. In section 6.6, I illustrate how the perceived and real risk of landlessness led to resistance to displacement and how these resistance behaviors subsequently contributed to increased risks of marginalization.

## **6.2 BNP-area residents' changing perceptions of the risk of landlessness**

### **6.2.1 Prior perceptions of land security**

Despite histories of displacement and resettlement, which are detailed in Chapter IV, nearly all BNP-area people we spoke with explained that they previously believed their ability to live on and use their land was secure, even though they were aware that the land was part of BNP. Leaders and some community members in both Tchove and Hocuanhe stated that they have been aware for decades that they were living in and around a national park and that this meant that there were certain restrictions on their use of natural resources (i.e. no hunting). As is described in Chapter IV, colonial authorities informed BNP-area residents that the area had been proclaimed a national park; however, the colonial administration had a minimal management presence in BNP in the early years of the park (1973-75) and they made no effort to physically remove people from the park (C5). Furthermore, there was no management presence in or around BNP between 1975 and 1998. People in both Tchove and Hocuanhe explained that this long history of living in BNP without any threat of park-related displacement led them to feel secure in their ability to stay on their land despite it being inside a national park. As one resident of Tchove said, “I never thought I would have to move. I was born around here...I knew it was the buffer zone. I knew it was the park” (B7).

Although BNP-area residents were temporarily displaced in the 1980's during the FRELIMO-RENAMO war and land rights throughout the country were ambiguous in the years after the war, many Tchove and Hocuanhe residents expressed that they still felt a sense of land security upon returning to their land in the early to mid 1990's. As people in both communities pointed out many times, they had a sense of land security because

“[after the war] the government told us to return to our places of origin” (B42). That it is government sanctioned for displaced people to return to their “place of origin” was the dominant message communicated to displaced people by the government, UNHCR, and other cooperating partners who were part of the post-war repatriation and reintegration effort between 1992 and 1996. For Hocuanhe residents and some Tchove residents, returning to their places of origin meant returning to live inside BNP.

Since the beginning of the TFCA Program in 1998 and especially since the recent displacement and resettlement, people in both Tchove and Hocuanhe explained that their belief that their land was secure has dissipated and many people expressed distrust in the government’s ability or desire to secure land rights for them. As one resident of Hocuanhe stated, “the people who told us to return to our places of origin were wrong” (B42).

#### **6.2.2 Mixed messages from outsiders about land security**

Perceptions of land insecurity amongst people living inside BNP developed, in part, in response to mixed messages about resettlement, resource access, and wildlife introduction from consultants, government employees, park employees, and other outsiders. People in both Tchove and Hocuanhe explained that feelings of land insecurity began in 1998 when the TFCA Program initiated activities in the BNP area. While TFCA Program employees maintain that the message to communities then and now has not involved any mention of resettlement (G27), people in Tchove, Hocuanhe, and other communities, however, explained that consultants and government authorities were not consistent in their messages to communities.

The most well-documented example of mixed messages involved the consultancy activities leading up to the drafting of a management plan for BNP (2001-2004). The history of mixed messages and resulting tensions are detailed in reports produced by Development Alternatives Incorporated (DAI), the lead consultancy group involved in developing the management plan (DAI 2002, 2003). As a DAI report explains, a “fear of eviction and wild game introduction” existed in BNP-area communities prior to the first socially-oriented consultancy activities in 2002 (ecologically-oriented consultancies began the previous year). These fears were “fueled by outsiders (*sic*) heightened activities in the park and particularly ecologists’ activities including mention of game introduction and villagers (*sic*) eviction from the park without any consultation or forewarning of villagers by the ecologists involved or the Government” (DAI 2003).

Socially-oriented consultancy activities were postponed in June 2002 because of the tensions associated with these fears (DAI 2002). In May 2003, in what was termed by DAI consultants as an “historic meeting” in the district capital, consultants from the planning team, Chigubo District authorities, a USAID<sup>47</sup> employee, and a employee of the Ministry of Tourism “brought a clear message of peace with villagers.” This message of peace was a “clear policy statement [of] no eviction” (DAI 2003). The planning team also promised community leaders in attendance from 11 villages in and around BNP that they would participate in any decisions regarding wildlife introductions.<sup>48</sup> The planning team subsequently held additional meetings and research activities in each BNP-area community during which they repeated the message of no eviction to community members (DAI 2003).

---

<sup>47</sup> USAID was the financial sponsor of the development of the management plan.

<sup>48</sup> The planning team subsequently engaged the leaders in activities to identify acceptable wildlife to be reintroduced.

### 6.2.3 Consistent message from park guards of impending displacement

While messages from outsiders were infrequent and mixed, the message to communities from resident park guards was consistent. One long-time park guard explained that the message he and other guards have been giving to community members since the guards arrived in 1998 is that “as the park becomes more organized...people will not be welcome to stay in the park.” And that “there would come a time when use of the banhine would be forbidden” (G11).

The park guards’ explanation was corroborated by people in Tchove. As one resident stated, “before these [park] people came...we didn’t think that we would have to move, but we started feeling [that we would have to move] when the park people first came and said that this was a place that we would have to leave” (B52).

BNP-area residents also explained that park guards were telling residents that dangerous wildlife was going to be introduced. Many residents explained that they, therefore, perceived themselves to be more safe from wildlife in the new villages as opposed to being in the park. This perception is illustrated in the following conversation I had with a person who recently moved from inside the park to the Tchove village:

I didn’t want to stay inside the park anymore because I’m afraid of being eaten by animals.

*Have you had problems with animals where you were living?*

I did not have any problems, but I know that animals eat people.

*Are you afraid of the animals that are currently near your old residence?*

No, I’m afraid of the animals that the park people said they are going to bring.

*Who said that animals were going to be introduced?*

The people working at the main camp. They used to say everyday that we are going to introduce animals, so you people will have to move.

*Why did you choose to move to this place?*

Because I like this place and it is not inside the park (B11).

#### **6.2.4 Land in the new village was perceived as secure by comparison to land in the park**

As described in Chapter I, in March 2006, employees of the district administration, communicated to people in BNP-area communities that they were not allowed to live in the park and that they should organize themselves in villages outside of the park. As explained by many residents in the subsequently-created village in Tchove, land in the new village was perceived to be more secure compared to land in the park where they lived under the specter of displacement.<sup>49</sup> As Tchove's president stated, "The government found a way out for us. They told us that what they think is the best thing for us is to move together in a village outside the park so that the park can do whatever they want with their land" (B53). Similarly, a recently resettled resident of Tchove village explained that the new village "is a safe place to live [because] this land does not belong to the park" (B14).

### **6.3 District Administration perceives minimal risk of landlessness**

In interviews focused on the current displacement and resettlement, employees of the District Administration consistently explained that landlessness was *not* a risk for displaced and resettled people. This was primarily so because of the perception that

---

<sup>49</sup> According to the president of Tchove, and roughly verified by observation, approximately one-third of Tchove's population (approximately 350 people) were living inside the boundaries of the park prior to the current resettlement. The other two-thirds of residents lived dispersed in and around the buffer zone of the park.

productive land in the BNP area is abundant. As an employee of the district administration explained, “there is enough land for everyone to live and produce...there is a lot of bush that people can clear” (G4).

The perception of land abundance among those in the District Administration influenced their efforts, or lack thereof, to provide land to displaced people. When asked about a formal process for allocating land for resettled people, an employee of the district administration explained that “There is no plan for land allocation because there is a lot of land, so people can choose wherever they want to live” (G4). When asked if there was a plan to compensate people for the land that they were losing, the employee explained that there was no plan for compensation because—referencing the Mozambican Constitution—“The land belongs to the State. People have the right to use and profit from land [and] they can be compensated for [lost] infrastructure, but not for the land” (G4). The District employee explained that people were receiving new land in place of the land they were leaving. “People are losing one land and gaining other land...The government provides enough land where they are going. People don’t even miss the places they came from” (G4).

District employees also explained that there is no effort to formally delimit or demarcate land or otherwise specify land rights for affected communities because “the district does not have partners helping us with that process, so this is not happening” (G4). Here, the District employee is explaining that, unlike other land delimitation efforts in Mozambique, there was no support or funding provided by NGO’s to help with land delimitation. But again, the District employee insisted that “there is no danger of people losing land [because] there is enough land” (G4).

When asked about the possibility of conflicts regarding land allocation, the District employee explained that “there have been no conflicts, and we don’t expect conflicts over land allocation given the fact that there are vast amounts of land. People can have as much land as they want, so the problem is your ability to work the land” (G4).

While there was no formal plan for land allocation, employees of the district administration did outline a general plan with regard to what land they thought to be most productive. “The government wants people to stay on land that is good for agriculture and grazing and has good water.” These places, he explained, were near ephemeral rivers and places where there were existing boreholes. There were, however, no technical studies conducted to identify such places.<sup>50</sup>

#### **6.4 All land is not equal: reduced land quality as part of a system of impoverishment risks**

The large majority of people that we spoke with in Tchove, Hocuanhe and other communities also perceived that there was an abundance of forested land that could be cleared for housing and local farms. Many of these same people stressed, however, that all land is not equal and that they were most concerned about losing or having more difficult access to specific lands, such as the banhine and certain forested lands. The risk of landlessness for BNP-area people is, as many explained, more about land quality rather than land quantity. This distinction between land quantity and land quality is helpful in understanding the relationship between landlessness and other risks in the system, specifically, loss of common property, food insecurity, and joblessness.

---

<sup>50</sup> Employees of the District Administration explained that their policy is to send someone to each new village to assist local leaders in village planning.



#### **6.4.1 Relationship between land quality and loss of common property**

As explained in Chapter IV, the banhine is not considered by BNP-area residents as being within the boundaries of any specific community. Access to and use of the banhine, however, is controlled by the traditional authorities in six BNP-area communities, with two *Regulos*, or paramount chiefs having additional powers. In short, the banhine is managed as a common property.

The current displacement and resettlement restricts or makes access more difficult to the banhine. Cernea explains the risk of loss of common property as follows:

For poor people, particularly for the landless and assetless, loss of access to common property assets that belonged to relocated communities (pastures, forested lands, water bodies, burial grounds, quarries, etc.) results in significant deterioration in income and livelihood levels. Typically, losses of common property assets are not compensated by governments. Losses of access to various basic public services...also occur rather often and should be linked to this class of risks (Cernea 1997:1575).

Employees of the district administration acknowledged in interviews that it will be more difficult to resettle people away from the banhine because there are valuable resources in the banhine (G25). No one in the district administration, however, explained how restricted access to the banhine would or could be compensated or otherwise accounted for in the resettlement. As forewarned by Cernea in the passage above, loss of or restricted access to the banhine is not being compensated.

#### **6.4.2 Relationship between land quality and food and water insecurity**

Cernea describes the risk of food insecurity as follows:

Forced uprooting increases the risk that people will fall into temporary or chronic undernourishment, defined as calorie-protein intake levels below the minimum necessary for normal growth and work (Cernea 1997:1575).

Although this IRR risk focuses specifically on food insecurity, I have expanded this risk to address potable water insecurity. The current displacement and resettlement is restricting or making access more difficult to critical water sources and replacement sources are not available in resettlement areas.

#### 6.4.2.1 The banhine provides potable water security

As explained in Chapter IV, BNP-area residents acquire water from different sources depending on availability. When water is plentiful, residents acquire water from sources in forested areas nearby their homes. As water becomes scarce, residents walk longer distances to hand dug wells in forested areas. When these wells become dry, residents acquire water from hand-dug wells in the banhine where, as one resident of Tchove explained, “we know we will always find water” (B54).

A major part of the district administration’s resettlement plan is “to provide the minimum conditions for people to live; water is the first one” (G3). As this district employee further explained, “the most pressing issue for government is not moving people, but providing water” (G3). Water provision is difficult in the BNP area because deeper levels of groundwater, which machine-drilled boreholes tap into, provide brackish to saline water that is not potable. This is the case in Tchove, Catine, and Harriane, three of the proposed resettlement areas around BNP. Water from the banhine, however, is “always tasty,” as many BNP-area residents explained.

Moving out of the park, away from the banhine, and into resettlement areas, paradoxical to the District Administration’s intentions, limits rather than increases people’s access to potable water. A resident of Hocuanhe summarized this paradox: “They tell us to move to a place where there is water. The only places we know where

there is water is in the banhine and in [the wells we created]. These places are inside the park. But they don't want us in the park" (B42).

#### 6.4.2.2 Survival knowledge is context specific

An example of the connection between landlessness and the risk of food insecurity is that the current displacement and resettlement is removing people from resources and specific places where their localized knowledge enables them to find sufficient foods. As one Hocuanhe resident explained, "I know how to survive around here. If I am suffering I know how to get resources from the bush. I know what to get here to survive" (B22). As another Hocuanhe resident explained with regard to finding and harvesting non-timber forest products, "Moving is like being born again. You have to learn everything like it is new" (B42).

While the forested lands in resettlement areas are of the same landscape type and provide many of the same non-timber forest products, many BNP-area residents explained that they prefer to return to specific trees or areas that they know will produce sufficient foods. Knowledge of these places, in many cases, has been passed down through generations. As one resident of Hocuanhe explained, "my father showed me these trees, so I go back to these trees because I know I will find [food] here" (B26).<sup>51</sup>

#### **6.4.3 Relationship between land quality and joblessness**

While wage employment is almost non-existent in the BNP area, people still engage in a cash and barter economy in small but meaningful ways. Access to the

---

<sup>51</sup> Even if displaced people are able to learn how and where to harvest non-timber forest products in resettlement areas, they will likely be challenged to find productive trees or areas that are not controlled by people in host communities.

banhine and other specific lands is critical for many “job” opportunities. Cernea describes the risk of joblessness as follows:

The risk of losing wage employment is very high both in urban and rural displacements for those employed in enterprises, services, or agriculture. Yet, creating new jobs is difficult and requires substantial investment. Unemployment or underemployment among resettlers often endures long after physical relocation has been completed (Cernea 1997:1573).

#### 6.4.3.1 Livestock owners rely on water from the banhine

Livestock are highly valued economic and cultural assets in the BNP area. Livestock-owning households are considered wealthier than non-livestock-owning households and are a minority in both Tchove and Hocuanhe. Livestock owners in Tchove and Hocuanhe explained that they sell cattle and goats to non-local people when they are hungry and when they need transport to health clinics. They also use livestock to pay bride price. Livestock are rarely consumed locally.

What is important to understand with regard to livestock, land quality, and the risk of joblessness is that livestock owners, especially cattle owners, are heavily reliant on the dry-year wells in the banhine. In times of drought when all other water sources are dry, first cattle owners and then goat and sheep owners will temporarily move to the banhine to water their livestock. They will remain in the banhine for months and sometimes years before returning home after substantial rains fill local watering areas. All cattle owners we spoke with in Hocuanhe and neighboring Hlecane had taken their cattle to the banhine where they or their relatives are temporarily living and caring for the cattle. The four livestock-owning households in Tchove live close enough to banhine dry-year wells that they are able to herd their cattle to and from such wells in a day. The primary point, however, is that the current displacement and resettlement prohibits

temporary inhabitation of livestock owners in the banhine and makes daily access more difficult for cattle owners.

#### 6.4.3.2 BNP-area people sell non-timber forest products, crops, and other goods from BNP

Restricted or more difficult access to the banhine also puts at risk opportunities for BNP-area residents to sell non-timber forest products, crops, and other goods harvested, grown, or hunted inside the park. Many residents of Tchove, Hocuanhe, and other communities have mature cashew trees near their homes inside the park and expressed distress about leaving their trees unguarded and not having access to the trees for future harvests.

People in the BNP area also barter and sell food and basic non-food household items including vegetables, sugar cane, *mehewu*, palm wine, and distilled spirits that are produced in or with materials from the park. Although, while some expressed concern that restricted access would inhibit their abilities to sell and barter such items, others expressed excitement that village life would allow for greater commerce. “Profit is where the people are” one resident of Ntchai Ntchai, a community near Tchove, explained (B49).

Sale of game meat may also be a means through which BNP-area people engage the cash economy. BNP-area people were reticent, however, to talk about hunting or selling game meat. Most BNP-area people are aware that hunting inside the park is illegal.

#### 6.4.3.3 Traditional healers rely on medicinal plants only found in the banhine

A traditional healer in Hocuanhe explained that there are some medicinal plants in the banhine that are not in the forested lands outside the banhine. “In the banhine you find diverse species that are important for healing” he explained (B24). “Depending on the disease, you need different species of plants, so what’s important is to have plants from a diversity of places” (B24). Restricted access to the banhine will impair traditional healers in their jobs. Restricted access to banhine-area herbs also poses health risks for people who rely on traditional healers as their primary health care providers.

### **6.5 Consequences of the lack of planned reconstruction of land security**

#### **6.5.1 Resettlement planning in Tchove**

Although people in the District Administration explained that they sent employees to assist communities in resettlement planning, no one in Tchove, including the community president or the traditional leader, reported that such a person ever came to Tchove. Further, no government official or local leader specifically allocated plots to village resettlers. Instead, resettlers explained that the community president told them to choose a plot of land in the village and clear it to claim it as theirs. The first people to resettle in the village were therefore the first to claim land.

People from communities other than Tchove were some of the first people to move to the new village. These outsiders, therefore, were among the first to be able to choose land on which to live and to farm. While neither long-time Tchove residents nor newcomers expressed concern about this, it is possible that this situation may lead to land conflicts in the future.

Although population density in the BNP area is low, shifting agriculture requires vast amounts of land to accommodate fields in different stages of fallow and use. Forested land in Tchove that can be cleared for farming is abundant, but land close to the village center is limited. This issue may become a bigger problem in time if populations grow or when soil in the proximate fields becomes exhausted and people have to walk long distances to get to new farming areas.

### **6.5.2 Relationship between landlessness and social disarticulation**

While the district administration did not allocate or secure land for people in Tchove as part of the current displacement and resettlement, there had been an earlier attempt by the TFCA Program to do so. Rather than helping to secure land, this process instead resulted in confusion about boundaries and contributed to tensions between traditional and modern governance systems and eventually led to the physical division of Tchove into two villages. This situation is one example of how land insecurity relates to social disarticulation. Cernea describes social disarticulation as follows:

Forced displacement tears apart the existing social fabric. It disperses and fragments communities, dismantles patterns of social organization and interpersonal ties; kinship groups become scattered as well. Life-sustaining informal networks of reciprocal help, local voluntary associations, and self-organized mutual service are disrupted. This is a net loss of valuable “social capital,” that compounds the loss of natural, physical, and human capital. The social capital lost through social disarticulation is typically unperceived and uncompensated by the programs causing it, and this real loss has long-term consequences (Cernea 1997: 1575).

Phase One of the TFCA Program included a legal land delimitation process that was conducted cooperatively by IUCN and the government. The goals of the land delimitation process were to provide land security, protect Tchove residents from private-sector land speculators, and enable the community to benefit from future tourism

initiatives by using their land to negotiate with private-sector tourism operators (TFCAPISP ICR 2003). The delimitation identified the boundaries of the park and buffer zone as well as the boundaries of Tchove outside the park.

Tchove's land in the buffer zone and outside the park was formally delimited and registered with the National Directorate for Geography and Cadastre. As a government employee involved in the process explained, however, logistical and financial problems prevented project personnel from formally presenting the land title to the community of Tchove and therefore completing the process (G23).<sup>52</sup>

The inability to complete the land delimitation process contributed to confusion and conflict among community leaders regarding the boundaries of their community and the boundaries of the park. This became problematic when, nearly two years later, employees of the District Administration told Tchove residents to organize themselves in a village *outside* the park.

The community president responded by organizing people in a village near the schoolhouse, an area the president contends is outside the park. This area was called "first *bairro*."<sup>53</sup> The traditional leader, however, contended that the area around the schoolhouse is *inside* the park. Rather than helping to organize people to form a village near the schoolhouse, the traditional leader instead organized people to form a second

---

<sup>52</sup> This title, although not delivered, formally gives rights to the community of Tchove to their lands outside the park but within and around the buffer zone of the park. No rights to land inside the park were formalized in this process, although as government personnel pointed out, access to such lands was not restricted (Grachane 21 November 2006).

<sup>53</sup> *Bairro* is a Portuguese word for a neighborhood, district, borough or some form of division within a community.



village approximately four kilometers away.<sup>54</sup> This village is referred to as “second *bairro*.”

We first learned of the division of Tchove into two villages during a contentious meeting with the community president, the traditional leader, and others representing first and second bairros. In that meeting, the traditional leader and others in second bairro emphasized many times that, “we are not opposed to being in a village. We are just opposed to being in a village in this place,” referring to first bairro (B55). The traditional leader continued,

You can’t ask people to move to a place where there is no water and then we have to move away again to get water. I don’t want to play games... There is a park here, the boundary is here and we were told by the government to move outside the boundary of the park and to live together. So we are doing what the government said. But we are not listening to the president who is telling us to move to first bairro because the river [and their hand-dug wells in the dried riverbed] is not here... People from first bairro are lying to try to get people to move here (B55).<sup>55</sup>

What is important about this with regard to the risk of landlessness is that rather than contributing to land security, the incomplete land delimitation process instead contributed to confusion about boundaries and land rights. This confusion contributed to intra-community tensions that divided traditional and modern community leaders,

---

<sup>54</sup> The second village is in the location where a security village was temporarily formed in the 1980’s.

<sup>55</sup> The frank discussion in this first meeting was interrupted at least twice by meeting participants who expressed concern about having this discussion in front of outsiders. “These are our issues; not outsiders,” one person stated. In subsequent interactions with the traditional leader, community president, and others from first and second bairro, however, people continued to make their case for where the park boundary was and where the new village should be located. The tone of many of these conversations was confrontational and sometimes involved name-calling.

physically divided the community of Tchove, and will likely result in a net loss of social capital.<sup>56</sup>

## **6.6 Relationship between resistance, landlessness, and marginalization**

Landlessness and the system of risks of which it is a part manifest differently in some ways in Hocuanhe than in Tchove. In part, this is because Hocuanhe leaders and the majority of Hocuanhe community members are overtly resisting displacement and resettlement. In particular, this section illustrates how resistance and landlessness manifest in political, economic, and psychological marginalization. Conversely, this section also illustrates how fear of marginalization by host communities and fear of landlessness in resettlement areas provide motivations for resistance. Cernea describes the risk of marginalization as follows:

Marginalization occurs when families lose economic power and spiral on a “downward mobility” path. Middle-income farm households do not become landless, they become small landholders; small shopkeepers and craftsmen downsize and slip below poverty thresholds. Many individuals cannot use their earlier acquired skills at the new location; human capital is lost or rendered inactive or obsolete. Economic marginalization is often accompanied by social and psychological marginalization, expressed in a drop in social status, in resettlers’ loss of confidence in society and in themselves, a feeling of injustice, and deepened vulnerability. The coerciveness of displacement and the victimization of resettlers tend to depreciate resettlers’ self-image, and they are often perceived by host communities as a socially degrading stigma (Cernea 1997:1574).

---

<sup>56</sup> While both the president and the traditional leader explained on separate occasions that their relationship before the recent resettlement was good, I can not be certain if issues surrounding the resettlement caused or merely exacerbated previously existing tensions.

### **6.6.1 Damned if you resettle and damned if you resist**

As is detailed in Chapter IV, the land rights of Hocuanhe residents (as with all other residents of national parks in Mozambique) are ambiguous and insecure. There has been no formal land delimitation inside the park or in resettlement areas for Hocuanhe residents as there was for Tchove residents. If Hocuanhe residents continue to resist displacement, they will do so with tenuous legal rights to the lands they have long occupied inside the park.

If Hocuanhe residents do eventually acquiesce and leave their land, however, they will lose any rights they may have gained from continuous occupancy and use of their land inside BNP. Without formal land delimitation or a history of occupancy and use of the land in the resettlement area, Hocuanhe residents may experience more severe land insecurity if they move.

Hocuanhe residents generally expressed skepticism about land security in resettlement areas. Specifically, residents expressed distrust in the government's ability or desire to secure their land rights in resettlement areas. As one resident of Hocuanhe, who appeared to associate us with the government or other forces behind the resettlement, exclaimed in a meeting, "Even where you are sending us, you are going to do the same to us there. You are going to tell us to move. It will always be the same. You will tell us to move again" (B42).

Although this person was likely unaware of such plans, her fears are substantiated by TFCA Program plans for BNP. As was described in Chapter IV, the plan of the TFCA Program is to investigate the necessity of changing the boundaries of BNP to be more inclusive of the wetland's catchment area northwest of the park. This catchment area includes Harriane, the proposed resettlement area for Hocuanhe residents. The issue

of resettlement was planned to be addressed by the TFCA Program *after* any redrawing of the boundaries of the park. If Hocuanhe residents do move to the proposed resettlement area, it is possible that after the redrawing of the boundaries of the park, they will once again find themselves inside BNP and at risk of being resettled again.

### **6.6.2 Local feelings of alienation from government**

In group meetings and in individual interactions, many Hocuanhe residents expressed concern that the government is not looking out for their best interest with regard to the current displacement and resettlement and that resistance by the leaders and people of Hocuanhe is straining relations with the government. As one Hocuanhe resident explained, “The government is not representing us...People no longer know who to go to when they have something to say or something to ask” (B19). Most respondents did not distinguish between sectors or levels of government.

Many expressed feelings of disenfranchisement and rejection by the government. “The government is treating us as if we can’t think, like we are idiots. If they don’t want us we will go to Zimbabwe” (B21). Another woman elaborated this feeling, “when someone doesn’t give you a choice, you just get angry and want to leave” (B22).

A group of men who fought in the FRELIMO-RENAMO war expressed a feeling of betrayal by the government that they fought for.

The government made us fight a war. We are the ones who defeated the enemy. [FRELIMO] is where it is now because of us. They are the ones who told us don’t vote for the guys from the bush [a reference to RENAMO]. We didn’t. Now [FRELIMO is] in power and have jobs, and we are here and have lost our livestock (B26).

Referencing the possibility of wildlife reintroduction, another war veteran exclaimed, “We didn’t see anyone from the party of the animals fighting in this land.

Now why are they removing us so that...the party of animals can bring animals in here and make us move?" (B27). Similarly, a woman stated that "If you move us, then Chigubo [District] will fall because no one will pay taxes. The elephants will have to walk all the way to [the District capital] to pay taxes" (B42).

### **6.6.3 Uncertainty**

Marginalization is also manifest through the uncertainty Hocuanhe residents are experiencing about the future. As previously discussed in this chapter, BNP-area residents have been living with a sense of land insecurity since the TFCA Program was initiated in 1998. Residents reported that their sense of insecurity increased when they received the message from the District Administration that they should resettle outside the park. The leadership and the majority of people in Hocuanhe are resisting displacement and resettlement; however, they are unsure how long they will be able to do so.

This uncertainty about the future is causing economic troubles for residents who are unsure whether or not to build or fix their houses and kraals, clear new farmlands, or even plant crops. As one resident in Hocuanhe explained,

Right now I don't feel free to do what I want to do because some people are telling me to move from my land. I'm feeling uneasy...I don't feel free to start a new farm if the one I have is getting exhausted. I live with fear...I don't have power to do anything. I can't build a brick house here or start a business because you can't do these things if you're going to be forced to move...people in the community don't feel free. (B18).

Similarly, the traditional leader of Hocuanhe explained that "people are trying to guess what the government is going to do next. So they are not farming with all their heart. People are farming with one foot raised [ready to move]" (B43).

The psychological trauma of uncertainty was also the most observable health effect of the resettlement. As one resident of Hocuanhe explained,

We are being moved to a place where we do not know what we'll find. I'm not concerned about lack of food or water because we deal with those issues here. I'm concerned because people are acting crazy because they don't know [about the future]" (B19).

The traditional leader of Hocuanhe explained that his people are "just like an animal when people are shooting. The animal jumps around and doesn't know where to go" (B41).

A Hocuanhe man compared his situation to that of a woman about to be married.

When you conquer a woman, she doesn't know where she is going to go and if she is going to suffer or live well. We [like the woman] do not know if we will suffer or if we are going to live well. We are just being told to move (B25).

The marginalization and psychological anguish associated with uncertainty was perhaps best described by a woman from Hocuanhe who, speaking for the community, explained that

When a husband sleeps with his wife, all he thinks about is the land that is being taken. When a wife sleeps with her husband, all she thinks about is the land that is being taken. When a child sleeps, all he thinks about is the land that is being taken (B42).

#### **6.6.4 Landlessness, resettler-host relations, marginalization, and resistance**


One of the reasons often voiced by leaders and residents of Hocuanhe for resisting displacement and resettlement was the fear of landlessness and marginalization due to strained relations with their proposed host community.<sup>57</sup> Hocuanhe and its eastern neighbor Hlecane are situated wholly within BNP. Hocuanhe's neighbor to the west is

---

<sup>57</sup> The focus of this research is on displaced communities rather than host communities and analysis focuses on how relationships between hosts and displaced people affects the displaced people rather than the hosts. Risks to hosts is another possible focus of analysis using the IRR model.

Harriane, which is partially inside the park and partially outside the park. The resettlement proposal of the District Administration is that residents of Hocuanhe, Hlecane, and Harriane congregate in separate but proximate villages on the portion of Harriane's land that is outside the park. This is illustrated in figure 6.1 below.

**Figure 6.1: Location of Hocuanhe, Hlecane, and Harriane, and their proposed resettlement areas**



Part of the justification given by the District Administration for this plan is that the challenges commonly associated with displaced and host communities would be nullified because all three of these communities fall within the jurisdiction of the *Regulo*

of Hocuanhe, a higher-order traditional leader akin to a paramount chief. As an employee of the district administration explained, “There will be no problems because the same traditional chief rules all three places” (G4).

Nonetheless, people in Hocuanhe, including the *Regulo*, expressed concern about the possibility of resettling onto the lands of Harriane. As the *Regulo* explained, “It is not an easy job going to another place. If something goes wrong, we will be blamed [by the host community]. If we are here, we know how to live” (B41).

The *Regulo* and other residents of Hocuanhe and Hlecane explained that they were not opposed to the idea of forming a village, as long as that village was on the lands of either Hocuanhe or Hlecane and *not* Harriane. In a community meeting, residents of Hocuanhe explained that the people of Hocuanhe are part of the *Chauke* clan and have lived in the area longer than any other people. Hlecane was created when the *Regulo* of Hocuanhe sent his brother to control additional lands to the east. Some time after this, “migrants” from the *Matwasa* clan arrived in the area and asked the *Regulo* of Hocuanhe for permission to settle in the area. The Hocuanhe *Regulo* formed an alliance with these members of the *Matwasa* clan and provided them with some land to the west of Hocuanhe. This area came to be called Harriane. These three communities have since lived under the rule of the *Regulo* from Hocuanhe.

As the Hocuanhe residents explained, the *kin*-based relationship between Hocuanhe and Hlecane has always been closer than the *alliance*-based relationship between Hocuanhe and Harriane. As one resident of Hocuanhe explained,

The relationship is closer between Hocuanhe and Hlecane because we are brothers. The relationship between Hocuanhe and Harriane is like when there is a marriage” (B42).



When discussing the possible resettlement, the traditional leader and president of Harriane, the proposed host community, emphasized instead that potential problems between hosts and resettlers depends on the availability of food and water.

A big challenge will be if the people of Hocuanhe and Hlecane come here without food and want food from us, because we also don't have food....The biggest challenge will be water. All of these people need water. If there is not water, then people will fight. Someday [our wells inside the park] will be inside a fence. The government needs to give us water (B3).

The traditional leader of Harriane showed deference to the power of the *Regulo* of Hocuanhe and emphasized that the two communities share the same culture and therefore would be able to understand each other and work together. He explained, however, that

If [the people of Hocuanhe and Hlecane] don't come here with strange ideas trying to make our life difficult, then everything will be fine. Otherwise we won't be able to understand each other and there will be problems (B3).

## 6.7 Chapter Summary

This chapter described the consequences of displacement and resettlement for affected people. Using the IRR framework, this chapter focused on the risk of landlessness and illustrated the relationship between landlessness and the system of impoverishment risks of which it is a part. Specifically, I illustrated the connections between the risk of landlessness and the risks of the loss of common property, food insecurity, joblessness, social disarticulation, and marginalization. Further, I illustrated how both subjective and objective characteristics of the risks were important in understanding the links between the risks in the system.

## **CHAPTER VII**

### **Discussion**

#### **7.1 Introduction**

The purposes of this chapter are to briefly summarize the research problem, framework, methodology, and findings; to discuss the implications of the research; to explain the limitations of the research; and to suggest avenues for future research.

#### **7.2 Review of research problem, questions, framework, methods, and findings**

The problem area that this dissertation addressed is the impending decisions and consequences of such regarding the future of often-times marginalized people resident in and reliant on resources in strict protected areas. This problem area is characterized by contentious debates and opposing approaches to protected area management that either do or do not involve displacement of resident people.

I situated the issue of protected area displacement within the larger literature of development-induced displacement and resettlement. My focus within this literature was on The World Bank, its safeguard policy on involuntary resettlement, and the Impoverishment Risk and Reconstruction (IRR) framework.

Despite the World Bank safeguard and other progressive policies and practices, and despite advanced understanding of impoverishment risks and how to mitigate them enabled through IRR, people continue to be impoverished through displacement, resettlement and reconstruction efforts continue to be inadequate, and many academics,

development practitioners, social justice advocates, and especially, those being impoverished by displacement are left asking why. As many contributors to DIDR have pointed out, displacement and resettlement are imbued with power and politics and to better understand why resettlement continues to be inadequate we need to understand the political factors influencing both displacement decision-making and resettlement efforts.

This dissertation, therefore, investigated two interconnected questions: ***What are the political factors influencing (or causes of) displacement decision-making and how do these factors influence (oftentimes inadequate) resettlement efforts.*** Or, in other words, what are the eventual consequences of these influencing political factors. The specific case on which I focus is Banhine National Park in Mozambique.

To address the consequences of displacement and resettlement I used IRR to understand impoverishment risks and the ability (or lack thereof) of resettlement efforts to mitigate these risks. To understand why these consequences occurred, I embedded IRR within an investigation of the political factors influencing displacement decision-making. I framed this layer of research using political economic, actor-centered, and post-structural theoretical perspectives on power. Finally, I embedded both consequences and causes within a particular socio-ecological and historical context. My goal in embedding investigations of consequences, causes, and context was less to understand each layer of this framework and more to understand the connections between the layers.

I constructed a methodological framework that involved qualities of “interpretive” and “critical” approaches to science (Neuman 2003), that was “inquiry-guided” (Mishler 1990), and that was informed by extended case method (Burawoy 1998). I operationalized the methodological framework through a cyclical and iterative research

process that involved multiple research methods, analytic approaches, and means for me to understand relationships among data, theory, and my interpretations. The primary methods I used included: individual and household interviews; focus groups; and large community meetings with BNP-area residents and semi-structured interviews with park staff; district, provincial, and national-level government employees from various sectors; NGO and World Bank staff, and private consultants. I also analyzed many documents including government and donor project planning and evaluation documents, consultancy reports, historical documents, national policies, strategic plans, donor policies, and legal contracts.

Major findings of the research (organized in the order in which they are presented in previous chapters) include the following:

- District-level officials took action in early 2006 to promote the displacement of BNP-area residents and their resettlement in villages outside the park. District employees justified this action by explaining that displacement and resettlement would enable BNP-area residents to have improved access to available services and enable government or NGO's to better provide services in the future. District employees also justified the action as being in line with the purposes and future plans of the national park, specifically that people should not be living in the park.
- The causes and consequences of displacement were comprehensible within a unique historical, political, and socio-ecological context. This context involved the following.
  - A particular human history of inhabitation, displacement, and resettlement in the area now known as BNP. The history of inhabitation for the people of Hocuanhe, the oldest community in the BNP-area, began at least in the mid-to-late 1800's. People in Hocuanhe and other BNP-area communities were subsequently displaced numerous times for reasons related to colonial policies and the post-independence FRELIMO-RENAMO war. Early post-independence villagization schemes did not directly impact BNP-area residents. And, although certain restrictions on resource use were imposed in the 1960's with the establishment of a colonial-era cattle ranch and later with the establishment of *Coutada* 17 and BNP, area residents were not forced to physically relocate.

- A particular relationship between the ecological functioning of a dynamic wetland system and resident peoples' inhabitation patterns and livelihood systems. The primary importance of this relationship is that while population density in the BNP area is low and land is seemingly abundant, natural resources important for local livelihoods (especially in times of drought, crop failure, and famine) are only available in the wetland portions of the park and people are spatially organized to facilitate access to these resources. Specifically, non-village, dispersed living arrangements and livelihood systems are designed in response to the dynamics of the wetland and surrounding ecological system.
- Limited basic services such as water, health facilities, schools, and roads in or around BNP-area communities. Provision of such services is a major component of the development plan of the District of Chigubo. This plan (which at the time of research was not yet drafted) is based on a provincial strategic plan (drafted but not approved at the time of research) which itself is based on a national development framework. The national development framework was developed as a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper in line with IMF and World Bank mandates and also intended to help Mozambique achieve aspects of the UN Millennium Development Goals.
- Legal ambiguities with regard to the status and rights of people resident in and dependent on resources in Mozambican national parks and varying interpretations among different actors with regard to residents' status and rights. The lack of a national policy specifically addressing displacement and resettlement also contributed to these legal ambiguities and varying perceptions of the status and rights of people in parks.
- Institutional structures and policies related to a three-phase World Bank / GEF-financed Transfrontier Conservation Area Program. Most importantly for this research, there was a formal decision-making structure and process regarding involuntary resettlement that was guided by the World Bank's safeguard policy on involuntary resettlement and that was approved by the government of Mozambique at the highest ministerial level. This formal decision-making structure and process required coordination between various sectors of the Mozambican government, between the government and the World Bank, and between the government and the people potentially affected by displacement.
- The formal decision-making structure regarding displacement and resettlement did not, however, guide the actual decision-making regarding the displacement of BNP-area communities. Instead, district-level decision-making and actions promoting displacement and resettlement were influenced by at least six factors identified in this dissertation. These factors build on the context outlined above.

Factors were not mutually exclusive but instead interacted to influence decision-making. These factors included the following.

- A lack of coordination between the TFCA Program and the District Administration. This lack of coordination was due, in part, to the lack of implementation of a project-specific plan for coordination. Without such a plan, coordination between the TFCA project and the district administration was reliant on established forms of coordination. These forms of coordination were described by many within and outside government as being “sensitive,” “weak,” and highly dependent on individual perspectives and personalities. In this case, the perspectives of key figures were detrimental to coordination.
- The power of the poverty reduction agenda and the associated dominant idea that people in parks are impoverished. The poverty reduction agenda was described by many government figures at various levels as the most dominant agenda of the government. This agenda is heavily supported by international actors. With regard to parks such as BNP, there was a dominant idea among those in the district administration as well as those involved in the TFCA Program that people in parks are impoverished and that if they remain in parks, where basic services will not be provided, they will always be impoverished.
- A dominant idea that the provision of basic services can only occur if dispersed rural populations are concentrated. This dominant idea has historical antecedents in previous, controversial government villagization efforts. The idea is also apparent in current government planning initiatives. Actors differed, however, in their comfort regarding the association between past villagization efforts, current planning initiatives, and the resettlement of BNP-area residents. The “problem” of dispersed living arrangements, however, was questioned by very few respondents except BNP-area residents.
- Diverging perceptions of “voluntariness” by key actors. Many government employees distinguished past and present resettlement efforts by arguing that the former were involuntary and the latter are voluntary. TFCA Unit employees differed from other government employees in that they explained that government-induced resettlement could be participatory but could not be voluntary. With specific regard to the displacement and resettlement of BNP-area residents, employees of the district administration insisted that efforts there were voluntary and participatory. Affected BNP-area residents, however, explained that while they were given choice with regard to where they could resettle, they were not given choice about whether to resettle. These diverging perceptions of voluntariness are important to understand because how different groups

understood voluntariness was significant in influencing their perceptions of the appropriateness of resettlement.

- A rapid decentralization process that emboldened but did not empower the district employees to displace and resettle BNP-area residents. Employees of the district administration were emboldened to decide and act, in part, because of a rapid but constrained process of decentralization, a corresponding pressure applied to district administrations to be the primary ‘poles of development,’ and the encouragement from higher-level government officials, including the president of Mozambique, to concentrate dispersed rural populations. Although emboldened, the district administration was not financially or institutionally empowered to make such a decision or to carry out the resettlement as intended.
- The dominance of an uninhabited wildlife park model. There was a dominant idea that permeated among TFCA Unit employees, district, provincial, and national government employees, and others engaged in the TFCA Program that wildlife will be introduced to BNP, that human-wildlife conflicts are inevitable, and that residents will, therefore, have to move out of the park.
- The abovementioned factors, within the abovementioned context, led to a particular configuration of impoverishment risks. This configuration centered on the risk of landlessness and the relationship of other impoverishment risks to the risk of landlessness.
  - The risk of landlessness and related risks had both subjective and objective characteristics. A primary subjective characteristic of the risk of landlessness was the perception among employees of the district administration that displaced BNP-area residents were not at risk of landlessness because there was an abundance of land in resettlement areas. A primary objective characteristic of the risk of landlessness was that while displaced BNP-area residents had access to abundant land in resettlement areas, they are at risk of reduced access to and control of land and resources in the wetland that are specifically important for their local livelihoods. Restricted access to and control of land and resources in the wetland related specifically to the risks of loss of common property, food insecurity, and joblessness.
  - Another consequence of the perception among district employees that displaced BNP-area residents were not at risk of landlessness is that there was little concerted effort to promote land security for displaced people. This contributed to social conflict and the physical division of the community of Tchove into two villages.

- The leaders and residents of Hocuanhe were openly resisting displacement and resettlement. Fear among Hocuanhe leaders and residents of marginalization by host communities and fear of landlessness in resettlement area contributed to resistance. Resistance behaviors by Hocuanhe leaders and residents, however, also contributed to political, economic, and psychological marginalization.

## 7.3 Implications

### 7.3.1 Transparency and external attention is critical in displacement

Partly in response to the findings from this research, employees of the Chigubo District Administration, the TFCA Unit, and the World Bank Safeguards Unit met in May 2007 to discuss displacement and resettlement in BNP. During this meeting, these actors agreed to halt current actions to displace and resettle BNP-area residents, to conduct a census in the area, and to begin developing a formal Resettlement Action Plan consistent with the World Bank safeguard policy. Ten months after this meeting, a World Bank Safeguard Unit employee explained to me that the displacement and resettlement of BNP-area residents had supposedly stopped (although the employee had no way to verify this) and that the TFCA Unit had recently submitted a proposal to the World Bank regarding how the census would be conducted. No actions had been taken regarding a Resettlement Action Plan.

Part of the reason these actions are progressing slowly is because employees of the TFCA Unit as well as the World Bank are focused on resolving problems with the displacement and resettlement of residents of Limpopo National Park (LNP), Mozambique. LNP and the displacement and resettlement of LNP residents have drawn national, regional, and international media attention. This is due, in part, to the high media profile of neighboring Kruger National Park, South Africa, and the transfrontier park project connecting Kruger and LNP. The slowness by the TFCA Unit and the



World Bank to address the situation in BNP is likely exacerbating the impoverishment risks to which BNP-area residents are being exposed.

One of the reasons I chose to study displacement decision-making in BNP was because it was a lesser-known park that was not receiving a lot of attention from media, management, civil society, or academia. In this regard, I believe BNP is more like most inhabited parks in Africa and around the world. An implication of this research is that a lack of media, management, civil society, and academic attention does not bode well for residents of BNP or other lesser known parks in Africa where displacement decisions are impending. External attention to particular cases of displacement decision-making is critical to ensure that such decision-making is transparent and that the rights and welfare of displaced people and the environment are secure.

### **7.3.2 Linking the causes and consequences of displacement decision-making**

A major critique of IRR is that it addresses only the consequences of displacement and not the causes of displacement. IRR addresses consequences in large part because a primary purpose of IRR is to help do resettlement better. Or, in other words, the purpose is to reduce and ideally eliminate the impoverishing consequences of displacement and resettlement. This is opposed to the purpose of interrogating the political motivations of displacement decisions and decision-makers. As many in the displacement literature point out, Cernea has been very successful in advancing the cause of reducing displacement and resettlement's impoverishing consequences largely because he customized IRR so that it would be operational within the administrative structures of the World Bank and because IRR accounted for the political sensitivities within the World Bank and between the World Bank and client governments.

A major conclusion of this research, however, is that BNP-area residents were being exposed to a particular system of impoverishment risks because they were being displaced in a particular way. And, *the way they were being displaced was influenced by why they were being displaced (the factors influencing displacement decision-making)*. In other words, the unique set of factors influencing displacement decision-making in BNP caused BNP-area residents to be exposed to a particular system of impoverishment risks. My ability to understand the consequences of displacement was, therefore, aided by my understanding of the causes of displacement decision-making (as well as by the characteristics of the particular historical and socio-ecological context of decision-making).

An implication of this conclusion is that understanding the political climate in which displacement decisions are made can be enormously helpful in understanding how or if impoverishment risks from displacement and resettlement can be reduced or eliminated. Furthermore, an explicit analysis of the factors influencing displacement decision-making may expose illegal or unjust decisions and actions which could subsequently be prevented or overturned. In short, policies aimed at minimizing displacement and/or successfully resettling displaced people, such as the World Bank safeguard policy on involuntary resettlement, will likely continue to be inadequate if such policies and complementary analytical frameworks do not directly address the political causes of displacement. Based on this implication, I recommend that future assessments of displacement-induced impoverishment risks, or social impacts more generally, account for the political factors influencing displacement decision-making.

The specific connections between the causes and consequences of displacement and resettlement, however, are not necessarily direct, isolated, or easily addressed in policy or practice. Displacement decision-making occurs within complex and politically imbued systems. The factors influencing displacement decision-making presented in Chapter V identify the most prominent components of the decision-making system in this case. An understanding of any one of these factors is necessary but not sufficient to understand why displacement decision-making occurred as it did, let alone why impoverishment risks manifested as they did.

The system of which all of these factors of influence are component parts is not only complex, it is constantly changing and includes many uncertainties regarding cause and effect relationships. Intended and unintended consequences of individual or organizational actions are often difficult to trace through a system; and the consequences of policy or other structural influences or of dominant symbolic or ideational factors are even harder to trace. In short, it is hard to understand what causes led to what consequences.

By analyzing the factors of influence together, however, I was able to identify the relationships between factors as well as a storyline that wove together these components and illustrated the larger system of which displacement decision-making in BNP was a part. As example, that an uninhabited versus an inhabited protected area approach was dominant among key actors, therefore, is not sufficient to explain why displacement was being promoted in this case. Instead, by viewing this factor in relation to the other factors of influence, we can see that the dominance of the idea of an uninhabited protected area approach combined with pressures to reduce poverty and that both of these influences

supported the long-standing agenda of villagization. Working together, these factors of influence led to decisions and actions to promote the displacement of BNP-area residents.

### **7.3.3 “Sustainability” debates may have little influence on displacement decisions**

Much of the academic debate regarding the role of local and resident people in protected areas centers on whether or not local livelihoods have been, are, or can be environmentally sustainable. Such debates often underlie support for inhabited versus uninhabited protected area management approaches. The findings of this research illustrate a limited role for such debates among key actors. While a few project consultants made claims regarding environmental sustainability, these ideas were not a major factor influencing displacement decision-making. Instead, factors more powerful than those directly or commonly related to protected areas were influential (i.e. poverty reduction, decentralization, and villagization).

An implication of this is that long-standing and often polemical debates regarding the sustainability of inhabited versus uninhabited protected area management models may be of little consequence to real decisions about protected area displacement. Protected area-oriented literature, therefore, may be focused too much on what displacement decisions should be based rather than on what decisions are actually based. If academic debates do not address the actual factors influencing displacement decisions, we may be missing an opportunity to understand and influence such decisions in the future.

Although displacement decision-making may be influenced by factors much more powerful than “protected area” or “sustainability” issues, protected area management organizations and conservation NGO’s will likely be forced to take responsibility for the often negative consequences of protected area displacement. If protected area

management organizations and conservation NGO's are unaware of these more powerful factors they may be unintentionally negligent in any harm caused to people or the environment as a result of displacement decisions. If, however, such organizations are aware of these more powerful factors, they may more effectively influence decision-making. The implication remains, however, that regardless of the factors influencing displacement decision-making, protected area management organizations and conservation NGO's will likely be held responsible.

## **7.4 Limitations**

There were numerous limitations to this study. These limitations are detailed in this section and can be summarized as the following: limitations of the case study design; limitations to my ability to fully explore "chains of explanation;" limitations imposed by sensitive relationships between myself and research participants; and other challenges and limitations related to remoteness of the study site, lack of prior context-specific research, access to consultants and higher level government and other officials, and translation.

### **7.4.1 Limitations of the case study design**

Despite employing a research methodology that enabled in-depth investigation of the particularities of a case *and* the ability to generalize, I am limited in the type of generalizations I can make. The extended case methods enables me to generalize to theory, but not to other similar cases. The ability to generalize to other similar cases would enhance the practical application of this research and therefore make this research more useful to on-the-ground practitioners. I am, however, able to contribute to

generalizable debates about people, protected areas, and displacement as well as possibly advance the development of an application-oriented framework, IRR. I believe this was a worthwhile trade-off.

#### **7.4.2 Breaking the chains of explanation**

I focused my multi-scale investigation on a particular event that I wanted to understand—district actions to promote the displacement and resettlement of BNP-area communities. I then sought understanding of this event backwards in time and up, down, and across political scales (Vayda 1999). In doing so I was seeking understanding of why this event occurred and what the consequences of it were for affected people.

One challenge for any researcher adopting such an approach is that there is potentially no limit to how connected a particular issue is to various factors of influence or contextual variables. While the IRR framework and the power perspectives gave me some sense of boundaries of investigation, these boundaries could have been as wide or as narrow as I had the capability to make them. At certain points, I made conscious decisions to stop my investigations of certain chains of explanation.

I have no doubt that there were additional factors influencing displacement decision-making in this case and that the factors that I discuss could be more deeply explored. With regard to certain issues, this limits my ability to address relevant and important displacement issues.

As example, the findings of this research could be interpreted as being in line with the often-made claim regarding World Bank projects involving resettlement that failures to abide by safeguard or other similar policies are due to various borrower weaknesses (see Rew et al. 2000 for an overview of such claims). While the implications of this

study may help inform debates regarding the relationship between or relative “fault” of the World Bank versus borrower governments with regard to poorly handled resettlement, this study largely focused on one side of this debate—that of borrower weaknesses. Dynamics within the World Bank or between the World Bank and the Government of Mozambique went largely unexplored. The findings of this study, therefore, should not be interpreted to mean that “fault” should necessarily lie with the Mozambican government.

#### **7.4.3 Limitations of this case: sensitive relations with research participants**

As I explained in Chapter III, one of the many challenges of conducting research on displacement decision-making in BNP was that I was investigating a process that was still unfolding. Many key actors involved were not aware that displacement was occurring in BNP. I was confronted with a dilemma regarding whether or not I should inform key actors that displacement was occurring. And if I were to inform key actors, which actors should I inform, what information should I provide, and when? I determined that either informing or not informing key actors was going to influence the phenomenon that I was investigating. I also determined, in line with my methodological framework, that my influence on the phenomenon under study was not necessarily negative or to be controlled for; instead my relationships with research participants were part of the phenomenon that I was investigating. I further determined that I did not and could not have full awareness of exactly how my actions and inactions would be influential. I eventually made my decisions to inform, not inform, and to strategically wait to inform key actors based on two, occasionally conflicting objectives: 1.) to do no

harm to research participants and others and 2.) to rigorously pursue the objectives of this research.

I like to believe that I achieved the first objective (notwithstanding great debate regarding what constitutes “harm” and how direct or indirect harm must be). I recognize, however, that I do not know the full implications (harmful or not) of my own decisions and actions as a researcher.

With regard to my second objective—to rigorously pursue the objectives of this research—I believe that my actions in response to the situation described above limited my abilities to achieve this objective. As described in Chapter III, I informed key actors within the Government of Mozambique’s TFCA Unit about the displacement situation in the BNP area. As one TFCA Unit employee explained to me, and as I observed to be the case with other TFCA Unit employees, this placed employees of the TFCA Unit in a defensive position. Many subsequent conversations with TFCA Unit employees often involved them deflecting responsibility for displacement decisions and actions. These conversations helped me understand some of the complexities involved that were external to the TFCA Unit, but this did not enable me to fully investigate issues that might have been internal to the TFCA Unit.

In other cases, such as with consultants, government employees from other directorates or ministries, and other research participants, I did not inform actors of displacement decisions and actions in the BNP area. This was a limitation because I was not able to have forthright conversations with such actors regarding the specific causes or consequences of displacement. Instead, I asked very broad questions and engaged in



conversations about context-independent factors of influence and consequences, such as those relating to policy.

In even other cases when I knew that informing certain key actors could have significant implications, I cautiously and strategically timed my divulgence of information. This was the case with regard to employees from the World Bank. As example, before interacting with the World Bank, I asked for and received permission to communicate with the World Bank from employees of Mozambique's protected area management agency and the TFCA Unit. This was a limitation because it left me little time and resources to fully explore the situation from the perspective of World Bank employees.

The sensitivity of the situation under investigation also influenced my ability to interact with BNP-area residents. Some BNP-area residents were noticeably reserved in speaking with me. As example, in my first meeting with people in Hlecane, the community leaders first questioned my affiliations with government and asked me if I knew the government's intentions with regard to displacement. After I explained, truthfully, that I knew little more than they did, the community leaders politely explained to me that they did not want to talk about the current displacement. In later meetings, community leaders and others from Hlecane were more open to talking about the situation.

Despite the sensitive nature of this research and the limitations it imposed, I believe that BNP was an excellent case on which to focus my research. The sensitivities involved in my relationships with research participants as well as the sensitivities I

observed between research participants was much more revealing than it was concealing; my research was a beneficiary of these revelations.

#### **7.4.4 Other challenges and limitations**

Along with the limitations mentioned above, the general research context was challenging and also imposed limitations. The BNP area is very remote; travel to and around the BNP area was very difficult and, at times, limited the time we spent actually conducting research. There had been little to no prior research conducted in the BNP area. In fact, this was the first piece of academic work conducted regarding BNP. Nearly all of the BNP-specific literature I found was from recent consultancy reports. I was unable, however, to contact a key consultant who had led most of the socially-oriented projects in the BNP area; my numerous e-mails and voice messages were either not received or not answered.

Access to key high-level actors in government, the World Bank, and others was often difficult. Initial contact with certain key actors was challenging and appointments, when I could arrange them, were often cancelled. This limited my ability to fully investigate issues at higher political levels.

Finally, language presented a great challenge. I have limited abilities in Portuguese—the official language in Mozambique—and virtually no understanding of Shangaan—the language spoken in and around BNP. While my translator and research assistant was highly capable, we often experienced miscommunications.

### **7.5 Suggestions for future research**

The IRR framework has and will likely continue to function in the managerial roles for which it was intended. By situating IRR within an investigation of the causes of displacement in a particular context, I added a political dimension to the IRR framework. Adding an explicit political dimension to IRR produced a greater understanding of how and why affected people were being exposed to impoverishment risks. The theoretical connections between context, causes, and consequences of displacement, however, remain vague. I do not propose that these connections be modeled, per se, but that the connections be more deeply explored and refined so as to develop a more explicit framework for research and possibly for applied social impact assessments.

Further, in-depth, desktop research is needed to clarify or at least be more explicit about the conceptualization of risk in displacement literature. Cernea (2000), Dwivedi (2002), and deWet (2004) provide a good start to this discussion; however, additional clarification is needed.

Further investigation is also needed to understand how poverty reduction and conservation agendas interact at international, national, and local political scales. While there are academic debates regarding the relationship between the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Millennium Development Goals at an international scale, these international agreements play out differently at national and local scales and in different contexts. Further research should focus on how such international agreements are operationalized in relation to one another and to what extent the intentions of such agreements remain intact at national and local scales.

Finally, a major weakness of the displacement and resettlement literature is that most research focuses on cases of displacement and resettlement that have already

occurred, and oftentimes, occurred many years before research began. This research is unique in that I was investigating a case of displacement and resettlement at a very early stage in the process. And the process is still continuing. This presents an opportunity for a longitudinal study of the causes and consequences of displacement and resettlement. Such a study would help fill a gaping hole in displacement research.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abbot, J. I.O., D.H.L. Thomas, A. A. Gardner, and S.E. Neba and M.W. Khen. 2001. Understanding the Links Between Conservation and Development in the Bamenda Highlands, Cameroon. *World Development* 29, no. 7: 1115-36.
- Abrahamsson, H. and A. Nilsson 1995. *Mozambique: The Troubled Transition from Socialist Construction to Free Market Capitalism*, trans. Mary Dally. London: Zed Books.
- Adams, J. 1995. *Risk*. London: UCL Press.
- Agrawal, A. and C. Gibson. 1999. Enchantment and Disenchantment: The Role of Community in Natural Resource Conservation. *World Development* 27, no. 4: 629-49.
- Agrawal, A. and K. Redford. 2007. Conservation and Displacement. In *Protected Areas and Human Displacement: A Conservation Perspective*, eds. K. Redford and E. Fearn, 4-15. Bronx, NY: Wildlife Conservation Society.
- Agrawal, A. and C. Gibson. 2001. *Communities and the Environment: Ethnicity, Gender, and the State in Community-Based Conservation*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Alpert, P. 1996. Integrated Conservation and Development Projects: Examples from Africa. *BioScience* 46, no. 11: 845-55.
- Amend, S. and T. Amend. 1995. *National Parks without people? The South American Experience*. Gland: IUCN.
- Anstey, S. 2001. Necessarily Vague: The political economy of community conservation in Mozambique. In *African Wildlife & Livelihoods: The promise and performance of community conservation*, eds. D. Hulme and M. Murphree, 74-87. Cape Town, South Africa: David Philip Publishers.
- Arce, A. and N. Long. 2000. *Anthropology, development and modernities: Exploring discourses, countertendencies and violence*. New York: Routledge.
- Barrett, C.B. and P. Arcese. 1995. Are Integrated Conservation-Development Projects (ICDPs) Sustainable? On the Conservation of Large Mammals in Sub-Saharan Africa. *World Development* 23, no. 7: 1073-84.
- Barutciski, M. 2000. *Addressing Legal Constraints and Improving Outcomes in Development-induced Resettlement Projects*. Final report to DfID. Oxford: Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford.

- Bebbington, A . 1999. Capitals and Capabilities: A Framework for Analyzing Peasant Viability, Rural Livelihoods and Poverty. *World Development* 27, no. 12: 2021-44.
- Beck, U. 1992. *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity*. Thousand Oaks CA: Sage Publications.
- Belsky, J.M. 1999. Misrepresenting Communities: The Politics of Community-Based Rural Ecotourism in Gales Point Manatee, Belize. *Rural Sociology* 64, no. 4: 611-66.
- Belsky, J.M. 2004. Contributions of Qualitative Research to Understanding the Politics of Community Ecotourism. In *Qualitative Research in Tourism*, eds. J. Phillimore and L. Goodson, 273-291. New York: Routledge.
- Bendix, R. 1960. *Max Weber: An intellectual portrait*. New York: Doubleday & Company Inc.
- Blaikie, P. 1985. The political economy of soil erosion in developing countries. *A new approach - with new problems*. Piers Blaikie, 81-106. Harlow, Essex, England: Longman.
- Blaikie, P, and H. Brookfield. 1987. Defining and debating the problem. In *Land Degradation and Society*, eds. P. Blaikie and H. Brookfield London: Methuen.
- Bowen, M.L. 2000. *The State against the Peasantry: Rural Struggles in Colonial and Postcolonial Mozambique*. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia.
- Brandon, K. 1996. *Ecotourism and conservation: A review of key issues*. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Brandon, K. and M. Wells. 1992. Planning for People and Parks: Design Dilemmas. *World Development* 20, no. 4: 557-70.
- Bray, D.B., L. Merino-Perez, P. Negreros-Castillo, G. Segura-Warnoltz, J.M. Torres-Rojo, H.F.M. Vester. 2003. Mexico's Community-Managed Forests as a Global Model for Sustainable Landscapes. *Conservation Biology*. 17, no. 3: 672-77.
- Brechin, S.R., P.R. Wilshusen, C.L. Fortwangler, and P.C. West. 2003. *Contested Nature: Promoting International Biodiversity with Social Justice in the Twenty-first Century*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Brockington, D. and J. Igoe. 2006. Eviction for Conservation: A Global Overview. *Conservation and Society*. 4:424-470.
- Brockington, D., J. Igoe, and K. Schmidt-Soltan. 2006. Conservation, Human Rights, and Poverty Reduction. *Conservation Biology* 20, no. 1: 250-252.

- Bromley, D.W. 1994. Economic dimensions of community-based conservation. In *Natural Connections: Perspectives in community-based conservation*, eds. D. Western and R.M. Wright, 428-47. Washington, DC: Island Press.
- Brosius, J. P., and D. Russell. 2003. Conservation from above: an anthropological perspective on transboundary protected areas and ecoregional planning. *Journal of Sustainable Forestry* 17, no. 1/2: 39-65.
- Brosius, J.P., A. Lowenhaupt Tsing, and C. Zerner. 1998. Representing Communities: Histories and Politics of Community-Based Natural Resource Management. *Society and Natural Resources*, 11, no. 2: 157-69.
- Brown, K. 1998. The Political Ecology of Biodiversity, Conservation and Development in Nepal's Terai: Confused Meanings, Means and Ends. *Ecological Economics* 24: 73-87.
- Brown, K. 2002. Innovations for Conservation and Development. *The Geographical Journal* 168, no. 1: 6-17.
- Bryant, Raymond L., and Sinead Bailey. 1997. *Third World Political Ecology*. London: Routledge.
- Burawoy, M. 1998. The Extended Case Method. *Sociological Theory*, 16, no. 1: 4-33.
- Cernea, M. 1990. *Poverty Risks from Population Displacement in Water Resources Development*, HIID Development Discussion Paper no. 355, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University.
- Cernea, M. 1995. Understanding and Preventing Impoverishment from Displacement: Reflections on the State of Knowledge. *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 8(3): 245-64.
- Cernea, M. 1997. The Risks and Reconstruction Model for Resettling Displaced Populations. *World Development*, 25(10): 1569-87.
- Cernea, M. 1999. *Economics of Involuntary Resettlement: Questions and Challenges*. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
- Cernea, M. 2000. Risks, safeguards, and reconstruction: A model for population displacement and resettlement. in *Risks and Reconstruction: Experiences of Resettlers and Refugees*. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
- Cernea, M. 2002. *For a new economies of resettlement: a sociological critique of the compensation principle, A working paper*. Ithica, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Cernea, M. and C. McDowell 2000 *Risks and Reconstruction: Experiences of Resettlers and Refugees*. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
- Cernea, M. and K. Schmidt-Soltau. 2003. Biodiversity Conservation versus Population

Resettlement: Risks to Nature and Risks to People. *Paper presented at The International Conference on Rural Livelihoods, Forests and Biodiversity.*

Cernea, M. and K. Schmidt-Soltau 2006. Poverty Risks and National Parks: Policy Issues in Conservation and Resettlement. *World Development*, 34 no.10:1808-1830.

Chambers, R. 1969. *Settlement Schemes in Tropical Africa*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Chambers, R. and G.R. Conway. 1992. *Sustainable rural livelihoods: Practical concepts for the 21st century*. London: Institute of Development Studies Discussion Paper 296.

Chatty, D. and M. Colchester. 2002. *Conservation and Mobile Indigenous Peoples: Displacement, Forced Settlement, and Sustainable Development*. New York: Berghahn Books.

Christensen, J. 2004. Win-Win Illusions. *Conservation in Practice* 5, no. 1: 12-27.

Clark, D.L. 2002. The World Bank and Human Rights: The Need for Greater Accountability. *Harvard Human Rights Journal*. Vol. 15: 205-226.

Clegg, S.R. 1989. *Frameworks of Power*. London: SAGE Publications.

Cortner, H. J. et al. 1996. Institutional Barriers and Incentives for Ecosystem Management: a Problem Analysis. *U.S. Forest Service General Technical Report PNW-GTR-354*. Portland, Oregon: Pacific Northwest Research Station.

deHaan, L. and A. Zoomers. 2005. Exploring the Frontier of Livelihoods Research. *Development and Change* 36, no. 1: 27-47.

deSatge, R. and A. Holloway. 2002. *Learning about livelihoods: insights from southern Africa*. Oxford: Periperi Publications.

deWet, C. 2001. Economic Development and Population Displacement: Can Everybody Win? *Economic and Political Weekly*. December 15: 4637-4646.

deWet, C. 2004. Why do things often go wrong in resettlement projects? in A. Pankhurst and F. Piguet (eds) *People, space and the State: Migration, Resettlement and Displacement in Ethiopia*. Addis Abbaba: The Ethiopian Society of Sociologists.

deWet, C. 2006. *Development-induced Displacement: Problems, Policies and People*. New York: Berghahn Books.

Downing, T.E. 2002. *Avoiding New Poverty: Mining-induced Displacement and Resettlement*. England: International Institute for Environment and Development.



- Dwivedi, R. 1999. Displacement, Risks and Resistance: Local Perceptions and Actions in the Sardar Sarovar. *Development and Change*, 30: 43-78.
- Dwivedi, R. 2002. Models and Methods in Development-induced Displacement (Review Article). *Development and Change*, 33(4):709-732.
- Erbas, S.N. 2004. Ambiguity, Transparency, and Institutional Strength. IMF Working Paper No. WP/04/115. Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=878939>
- Escobar, A. 1996. Constructing Nature: Elements for a post-structural political ecology. In *Liberation Ecologies: Environment, development, social movements*. eds. R. Peet, and M. Watts New York: Routledge.
- Esty, D.C., and M.H. Ivanova. 2002. *Global Environmental Governance: Options and Opportunities*. New Haven, CT: Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies.
- Falck, H., K. Landfald, and P. Rebelo 2003. Mozambique. *Development Policy Review*, 21:235-252.
- Ferraro, P.J., and A. Kiss. 2002. Direct Payments to Conserve Biodiversity. *Science* 298: 1718-19.
- Few, Roger. 2002. Researching actor power: analyzing mechanisms of interaction in negotiations over space. *Area* 34, no. 1: 29-38.
- Fox, J.A. and L.D. Brown 2000. *The Struggle for Accountability: The World Bank, NGOs, and Grassroots Movements*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
- Gebre, Y.D. and I. Ohta 2005. *Displacement Risks in Africa: Refugees, Reettlers and their Host Populations*. Kyoto, Japan: Kyoto University Press.
- Geisler, C. and R. de Sousa. 2001. From Refugee to Refugee: The African Case. *Public Administration and Development* 21: 159-70.
- Gezon, L. 1997. Institutional Structure and the Effectiveness of Integrated Conservation and Development Projects: Case Study from Madagascar. *Human Organization* 56, no. 4: 462-70.
- Ghimire, K. and M.P. Pimbert. 1997. *Social change and conservation : environmental politics and impacts of national parks and protected .* UK: Earthscan.
- Gibson, C. and T. Koontz. 1998. When "Community" Is Not Enough" Institutions and Values in Community-Based Forest Management in Southern Indiana. *Human Ecology* 26, no. 4: 621-47.
- Gibson, C. and S.A. Marks. 1995. Transforming Rural Hunters into Conservationists: An Assessment of Community-Based Wildlife Management Programs in Africa.

*World Development* 23, no. 6: 941-57.

Giddens, A. 1990. *The Consequences of Modernity*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Glaspell, Brian S. 2002. "Minding the Meaning of Wilderness: Investigating the tensions and complexities inherent in wilderness visitors' experience narratives." The University of Montana.

Guha, R. 1989. Radical American Environmentalism and Wilderness Preservation: A Third World Critique. *Environmental Ethics* 11: 71-83.

Gunder Frank, A. 1966. The Development of Underdevelopment. *Monthly Review* September: 17-31.

Gunderson, L.H., and C.S. Holling. 2002. *Panarchy: Understanding transformations in human and natural systems*. Washington, DC: Island Press.

Hajer, M.A. 1995. *The Politics of environmental discourse: Ecological modernization and the policy process*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Hanson, A. and A. Oliver-Smith 1982. *Involuntary Migration and Resettlement*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Hatton, J. et al. 2001. *Biodiversity and War: A Case Study of Mozambique*. Washington D.C.: Biodiversity Support Program

Hecht, S. and A. Cockburn. 1989. *The fate of the forest: Developers, destroyers and defenders of the Amazon*. London: Verso.

Honey, M. 1999. *Ecotourism and sustainable development: Who owns paradise?* Washington, DC: Island Press.

Hughes, R., and F. Flintan. 2001. *Integrating Conservation and Development Experience: A Review and Bibliography of the ICDP Literature*. London: International Institute for Environment and Development.

Hutton, J., W. Adams, and J. Murombedzi. 2005. Back to Barriers? Changing Narratives in Biodiversity Conservation. *Forum for Development Studies* 2: 341-70.

Isaacman, A. and B. Isaacman. 1983. *Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution, 1900-1982*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.

Keller, R. and M.F. Turek 1998. *American Indians and National Parks*. Tucson: University of Arizona Press.

Kellert, S.R., J.N. Mehta, S.A. Ebbin, and L.L. Lichtenfeld. 2000. Community natural resource management: Promise, rhetoric, and reality. *Society and Natural Resources* 13, no. 8: 705-15.

- Knight, F. 1965 (1921). *Risk, uncertainty and profit*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Koenig, D. 2001. *Toward Local Development and Mitigating Impoverishment in Development-induced Displacement and Resettlement*. Final Report. Prepared for ESCOR R7644 and the Research Programme on Development-induced Displacement and Resettlement organized by the Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford.
- Koenig, D. 2006. Enhancing Local Development in Development-induced Displacement and Resettlement Projects. in C. deWet (ed) *Development-induced Displacement and Resettlement: Problems, Policies and People*. New York: Berghahn Books. pp.105-140.
- Kramer, R., C. van Schaik, and J. Johnson. 1997. *Last Stand: Protected Areas and the Defense of Tropical Biodiversity*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Krueger, L. 2007. Protected Areas and Human Displacement: International Conventions, Policy, and Guidance. In K.H. Redford and E. Fearn (eds) *Protected Areas and Human Displacement: A Conservation Perspective*. Bronx: Wildlife Conservation Society.
- Lipton, M. 1977. *Why poor people stay poor: Urban bias in world development*. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press.
- Lockwood, M., G. Worboys, and A. Kothari 2006. *Managing Protected Areas: A Global Guide*. London: Earthscan.
- Logan, I.B. and W.G. Moseley. 2002. The political ecology of poverty alleviation in Zimbabwe's Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE). *Geoforum* 33: 1-14.
- Lukes, S. 1986. *Power*. New York: New York University Press.
- Mascia, M.B. and C.A. Claus 2007. Displacement in Marine Protected Areas: Making Sense of Social Change. In K.H. Redford and E. Fearn (eds) *Protected Areas and Human Displacement: A Conservation Perspective*. Bronx: Wildlife Conservation Society.
- Maniates, M. 1990. Organizational designs for achieving sustainability: The opportunities, limitations, and dangers of state-local collaboration for common property management. *First Annual meeting of the international association for the study of common property*.
- McCarthy, J. 2002. First World Political Ecology: Lessons from the Wise Use Movement. *Environment and Planning* 34: 1281-302.
- McCool, S.F. and G.H. Stankey. 2003. Advancing the dialogue of visitor management: Expanding beyond the culture of technical control. *Protecting Our Diverse*

*Heritage: George Wright Society Biennial Conference.*

- McDermott Hughes, D. 2005. Third Nature: Making Space and Time in the Great Limpopo Conservation Area. *Cultural Anthropology* 20, no. 2: 157-84.
- McDowell, C. 1996. *Understanding Impoverishment: The consequences of Development-induced Displacement*. Providence: Berghahn Books.
- McMichael, P. 2004. *Development and Social Change: A global perspective*. Thousand Oaks: Pine Forge Press.
- Mishler, E.G. 1990. Validation in Inquiry-Guided Research: The Role of Exemplars in Narrative Studies. *Harvard Educational Review*. 60:415-442.
- Mogelgaard, K. 2001. *Helping People, Saving Biodiversity: An Overview of Integrated Approaches to Conservation and Development*, Population Action International, Washington D.C..
- Moore, D.S. 1993. Contesting terrain in Zimbabwe's eastern highlands: political ecology, ethnography, and peasant resource struggles. *Economic Geography* 69, no. 4: 380-401.
- Moore, D.S. 1996. Marxism, culture, and political ecology: Environmental struggles in Zimbabwe's Eastern Highlands. In *Liberation Ecologies: Environment, development, social movements*, eds. R. Peet, and M. Watts, 125-47. London: Routledge.
- Murphree, M.W. 1999. Enhancing Sustainable Use: Incentives, Politics, and Science. *Berkeley Workshop on Environmental Politics* Berkeley: Institute of International Studies.
- Murphree, M.W. 1994. The role of institutions in community-based conservation. In *Natural Connections: Perspectives in community-based conservation*, eds. D. Western and R.M. Wright, 403-27. Washington, DC: Island Press.
- Nash, R. 1982. *Wilderness and the American Mind*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Nelson, M. 1973. *Development of Tropical Lands: Policy Issues in Latin America*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Neumann, R.P. 1992. Political Ecology of Wildlife Conservation in the Mt. Meru area of Northeast Tanzania. *Land Degradation and Rehabilitation* 3: 85-98.
- Neumann, R.P. and R.A. Schroeder. 1995. Manifest ecological destinies. *Antipode*, no. 27: 321-428.
- Neumann, Roderick P. 1997. Primitive Ideas: Protected Area Buffer Zones and the Politics of Land in Africa. *Development and Change* 28: 559-82.

- Neuman, W.L. 2003. *Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Methods*. Boston: Pearson Education, Inc.
- Newitt, M. 1995. *A History of Mozambique*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Newmark, W.D. and J.L. Hough. 2000. Conserving Wildlife in Africa: Integrated Conservation and Development Projects and Beyond. *BioScience* 50, no. 7: 585-92.
- Oates, J.F. 1999. *Myth and Reality in the Rain Forest: How Conservation Strategies are Failing in West Africa*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- O'Laughlin, B. 2002. Proletarianisation, Agency and Changing Rural Livelihoods: Forced Labour and Resistance in Colonial Mozambique. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 28, no. 3: 511-30.
- Oliver-Smith, A. 1996. Fighting for a place: The policy implications of resistance to resettlement. in C. McDowell (ed) *Understanding Impoverishment: The consequences of Development-induced Displacement*. London: Berghahn Books. pp. 77-98.
- Oliver-Smith, A. 2005. Applied Anthropology and Development-induced Displacement and Resettlement. in S. Kedia and J. vonWilligen (eds). *Applied Anthropology: Domains of Application*. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger. pp. 189-219.
- Oliver-Smith, A. 2006. Displacement, Resistance and the Critique of Development: From the Grass Roots to the Global. in C. deWet (ed) *Development-induced Displacement and Resettlement: Problems, Policies and People*. New York: Berghahn Books. pp. 141-179.
- Ortner, S.B. 1984. Theory in Anthropology since the Sixties. *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 26, no. 1: 126-66.
- Ostrom, E. 1986. A Method of Institutional Analysis. In *Guidance, Control, and Evaluation in the Public Sector*, eds. F.X. Kaufman et al. 459-475. New York: Walter de Gruyter.
- Ostrom, E. 1990. Analyzing Long-Enduring CPRs. In *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*, ed. E. Ostrom, 88-101. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Paulson, S. and L. Gezon. 2005. *Political Ecology across Spaces, Scales, and Social Groups*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Peet, R. 1998. *Modern Geographical Thought*. Oxford: Blackwell
- Peet, R. and M. Watts. 1996. *Liberation Ecologies: Environment, development, social movements*. New York: Routledge.

- Peet, R. and M. Watts. 1996. Liberation ecology: Development, sustainability, and environment in an age of market triumphalism. *Liberation ecologies: Environment, development, social movements*. Richard Peet, and Michael Watts, 1-45. London: Routledge.
- Peet, R. 1998. *Modern Geographical Thought*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
- Peluso, N.L. 1992. *Rich Forests, Poor People: Resource Control and Resistance in Java*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Picciotto, R., W. vanWicklin, and E. Rice 2001. *Involuntary Resettlement: Comparative Perspectives*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers
- Pincus, J.R. and J.A. Winters 2002. *Reinventing the World Bank*. Ithica: Cornell University Press.
- Pitcher, M.A. 2002. *Transforming Mozambique: The Politics of Privatization, 1975-2000*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Pretty, J. 2003. Social Capital and the Collective Management of Resources. *Science* 302.
- Redford, K. 2006. Personal communication
- Rew, A. et al. 2000. *Addressing Policy Constraints and Improving Outcomes in Development-Induced Displacement and Resettlement Projects*. Oxford: Refugee Studies Centre and the Department for International Development.
- Robbins, P. 2004. *Political Ecology: A Critical Introduction*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
- Rostow, W. 1960. *The stages of economic growth: A non-Communist Manifesto*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Runte, A. 1987. *National Parks: The American Experience*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska.
- Salafsky, N. and E. Wollenberg. 2000. Linking Livelihoods and Conservation: A Conceptual Framework and Scale for Assessing the Integration of Human Needs and Biodiversity. *World Development* 28, no. 8: 1421-38.
- Scmink, M. and C.H. Wood. 1987. The political ecology of Amazonia. In *Land at Risk in the Third World: Local Level perspectives*, eds. P. D. Little and M.M. Horowitz, 38-57. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Scudder, T. and E. Colson 1982. From welfare to development: A conceptual framework for the analysis of dislocated people. In A. Hanson and A. Oliver-Smith (eds) *Involuntary Migration and Resettlement*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

- Senge, P. 1990. *The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization*. New York: Doubleday.
- Siebert, S.F. and J.M. Belsky. 2002. Livelihood Security and Protected Area Management. *International Journal of Wilderness* 8: 38-41.
- Sporton, Deborah. 1998. *Poverty and Sustainable Livelihoods*. Windhoek: DFID.
- Stevens, S. 1997. *Conservation through Cultural Survival: Indigenous Peoples and Protected Areas*. Washington, DC: Island Press.
- Stonich, S.C. 1993. *"I am destroying the land!": The political ecology of poverty and environmental destruction in Honduras*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Stevens, S. 1997. *Conservation through Cultural Survival: Indigenous Peoples and Protected Areas*. Washington, DC: Island Press.
- Stolton, S. and N. Dudley. 1999. *Partnerships for Protection: New Strategies for Planning and Management for Protected Areas*. London: Earthscan.
- Terborgh, J. 1999. *Requiem for Nature*. Washington, DC: Island Press.
- Terborgh, J. 2004. Reflections of a Scientist on the World Parks Congress. *Conservation Biology*. 18:619-620.
- Tinley, K. Personal communication. July 10, 2006.
- Turton, D. 2002. Forced Displacement and the Nation-State. In J. Robinson (ed) *Development and Displacement*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Twyman, C. 2000. Livelihood Opportunity and Diversity in Kalahari Wildlife Management Areas, Botswana: Rethinking Community Resource Management. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 26, no. 4: 783-806.
- United Nations High Commission for Refugees. 2001. *50 years on: What future for refugee protection?* Mimeo. <http://www.hrw.org/campaign/refugees/text1.htm>. Accessed November 2006.
- Wallerstein, I. 1974. The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis. *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 16, no. 4: 387-415.
- Watts, M. 2000. Political Ecology. *A Companion to Economic Geography*, eds. E. Sheppard and T. J. Barnes, 257-74. Ames, IA: Blackwell Publishing.
- Wells, M., K. Brandon and L.J. Hannah. 1992. *People and parks: linking protected area management with local communities*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

- West, P.C. and S.R. Brechin. 1991. *Resident Peoples and National Parks: Social Dilemmas and Strategies in International Conservation*. Tucson: University of Arizona Press.
- West, P., C. Fortwangler, M. Simsik, V. Agbo, and N. Sokpon. 2003. The Political Economy of Ecotourism: Pendjari National Park and Ecotourism Concentration in Northern Benin. In *Contested Nature: Promoting International Biodiversity with Social Justice in the Twenty-first Century*, eds. S.R. Brechin, P.R. Wilshusen, C. Fortwangler, and P.C. West. New York: State University of New York Press.
- West, P., J. Igoe, and D. Brockington. 2006. Parks and Peoples: The Social Impact of Protected Areas. *Annual Review of Anthropology*. 35:251-277.
- Western, D., and M. A. Wright. 1994. *Natural Connections: Perspectives in Community-Based Conservation*. Washington, DC: Island Press.
- Western, David, and R. Michael Wright. 1994. The Background to community-based conservation. *Natural Connections: Perspectives in community-based conservation*. D. Western and R.M. Wright, 1-14. Washington, DC: Island Press.
- Wilkie, D.S., G.A. Morelli, J. Demmer, M. Starkey, P. Telfer, and M. Steil. 2006. Parks and People: Assessing the Human Welfare Effects of Establishing Protected Areas for Biodiversity Conservation. *Conservation Biology* 20, no. 1: 247-49.
- Willis, K. J., L. Gillson, and T. M. Brncic. 2004. How "Virgin" Is Virgin Rainforest? *Science* 304: 402-3.
- Wilshusen, P.R., S.R. Brechin, C.L. Fortwangler, and P.C. West. 2002. Reinventing a Square Wheel: Critique of a Resurgent "Protectionist Paradigm" in International Biodiversity Conservation. *Society and Natural Resources* 15: 17-40.
- Wilshusen, P.R. 2003. Exploring the Political Contours of Conservation: A conceptual view of power in practice. In *Contested Nature: Promoting International Biodiversity and Social Justice in the Twenty-first Century*, eds. S.R. Brechin, C. L. Fortwangler, P.C. West, and P.R. Wilshusen, 41-57. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
- Wilshusen, P.R. 2003. "Negotiating devolution: community conflict, structural power, and local forest management in Quintana Roo, Mexico." The University of Michigan.
- World Bank 1994. *Resettlement and Development: The Bank-wide Review of Projects involving Involuntary Resettlement 1986-1993*. Washington, DC: The World Bank, Environment Department.
- World Bank 2004. *Involuntary Resettlement Sourcebook: Planning and Implementation in Development Projects*. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
- World Bank. 2005. *Transfrontier Conservation Areas and Tourism Development*



*Project.* Project Appraisal Document, Report No: 32148-MZ. Washington DC: World Bank.

*World Bank Safeguard Policies* <http://web.worldbank.org> accessed August 10 2007.

World Commission on Dams 2000. *Dams and Development: A New Framework for Decision-making, a report to the World Commission on Dams.* London and Sterling, VA: Earthscan Publications

Young, E. 2001. State Intervention and Abuse of the Commons: Fisheries Development in Baja California Sur, Mexico. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 91, no. 2: 283-306.

Zimmerer, K.S. 1996. Discourses on soil loss in Bolivia. In *Liberation Ecologies: Environment, development, social movements*, eds. R. Peet, and M. Watts, 110-124. London: Routledge.

## **APPENDIX A**

### **Informed consent explanation**

Chad Dear is a graduate student from the United States of America (USA). He studies and does research in the social sciences at the University of Montana in Missoula, Montana, USA. Chad has come to Mozambique to do research on human settlement, resettlement, and livelihoods in this area. Chad is affiliated with the University of Eduardo Mondlane in Maputo. He also has permission from the director of the National Directorate for Conservation Areas and the director of the Provincial Directorate of Tourism to interview people here (include others we gain permission from). Chad is *not* doing development or any work for the government or any other organization.

Chad is working with Celso Inguane. Celso is a BA Honours student at the University of Eduardo Mondlane in Maputo. Celso is helping Chad with translation and other research activities.

Chad and Celso are asking for your permission to interview you about your history in this area, your current conditions, and what you think is best for your future. Specifically, Chad and Celso will ask you about where you live now and where you and your family and household have lived previously. We will also ask about past and present livelihoods, especially as they relate to the wetland.

Chad and Celso have no interest or desire to get land in Mozambique, so please do not fear answering these questions because you think they want to get land. Their only purpose in asking these questions is to learn about the past, present, and possible future of people in this region.

The interviews will take between one and two hours. Chad will use the information you share and join it with the information from other people to understand the whole area. The information collected from many people will be mixed together so that it is impossible to identify any individuals, families, or homesteads. In other words, your identity will always remain confidential and anonymous.

Chad and Celso will be taking notes during interviews/meetings. Sometimes, Chad and Celso will record interviews. If you prefer for the interview not to be recorded, that is fine. Chad and Celso record so that they do not miss any of your responses.

If you feel uncomfortable talking with Chad and Celso, you can refuse to participate. You are also free to refuse any particular questions, or stop the interview at any time with no penalty. But please understand that your identity will always be kept secret.

At the end of the research, Chad will write final reports. These reports will not identify any individuals or their answers. He will give these reports to community leaders and people interested in life in this region, to schools in your area, to students and other researchers in Mozambique and America, to Universities and to interested government organizations. Preparing the final report will take some time; perhaps as long as one year.

If you have any questions, you can ask them now or later. Or you can contact local leaders. Celso's phone number is 84 2279600. He resides in Maputo. Chad's phone number is 82 5782062. He temporarily resides at the University of Eduardo Mondlane in Maputo. Chad's permanent address is:

Chad Dear  
College of Forestry and Conservation  
University of Montana  
Missoula, Montana, 59812 USA  
chaddear@hotmail.com

## **APPENDIX B**

### **Interview protocol for BNP-area community leaders**

#### **Introduction**

1. Explain details of study including content and process
2. Present folder of documents including credentials, authorization forms, etc.
3. Ask for permission to conduct research in the community
4. Ask for informed consent to conduct an interview with the leadership present.

#### **Governance structure, demographics, and public services**

5. Are there other people you are working with in the leadership of this community?
  - a. What are their responsibilities? (be sure to ask about government and traditional leadership structures.
6. What is the name of this community?
  - a. Are there any other names
  - b. Does (name of community) involve any other places? Where? Explain.
  - c. Is (name of community) inside the park?
7. How many people live in (name of community)?
  - a. How are people organized on the landscape? Specifically ask if there is a village or villages, aggregates, or dispersed households?
8. How would you characterize the people that live in (name of community)?
  - a. Are there any differentiating characteristics within the people of (name of community)? Probe on language, ethnicity, origin, and religion.
9. Are the people of (name of community) different than the people of other nearby communities in terms of language, ethnicity, origin, religion, or in any other ways?
10. What groups of people within (name of community) are better off or worse off? Why?
  - a. What is it that better off groups have that worse off groups don't?
11. What public services are available to the people of (name of community)? How old are these and what is their condition?
  - a. Is there a school? Up to what grade?
  - b. Are there boreholes? Are they working?
  - c. Is there a clinic? Are there trained people working at the clinic?
  - d. Are the roads adequate to connect you to markets, resources, or other communities?
12. Do you think generally that conditions have improved or declined over the past ten years?

## **Livelihoods**

13. Can you tell us how people in (name of community) make a living?
  - a. What are the most important livelihood activities?
  - b. When are these activities practice?
  - c. Who practices these activities?
  - d. Do people trade or sell the products they grow, harvest, hunt or catch?
14. What do you call the area where the water fills when there is a major storm?
15. We are interested in understanding the role of the wetland and wetland resources in people's livelihoods. Is the wetland and the resources in and around the wetland important to the people of (name of community)? Explain.
  - a. Do people farm in or near the wetland? When, where, how, what?
  - b. Do people fish in the wetland? When, where, how, what?
  - c. Do people hunt in or near the wetland? When, where, how, what?
  - d. Do people graze livestock in or near the wetland? When, where, how, what?
  - e. Do people water their livestock in or near the wetland? When, where, how, what?
  - f. Do people gather water for their own consumption in or near the wetland? When, where, how, what?
16. We are interested in learning about how the wetland is managed.
  - a. Who is allowed to use wetland resources?
  - b. When can different groups use wetland resources?
  - c. Where in and around the wetland can they use resources?
  - d. How much can they take?
  - e. Why are these rules in place?
  - f. Who determines the rules? How are they enforced?
  - g. How are disputes settled?
  - h. Has the system of wetland management changed over the years? How? Why?
17. How do people use the resources from the wetland?
  - a. Do people sell or trade wetland resources?
    - i. How much of what people harvest do they sell or trade?
    - ii. Where (to whom) do they sell or trade goods?
18. Has the number of people with access to wetland resources increased or decreased in the last ten years?
  - a. How much? Why?
19. Is there anything that is making access and use of wetland resources more difficult?

## **Histories of inhabitation, displacement, and resettlement**

20. How long have people lived in (name of community)?
  - a. Why did people settle here initially?
21. Did people here work for the white cattle ranchers?

- a. Did people have to resettle because of the white cattle ranchers? (either move away from ranchland or move to work)
  - b. Did white cattle ranching affect the way people made a living?
  - c. Did white cattle ranching affect people's access to the wetland?
22. Did people move during the war?
- a. Where did they go? When?
  - b. When did people start returning?
  - c. Where did they return to? Why?
  - d. Has the return of people ended?
  - e. Did some people stay during the war?
  - f. Did others who were not from here before the war settle here after the war?
  - g. How did people's livelihoods change because of the war?
- If leaders bring up current efforts to resettle people, then ask:
23. When and how did you receive word that people should resettle?
- a. What were the reasons given to you for you to resettle?
  - b. Has government or an NGO provided or promised to provide any services?
  - c. How many people will be moving (out of total population)?
  - d. Are there some people who do not want to move? Why?
    - i. Will they be allowed to stay where they are if they want to?
  - e. How is displacement affecting livelihoods?

## APPENDIX C

### Household interview protocol, Phases I and II

Questions 1-6h were asked in all household interviews.

Note sex and approximate age of respondent, location of household, observations of material conditions of household.

1. Please explain the composition of your household.
2. How many of the children are in school?
3. Do you own any livestock? If so, what kind? How many?
4. Do you receive food, money, or other support from family or others who work outside of Hocuanhe?
5. Has your household ever received food donations? If so, when?
6. Establish timeline of places where the research participant has lived and the approximate dates of residence. Also explore the places and dates of respondents' ancestors' places and times of residence. Ask the following questions for each place of residence.
  - a. Was your household located in a village, an aggregate, or far from other households?<sup>58</sup>
  - b. From what source did you gather water?
    - i. How far was it from your household?
    - ii. Was it a reliable source?
    - iii. If this source ran dry, where would you find water?
    - iv. How often would you have to use your back-up?
  - c. Where was the location of your farm in relation to your household?
    - i. Did you always farm in the same plot?
    - ii. Did you ever farm in the wetland?
  - d. How far was your household from the wetland? Was the wetland important to you? Why? How did you use the wetland?
  - e. How far was your household from the school?
  - f. Could you tell me about some of good things about living in this specific place. Probe.
  - g. Could you tell me about some of the bad things about living in this specific place. Probe.
  - h. Why did you move?

Questions 7-18 were asked in phase II household interviews to Tchove residents who had or were in the process of resettling.

---

<sup>58</sup> If respondents had trouble answering this question, I would ask them to estimate the number of households that might be able to hear a rooster if it crowed from their household.

7. When did you move to this location?
8. Why did you move?
9. Do you think that life will be better for you here?
10. How do you plan to make a living here? How is this different than where you were living before?
11. How big is your farm now compared to the one you had before?
12. Do you feel secure on the land that you have moved to?
13. Was it difficult to construct your new home? Did you receive any help?
14. Do you think that you will have access to more or less food here than where you were before?
15. Do you think that you will have access to more or less areas for grazing and collecting forest products here than where you were before?
16. Where you were before, were there people who you relied on in bad times?
  - a. Are those people available to you here?
17. What are the biggest challenges of moving to a village?
18. What are the greatest potential benefits of moving to a village?

(I consistently asked probes relevant to the eight impoverishment risks identified in the IRR model.)



## APPENDIX D

### Planning and Policy Documents Analyzed

The following is a list of documents analyzed which are not directly cited in the dissertation text and do not appear in the bibliography. Citations are provided in as complete a form as is possible.

2005, December 15. *Development Credit Agreement (Transfrontier Conservation Areas and Tourism Development Project) between Republic of Mozambique and International Development Association*. Credit number 4130 MOZ.

2006 *Co-financing agreement for the development and management of the Banhine National Park, sub-project of the Transfrontier Conservation Areas and Tourism Development Project between the Ministry of Tourism (MITUR) and African Wildlife Foundation (AWF)*.

African Wildlife Foundation. March 2005. *Mozambique: Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable Natural Resource Management in the Limpopo Heartland*.

Development Alternatives Inc. *Community Participation in Banhine National Park Management Planning: Progress, Preliminary Results and Recommendations*. 02-0190PTR-018. Prepared for USAID Regional Center for Southern Africa under contract number PCE-1-00-99-00002-00 Task order #811.

Global Environment Facility. July 2004. *Transfrontier Conservation Areas and Tourism Development Project*. GEF Intersessional Work Program Submission. PO76809.

Holden, P. and D. Grossman. 2003. *Banhine Business Feasibility Study*. Busico cc, Phillapa Holden, David Grossman and Associates.

Lane, K. 2004. *Socio-Ecological Survey Limpopo Heartland*. Prepared for the African Wildlife Foundation. Hamilton-Fynch

*Regulations on the Law on Forestry and Wildlife*. Trans, Mozlegal and Nakosso. Maputo, Mozambique.

MPF/DNPO December 2003. *Decentralisation Planning and Budget*. Maputo, Mozambique: Governmnet of Mozambique.

- Munthali, S. 2003. *Strategy Document: Limpopo Heartland*. White River, South Africa: African Wildlife Foundation.
- Norton, P. and A.M. Loforte. February 2005. *Mozambique Transfrontier Conservation Areas and Tourism Development Project, Project Report: Environmental and Social Management Framework*.
- Republic of Mozambique. April 2001. *Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty 2001-2005 (PARPA)*. Strategy document for the reduction of poverty and promotion of economic development. Maputo.
- Republic of Mozambique. May 2006. *Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty 2006-2009 (PARPA II)*. Maputo.
- Republic of Mozambique, Ministry of Tourism. June 2006. *Principles for Administration of Protected Areas in Mozambique*. Maputo.
- Republic of Mozambique, Government of Gaza. October 2006. *Strategic Development Plan, Gaza Province*. With technical assistance from UNDP and FAO.
- Stalmans, M. March 2004. *Parque Nacional de Banhine, Mozambique: Ecological and Social Facets*. Powerpoint presentation prepared for African Wildlife Foundation.
- Tinley, K. 10, September 2001. *Gaza and Banhine*. Facsimile transmission to Dr. Jeremy Anderson. 7 pages.
- Tvedten, I., M. Paulo, and C. Rosario. 2006. *Opitanha: Social Relations of Rural Poverty in Northern Mozambique*. CMI Report. CHR. Michelsen Institute.
- Von Maltitz, G.P., M. Souto, I. Naicker, J. Cooper, J. Muller, and E. vanWyk. 2003. *Mozambique Transfrontier Conservation Areas (TFCA) and Institutional Strengthening Project: Describing Existing Land Use Practices and Determining Land Use Options for the Interstitial Areas of the Greater Limpopo TFCA*. CSIR in conjunction with Austral Consultoria e Projectos, Ltd (ACP) of Maputo.
- World Bank. 2003. *Mozambique – Transfrontier Conservation Areas Pilot and Institutional Strengthening Project*, Integrated Safeguards Data Sheet. 25633. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- World Bank. 2003. *Mozambique – Transfrontier Conservation Areas Pilot and Institutional Strengthening Project*, Project Information Document. PID11612. Washington, DC: World Bank.

- World Bank. 2004. *Mozambique – Transfrontier Conservation Areas Pilot and Institutional Strengthening Project*, Implementation Completion and Results Report. 28382. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- World Bank. 1996. *Mozambique – Transfrontier Conservation Areas Pilot and Institutional Strengthening Project*, GEF Project Document. 15534. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- World Bank. 2005. *Mozambique – Transfrontier Conservation Areas Pilot and Institutional Strengthening Project*, Environmental Assessment. E1160. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- World Bank. 2001. *Mozambique – Transfrontier Conservation Areas Pilot and Institutional Strengthening Project*, Resettlement Plan. RP327. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- World Bank. 2005. *Mozambique – Transfrontier Conservation Areas Pilot and Institutional Strengthening Project*, Integrated Safeguards Data Sheet. AC1518. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- World Bank. 2005. *Mozambique – Transfrontier Conservation Areas Pilot and Institutional Strengthening Project*, Project Information Document. 32720. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- World Bank. 2005. *Mozambique – Transfrontier Conservation Areas Pilot and Institutional Strengthening Project*, Project Appraisal; Document. 32148. Washington, DC: World Bank.